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This thesis is an empirical investigation into the control mechanisms of headquarters 
(HQ) exercised over their subsidiaries and is conducted with the help of primary data 
collected from 147 Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) operating in the kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia (KSA). Following on from the literature review, this study proposed that 
the headquarters–subsidiary mechanisms could be linked to agency theory (with the 
‘classical’ principal–agent relationship as its core) and to resource dependency theory 
(implying relations between the subsidiary and other partners based on 
interdependence). Our results show that the agency and resource dependency 
mechanisms are indeed used side by side and complementary to each other to exercise 
control.  
The Headquarters–subsidiary model used in this study has four components of control 
in it: personal centralised control (PCC), bureaucratic formalised control (BFC), 
output control (OUT) and informal control (INFO). These controls (as an agency 
mechanism) provide a solid platform on which other mechanisms can be built. The 
complementarities of these control mechanisms may be linked to earlier studies that 
show that successful organisations combine tight control with more open, informal 
and flexible information and communication exchanges. A focus that bends too much 
towards formal control or too much towards informal control may threaten a 
company’s existence. Our research provides an empirical explanation on this premise. 
The study found that Anglo-Saxon countries heavily use impersonal types of control 
mechanisms, specifically bureaucratic formalised control and output control. 
Compared to the US, the level of control in Oriental subsidiaries is less; or, put 
differently, the latter enjoy a greater degree of autonomy than US subsidiaries. Once a 
unit is operational, Oriental parent companies grant many more degrees of freedom 
than US parent companies. When we deconstructed the results for Europe, comparing 
German and British MNEs as a group to Oriental MNEs, we found that the latter 
exercised greater overall control. With regard to output and bureaucratic control, we 
found that both US MNEs and those from the Middle East exercised greater control 







The study drew the aspect of international transfers into the picture and investigated 
the role of expatriates in controlling subsidiaries. It has been recognised that 
expatriates can form both direct and indirect means of control. In executing direct 
types of control, expatriates directly supervised decisions taken at subsidiaries. The 
study found that this role is particularly strong in MNEs from Asia-Pacific countries 
and German MNEs, and is much less important in subsidiaries of Anglo-Saxon 
MNEs. 
We found that subsidiaries of German MNEs experienced a very high level of control; 
indeed, the only control mechanism that German MNEs did not implement among 
subsidiaries was control by socialisation and networks. German and Japanese MNEs 
are perhaps more rooted in business systems concerned with the management of 
issues internationally than American or British companies. The second group 
reflected that Anglo-Saxon countries heavily used impersonal types of control 
mechanisms, specifically bureaucratic formalised control and output control. When 
we deconstructed the results for Europe, comparing German and British as a group to 
Oriental MNEs, reveals the latter as possessing greater overall control. With regard to 
output and bureaucratic control, we found that both US MNEs and those from the 
Middle East exercised greater control than Oriental MNEs.  
Headquarters can strategize to implement control by the informal and social means 
method by positioning a sizeable number of managers from the home country within 
the subsidiary. Indeed, our results revealed this as true. It seems that their presence 
has positive and significant effects on most levels of control: personal, output, 
bureaucratic and informal. Contrary to this, however, we found that the presence of a 
sizeable number of expatriates (as opposed to headquarters managers) leaded to 
greater autonomy in subsidiaries.  
In terms of strategy and structure, we indicated that the three distinct organisational 
models identified for MNEs could be recognised in our study. Control INFO was 
significantly, positively related to global strategy, multi-domestic and transnational 
strategy compared with PCC, BFC, and OUT control mechanism. Conversely, BFC 
had a significant, negative and weak relationship with global strategy and 







however, we can deduce the existence of a tendency for global, transnational and 
multi-domestic MNEs to use indirect control mechanisms and informal control suited 
to their integrated organisational models to a larger extent. 
 
Our results confirmed previous studies in the field of organisation theory, in the sense 
that size is an important explanatory factor for differences in control mechanisms. In 
contrast to these studies, however, a dominant effect was found only for the indirect 
control mechanisms. Few detailed studies that have investigated the effect of size on 
the two indirect control mechanisms; in actuality, most previous studies have focused 
on the direct control mechanisms (personal centralised control and bureaucratic 
formalised control) only. As such, our study reconfirmed the importance of the 
variable size, but concluded that it is mainly associated with higher levels of indirect 
control. The age of the subsidiary does not seem to have a significant influence on the 
type of control mechanism that is exercised by headquarters towards a particular 
subsidiary. 
Our study investigated the importance of various MNE characteristics in an attempt to 
explain performance differences between MNEs. The advantage of this study is that 
many of the characteristics that have been identified in previous literature as being 
important factors influencing performance were included in our research design, in 
order for us to be able to answer the other research questions. This therefore allowed 
us to assess the relative importance levels of different variables in explaining 
performance differences between companies, such as: country of origin, industry, 
size, interdependence, local responsiveness, knowledge flows, and the strategy and 
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CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction 
This research investigates control mechanisms in multinational enterprises (MNEs). The 
current study is a logical consequence of extant empirical research carried out in the field of 
international management (O’Donnell, 2000; Gupta & Govindarjan, 2000; Chang & Taylor, 
1999; Nohria & Ghoshal, 2006; Birkinshaw & Hood, 1998; Birkinshaw, Hood & Young, 
2005; Yamin & Andersson, 2011). It focuses on the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) not 
only due to the growing role played by KSA (as an attractive and emerging market) but also 
due to the fact that previous, large-scale empirical studies have mainly studied Anglo-
American, Japanese, Korean or Malaysian headquarters’ perspectives (see, for example, 
Edwards, Ahmad & Moss, 2002; Gammeltoft, Barnard & Madhok, 2010; Park, Mitsuhashi & 
Fey, 2003; Rugman & Oh, 2008). 
 
The researcher is enthused by the work of Edstrom and Galbraith (1977b), who analysed the 
international transfer of managers in four MNEs. One of these MNEs transferred a far greater 
number of managers than its direct competitors, despite the organisations being 
approximately the same size, operating in the same industry and having nearly identical 
organisational charts. The authors hypothesised that this company used the international 
transfer of managers to develop a process of control based on socialisation and informal 
communication
1
.   
 
Since the publication of their research, and especially during the last decade, the number of 
studies on both control mechanisms and international transfers within MNEs has increased 
considerably (Persson, 2006). Concurrent with developments in general management theory 
(the learning organisation, the network organisation, the ‘end of bureaucracy’ and the firm as 
a brain), the general idea is that more and more MNEs are (or should be) moving towards 
becoming loosely coupled network organisations (Doz & Prahalad, 2007; Pérez-Nordtvedt et 
al., 2010). In such organisations, the management of human resources is of paramount 
                                                 
1
 Wiechmann (1974) mentions that people transfers (including for long-term assignments) enhance corporate 
acculturation, which is seen as an alternative to centralisation in integrating multinational marketing activities. 
The work of Edstrom and Galbraith (1977b) is the main source that is consistently cited in publications on 
control/coordination in MNEs. 




importance (Wang et al., 2009), and the emphasis on coordination is said to shift from formal 
to more informal and subtle mechanisms (Harzing & Noorderhaven, 2009). 
 
Within this informal or subtle type of coordination, the international transfer of managers is 
often claimed to play a key role (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 2002; Roth, & O’Donnell, 1996). 
However, the role of international transfers in this type of coordination has little empirical 
evidence. Most authors simply refer to Edstrom and Galbraith (1977b) to substantiate their 
arguments. Therefore, it appears to be a worthy subject for further empirical investigation, 
especially in an area such as the Middle East (Mellahi, Demirbag & Riddle, 2011; Soltani & 
Wilkinson, 2011). 
  
It is important to note that the use of international transfers should not be considered in 
isolation: in spite of its acclaimed importance, it is only one of the many ways to control  
MNEs. This thesis provides a broader picture by considering a variety of control 
mechanisms, exploring their application in various circumstances and relating them to other 
MNE characteristics in configuration analysis. 
 
1.2 Aim and objectives of the study 
As stated, the purpose of this study is to carry out an empirical examination of the types and 
degrees of control exerted by MNEs on their foreign subsidiaries located in KSA. Applying 
agency theory
2
 and organisational theory, the study conceptualises and tests the types and 
degrees of control imposed by headquarters (HQs) that are located in a relatively stable 
environment on their affiliated entities in KSA. A thorough review of the literature, as well as 
analyses of similar conceptual setups in different empirical contexts, will help in developing 
an adequate framework and subsequently deriving hypotheses. It should also help to reveal, 
through empirical testing, whether and to what extent certain structural and environmental 
properties moderate the types and degrees of control that are exercised by important 
organisations to coordinate their actions, interests and goals with their affiliated entities 
abroad. The main objective of the present work, therefore, is to apply a theoretical set of 
propositional arguments to a new empirical context in order to examine and contrast these 
arguments’ predictive ability and limitations. The study aims to contribute not only to the 
process of theory development through theory testing but also to our understanding of the 
                                                 
2
 For an overview, see Jensen and Meckling (1976), Kim and Kim (2005) and Mudambi and Pedersen (2007). 




control that MNEs use to monitor their affiliated entities, as well as the circumstances that 
influence the usage of control and to what extent the subsidiary will have more power. The 
contribution of this study is based on the development of a comprehensive theoretical 
framework that examines the factors that focus on HQ–subsidiary relations in MNEs 
operating in KSA. To the best knowledge of the researcher, this is the first time such a 
theoretical framework has been tested empirically and theoretically in the context of KSA. 
Many previous studies have focused on MNEs from one country of origin (usually the US). 
The present study explicitly addresses this limitation by including MNE HQs in a range of 
different countries. 
1.3 Research questions  
When considering the research opportunities related to control mechanisms in MNEs, several 
questions come to mind. First, is the informal and subtle type of control described above the 
control mechanism of the future, as it might be thought of as a rather expensive and indirect 
way to coordinate a company? Are there certain companies or parts of companies 
(subsidiaries) that would be better managed with more direct and possibly less expensive 
control mechanisms? More specifically, is it possible to distinguish the characteristics of both 
HQs and subsidiaries of MNEs that might explain the differences in the application of control 
mechanisms between and within MNEs? This leads to the first research question: 
Which characteristics of the HQs and subsidiaries of MNEs could explain the differences in 
the types of control mechanisms that are used by HQs towards their subsidiaries? 
In the international management literature, the topic of control has been a source of 
considerable discussion, which has resulted in a large number of publications on HQ–
subsidiary relationships. Most of these studies have been limited in the sense that they have 
considered only one or two control mechanisms and/or a limited number of predictor 
variables (HQs and subsidiary characteristics). Further, many previous studies have focused 
on MNEs from one country of origin (usually the US). The present study explicitly addresses 
these limitations by identifying and including a full range of control mechanisms and 
predictor variables. In addition, MNE HQs in a range of different countries and subsidiaries 
located in one country are included in the empirical part of this study. Finally, some variables 
that have previously been overlooked in previous research (like the industry in which the 




MNE operates) are used as predictor variables. As indicated above, the study focuses on 
international transfers as an informal and indirect type of control mechanism.  
The second research question is related to the specific way that MNE subsidiaries are 
controlled. The contrast between the general acceptance of the role of expatriation, as an 
informal control mechanism, and the lack of solid empirical confirmation of this relationship 
requires further quantitative measurement. However, expatriates could very well play a role 
in directly controlling subsidiaries, and there might be alternatives to international transfers in 
achieving a high level of informal control in MNE subsidiaries. Therefore, the second 
research question is formulated as follows: 
What role do international transfers play in controlling MNE subsidiaries? Are there 
alternative ways to achieve a high level of informal control in MNE subsidiaries? 
To date, very few studies in the international management literature have tried to derive and 
test the configurations of MNEs. These studies (e.g. Nohria & Ghoshal, 2006; Roth & 
O’Donnell, 1996) have focused on a limited number of variables. Bartlett and Ghoshal (2002) 
performed the most extensive configuration-type analysis. Their study, however, was based 
on case studies of only nine MNEs. The present study provides a valuable extension in this 
respect. An important assumption of configuration analysis is that companies that show 
higher levels of internal consistency (that is, they conform to the ideal-type configurations 
more closely) should outperform companies with lower levels of consistency. In addition, 
performance implications (however they are measured) are the essence of most, if not all, 
research in the field of management studies. Since a company’s performance is influenced by 
a multitude of different factors, the final research question is formulated in a rather general 
way: 
Which of the MNE characteristics included in this study could be used to explain differences 
in performance between MNEs? 
Many of the characteristics identified in previous literature as being important factors 
influencing performance are included in the present study’s research design. This, therefore, 
allows the study to assess the relative importance of variables such as country of origin, 
industry, size, strategy of the firm and knowledge flows in explaining performance 
differences between MNEs.  




1.4 The context of the study  
The Middle East has garnered its fair share of coverage in academic literature and current 
news. However, there has been a focus on political chaos and conflicts in the region 
(Kamalipour, 1997). Judging by the negative news coverage showing the Middle East as a 
region in continuous turmoil, one would expect it to be an inconsequential market for MNEs; 
regardless, the Middle East is home to many of the world’s largest MNEs – most of which 
enjoy sustained profitability from their operations in the region (Kavoossi, 2000). In actual 
fact, the list of MNEs operating in the region resembles a roster of the Fortune 500. In many 
sectors, MNEs have succeeded in establishing themselves as the dominant players, thereby 
controlling a significant share of the market in almost all Middle Eastern countries (Mellahi, 
Demirbag & Riddle, 2011). Over the past two decades, in their quest to join the World Trade 
Organization, generate jobs and upgrade their technological capabilities, the Middle Eastern 
governments have found themselves with few alternatives but to open their doors further to 
MNEs (Dasgupta, Keller & Srinivasam, 2002; Mellahi, Demirbag & Riddle, 2011). In the 
case of KSA, this is particularly relevant.  
 
The Saudi Arabian state was first established in the central region of the Arabian Peninsula in 
the early 18
th
 century. Modern Saudi Arabia was founded in 1932 by King Abdul Aziz Bin 
Abdul Rahman Al-Saud. On 23 September 1932, the country was named the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia (KSA). The nation experienced remarkable growth over a short period, spurred 
by the discovery of oil in the 1930s.  
 
KSA covers four-fifths of the Arabian Peninsula, approximately 865,000 square miles; this is 
nearly six times the area of the British Isles, four times the area of France and about one-third 
of the area of the US. It is situated in close proximity to three continents (Asia, Africa and 
Europe), as it covers part of West Asia and is parallel to East Africa. It is bounded to the 
north by Jordan, Iraq and Kuwait; to the east by the Gulf, Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab 
Emirates; to the south by Oman and Yemen; and to the west by the Red Sea (Ministry of 
Information, 2009). 
 
Globally, KSA is ranked fourth for fiscal freedom, has the seventh most rewarding tax system 
and has the seventh freest labour market, according to the World Economic Forum (2008). 
Furthermore, KSA is one of the world’s 25 largest economies and is the largest economy in 




the Middle Eastern region (UNCTAD, 2011). It is one of the world’s fastest growing 
countries: per capita income was forecast to rise from $20,700 in 2007 to $33,500 by 2020 
(Ibid). In addition, KSA is the world’s fastest reforming business climate (Ibid). As the 
largest free market in the Middle East, KSA represents 25% of total Arab GDP, has 25% of 
the world’s oil reserves, is ranked thirteenth out of 181 countries for the overall ease of doing 
business, is ranked seventh in terms of the ease of paying taxes and is the largest recipient of 
foreign direct investment in the Arab world (World Bank, 2011). Owing to the increasing 
foreign investment in KSA, the study of foreign subsidiaries in KSA is important both in its 
own right and because of the possible generalisations that could be made for other foreign 
subsidiaries located in the Gulf or Middle Eastern region.  
1.5 Structure of the thesis  
It is difficult to compare many of the studies on control mechanisms in MNEs and the role of 
international transfers as a control mechanism, as the researchers use very different 
definitions, concepts, classifications and operationalisations. In order to benefit from previous 
research and to be able to extend previous studies, the thesis first provides an extensive 
literature review of the different kinds of organisational control mechanisms; of the 
environment, strategy and structure of MNEs; and, finally, of the subject of international 
transfers within MNEs. These three building blocks have largely developed as separate fields 
of research, usually broadly referred to as organisation studies, international management and 
expatriate management, respectively. Various authors have urged international management 
scholars to pay more attention to available organisation theory
3
, and research in the field of 
expatriate management is often claimed to lack an integrative and strategic perspective
4
 (see, 
for example, Spencer & Gomez, 2010; Adler & Hashai, 2007). This thesis, therefore, also 
plays an integral role in combining these different fields of research. As discussed above, the 
empirical part of the study investigates the application of control mechanisms by HQs from 
22 different countries with subsidiaries located in KSA.  
 
• Chapter 1 presents the literature review of the three building blocks of this study: 
control mechanisms, MNEs and international transfers.  
                                                 
3
 See, for example, Scott (1961) for an overview.  
4
 Later, the thesis will discuss the limitations of most research in the field of international transfers.  




• Chapter 2 combines these three building blocks into the three research questions 
identified previously. It focuses on control mechanisms in MNEs and puts special emphasis 
on the role of the subsidiary and its performance in this respect. 
• Chapter 3 gives the background of the theories that are implemented in the study, 
develops a framework for the research using the most appropriate model, reviews the 
variables in the HQ–subsidiary relationship and develops the hypotheses of the study.  
• Chapter 4 details the research design and methodology. It discusses the research 
procedures and describes the selection of the research method and the operationalisation of 
variables.  
• Chapter 5 explains the data management, data screening prior to analysis, 
demographic characteristics, factor loading and descriptive analysis.  
• This is followed by data analysis and results in chapter 6.  
• The literature review and the results obtained from this study are linked in chapter 7.  
• In chapter 8, the thesis concludes by explaining the study’s contributions, implications 
and limitations. It also offers future research recommendations and directions.  
1.6 Chapter Summary  
This chapter provides the background of this study and details of the motivation for 
conducting the research, as well as the aim and objectives of the thesis. Also, it presents a 
brief overview of the research methodology applied in this study in order to meet the 
research aim and objectives. Although the types and degrees of control exerted by MNEs on 
their foreign subsidiaries have been investigated by many researchers worldwide, there was a 
gap in the research.  
This thesis makes a contribution to the international business literature by developing an 
integrative framework that examines the different types of factors affecting headquarters–
subsidiary relationships. The study would be a valuable contribution to our understanding of 
the different mechanisms of headquarters–subsidiary relationships, with particular reference 
to the culturally rich Middle Eastern region. Thus, the main aim of this research is to assess 
the different types of control that headquarters can have over subsidiaries in MNEs and how 
these can affect the headquarters–subsidiary relationship, as well as the subsidiary’s 
performance. The empirical study has been carried out in a new cultural context of KSA. 
 




CHAPTER TWO LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
As indicated in the introduction, this study focuses on control mechanisms in MNEs and puts 
special emphasis on the role of the subsidiary and its performance in this respect. This first 
section, therefore, reviews the literature about control mechanisms, MNEs and international 
transfers. 
2.1 Control mechanisms in organisations 
In the discussion on the control mechanisms in MNEs, there are some fundamental questions 
that need answering, including: what is control? What is an organisation? What forms of 
control can be distinguished within organisations? To answer these questions, the differences 
between control and coordination are first examined. Subsequently, it is found that 
coordination is one of the major foundations of economic (organisation) theory. In relation to 
this, this section discusses different theories that claim that coordination can occur through 
either markets or organisations. Organisational theorists (e.g. Nohria & Ghoshal, 2006; 
Martinez & Jarillo, 2005), however, point out that different coordination or control 
mechanisms can be used within an organisation. Unfortunately, virtually every scholar has 
his or her own classification of control mechanisms. Therefore, these different approaches are 
discussed and synthesised into a coherent classification of control mechanisms based on the 
related literature.  
2.1.1 Control and coordination definitions 
In this section, we try to give a definition of control and coordination and if possible make a 
distinction between these two concepts. In order to do this, we include citations of a number 
of authors who tried to define control or coordination, and their relation to one another; 
2.1.2 Control  
 
“All formal organisations are concerned with how to channel human efforts towards the 
attainment of organisational objectives. The organisation employs a set of instruments and 
processes designed to influence the behaviour and performance of organisational members, 
groups, sub-units and/or the organisation as a whole towards goal congruence and goal 
achievement. The sets of instruments and processes are designated herein as either control 
systems or control instruments.” (leksell and Lindgren 1982).  
 




“Control within organisations is a process whereby management and other groups are able to 
initiate and regulate the conduct of activities so that their results accord with the goals and 
expectations held by those groups.” (Child, 1984:136). 
 
“Control is seen as having one basic function: to help ensure the proper behaviours of people 
in the organisation. These behaviours should be consistent with the organisation strategy, if 
one exists, which, in turn, should have been selected as the best path toward achievement of 
the organisation objectives. “(Merchant, 1985:4). 
 
“The term control refers to the mechanisms used to assure the execution of organisational 
goals and plans.” (Youssef, 1975:136). 
 
“According to Child (1984:117) control is essentially concerned with regulating the activities 
within an organisation so that they are in accord with the expectations established in policies, 
plans and targets. This is consistent with Baliga & Jaeger’s definition (1968) which states that 
the importance of control is to ensure“achievement of the ultimate purposes of the 
organisation” (Baliga & Jaeger, 1984:25). 
 
Two important elements stand out in these definitions of control. First, management can use 
it to direct behaviour of individuals in an organisation towards the goals of this organisation. 




“Coordination means integrating or linking together different parts of an organisation to 
accomplish a collective set of tasks.”(Van de Ven, Delbecq & Koenig, 1976: 322).  
 
“Coordination of sub-units may be defined as the function of insuring that sub-units 
behaviours are properly interwoven, sequenced and timed so as to accomplish some joint 
activity or task completion.”(Merchant, 1984:94). 
 
A mechanism of coordination is any administrative tool for achieving integration among 
different units within an organisation. Therefore, the terms mechanisms of coordination or 
mechanisms of integration can be used as synonyms.” (Martinez & Jarillo, 2005:490) 
 
The fundamental theme in the definition of coordination appears to be the integration, 
harmonisation or linkage of different parts of an organisation towards a common goal. In 
contrast to the definitions concerning control, the power element is much more implicit. The 
final aim, however, appears to be the same as in the definitions of control, namely the 
direction towards common organisational goals. 
So what is the difference between coordination and control? 
 
 




2.1.4 Control and coordination  
 
“Organisational control systems represent mechanisms that convey information to initiate and 
regulate individual activities. They are needed to integrate individual goals and organisational 
diversity to create order and coordination out of potentially diffuse individual behaviours and 
diverse interest” (Pucik & Katz 1986:122). 
 
On the relationship between coordination and control, coordination involves various means. 
These can be referred to as coordinating mechanisms, although it should be noted that they 
are as much concerned with control and communication. Mintzberg (1994) quotes Utterer 
(1965, p. 233): “recent developments in the area of control, or cybernetics, have shown 
control and coordination to be the same in principle”. Theoretically, however, we would 
argue that coordination refers to the tuning of different tasks or activities. Control refers to 
the ways and means by which coordination is monitored and preserved. In this view, control 
is instrumental in achieving coordination in organisations. “(Björkman & Li , 2004).  
These three citations point in the same direction: control is a means to achieve an end called 
coordination, which in turn leads towards the achievement of common organisational goals. 
Most of the definitions of control as reproduced above skip the coordination step and assume 
control to lead directly to the achievement of common organisational goals. In the remainder 
of this thesis, we use the term ‘control mechanisms’ as a means to achieve coordination. 
Numerous authors, who use the terms of control and coordination interchangeably (see 
among others Hennart 1991 ,2011 ; Martinez & Jarillo, 2005), consistently speak of 
“coordination and control mechanisms” (see for instance  Andersson 1996;  Spencer & 
Gomez 2010) or use yet other terms to denote the same idea: governance mechanisms or 
integrative mechanisms (Ghoshal & Nohria, 1993, Collis et al. 2007). We will, therefore, 
under the heading of control mechanisms, discuss a selection of all the classifications that 
bear any relationship with the assurance that common organisational goals or objectives are 
met. 
 
First, we start with the history. Why do we need coordination? In the next section, we see that 
the need for coordination is a relatively recent phenomenon, coming forth out of 
specialisation and the division of labour, maybe the most fundamental cornerstones of the 
modern economy. (Harzing, 2001).  
 





2.2 Different types of Control Mechanism 
In this section, we review the different control mechanisms that are distinguished by a variety 
of authors. As discussed before, we deal with both classifications that use the term “control” 
and “coordination” as long as the mechanisms have a bearing on the assurance that common 
organisational goals or objectives are met. Table 2-1 summarises the control/coordination 
mechanisms distinguished by various authors in both organisational theory and international 
management literature
5
. The different classifications have been fitted into four distinct 
categories that have been constructed heuristically in the process of comparing the various 
classifications. A full explanation of the various categories is given below. Of course, fitting 
all these classification into just four categories meant some stretching of definitions and it 
does not always do full justice to the contributions of different authors. However, in order to 
come to an effective classification and use all the different previous studies, we had to make 
some generalisations. The authors have been classified in historical order. Sometimes, 
authors use equivalent terms to characterise the same mechanism, or give further 





                                                 
5
 In addition, there are a large number of studies in the field of accounting (e.g.; Chow, Shields and Chan, 1991; 
Chow, Kato and Shields, 1994; Merchant, Chow & Wu, 1995; O'Connor, 1995) that discuss various 
classifications of control mechanisms or management control systems (as they are usually called in this field). 
Their perspective on control mechanisms is, however, fundamentally different from that used by the various 
authors in organisation and international management theory.  
 





Table 2.1 Control mechanisms distinguished by various authors 
Author Different types of control 
March/Simon (1958) coordination by feedback 
 
programs (activity coordination) 
 
 




control through personal 
supervision 
 
rules and regulations 
 
performance records (results 
achieved) 
recruitment and training 
 
Thompson (1967) coordination by mutual 
adjustment 
standardisation (routines or 
rules) 
 
coordination by plan 
(schedules) 






















Galbraith (1973) hierarchy rules and programs 
 
planned targets goal setting creating lateral relationships 
(direct 








 control by socialisation 
 
Ouchi(1979) behaviour control (direct 
personal 
surveillance) 
behaviour control (rules and 
procedures) 
output control clan control (indoctrination, 
socialisation 
 
















MerChant (1985/1996) action (centralisation) action (bureaucratic)  
 
personnel (a.o. selection, training, 
cultural  control) 
 









personal control mechanisms 
(socialisation 
PucikKatz (1986) centralisation (direct 
Intervention) 









policies & standards) 




Martinez/Jarillo (1989) control/direct 
supervision; 
centralisation 
structural and formal 
(formalisation/ 
standardisation 
structural and formal 
(output; planning) 






hierarchy (personal) hierarchy (Impersonal 







Mintzberg (1994) direct supervision 
 
standardisation of work 
processes 
 
standardisation of output 
 




Source: different authors for the purpose of this study




2.2.1 Personal centralized control  
The first control mechanisms that are used in the first category, all denote the idea of some 
kind of hierarchy, of decisions being taken at the top level of the organisation and personal 
surveillance of their execution. Of the seventeen authors reviewed in Table 2.1, five scholars 
mention a control mechanism called centralisation, three mention hierarchies and eight 
authors refer to a direct personal kind of control (several authors use more than one term and 
three authors use other terms). We would use the term personal centralized control used by 
Martinez & Jarillo (2005) and Harzing et al (2006) as it captures most of the variety in this 
category. 
2.2.2 Bureaucratic formalized control 
The control mechanisms used in the second category are related in as much as they are 
impersonal (also called bureaucratic) and indirect. They aim at pre-specifying, mostly in a 
written form, the behaviour that is expected from employees. In this way, control can be 
impersonal because employees can and should refer to the “manual” instead of directly being 
told what to do. Of the seventeen authors, twelve refer in one way or another to this “written 
manual”. The terms used are formalisation, rules, regulations, paper system and programs 
(Buckley & Carter 2004). A number of authors also use the term standardisation in this 
respect. In fact, standardisation can be seen as a prerequisite for formalisation. It is nearly 
impossible to formalise work processes that are not standardised. Six authors mainly refer to 
the impersonal aspect of this kind of control and use the term bureaucratic. Later the study 
will, therefore, use the term bureaucratic formalised control to describe this category. 
2.2.3 Output control 
This category bears the greatest resemblance to the market aspect of coordination. Perhaps 
organisational theorists are more likely to neglect this category than the other ones. Of the 
thirteen authors that do define a control mechanism in this category, seven use the term 
output. Basically, as we have noticed before, the main characteristic of this category is that it 
focuses on the outputs realised instead of on behaviour (as the other three control 
mechanisms do). These outputs are usually generated by the use of reporting or monitoring 
systems, taking any form from rather general aggregated financial data to detailed figures 




regarding sales, production levels, productivity, investments, etc. Hennart use the terms result 
and price, which can be regarded as equivalents of output, although in the case of price there 
are subtle differences (see e.g Hennart 2011). Four authors refer to plans (Martinez & Jarillo 
distinguish both planning and output). As all of these are defined by the authors as setting 
goals that the employee can achieve with a considerable amount of freedom of action.. The 
key element that distinguishes this control mechanism from the two previous ones is that, 
instead of particular courses of action, certain goals/results/outputs are specified and 
monitored by reporting systems
6
. Because of the relatively high consistency in terms used, 
we use the term output control for this category later in our study.  
2.2.4 Control by socialisation and networks 
The fourth category combines a lot of relatively diverse mechanisms. It is mainly defined by 
what it is not: it is not hierarchical, it is not bureaucratic, there are no fixed targets, it is 
usually not very formal, etc. Compared to the other categories this control mechanism is 
rather informal, subtle and sophisticated (Martinez & Jarillo, 2005) In spite of this diversity, 
we can distinguish three main sub-categories in this broad category: 
Socialisation – which can be defined as ensuring that employees share organisational values 
and goals; i.e. they are socialised into a common organisation culture. It is identified by ten 
authors, several of whom point to the importance of selection in this respect. 
Informal, lateral or horizontal exchange of information – some authors point to the 
importance of non-hierarchical communication as a control mechanism, using terms such as 
mutual adjustment, direct (managerial) contract, informal communication and coordination 
by feedback. 
Formalised lateral or cross-departmental relation – this category has the same objectives as 
the second one, increasing the amount of (non-hierarchical) information processing, with the 
difference being that in this case the relationships are (temporarily) formalised within the 
organisational structure. Examples are task forces, cross-functional teams and integrative 
departments (Lee & Macmillan 2008; Martinez & Jarillo, 2005). As a common denominator 
for this category, we use the term: control by socialisation and networks. 
                                                 
6
 Until, of course, the reporting system reveals failure to achieve goals/budgets. In that case, companies are 
likely to resort to either personal centralised control or bureaucratic formalised control for correction.  




Networks comprise both the second and third sub-category, as the aim of both mechanisms is 
to create a network of communication channels that supplements the formal hierarchy. The 
term network is chosen because in organisation theory it is frequently used to denote non-
hierarchical relations. 
2.2.5 Integration between various control mechanisms  
Table 2.2 summarises this classification and includes labels used for these categories. A 
further explanation of these labels can be found below. 
 
Table 2.2 Classification of control in two dimensions 








training and task 
forces 
 Standardization, formalization, output 
control, planning  
 
Source: Adapted from Ann-Wil Harzing (2001)  
 
As a final remark, we would like to stress that the different control mechanisms that are 
distinguished should be regarded as complements rather than substitutes. One company can 
use different control mechanisms for different employees, different sections of the 
organisation, different subsidiaries, etc. It can even use more than one control mechanism in 
the same situation. Some authors (Martinez & Jarillo, 2005, Spencer & Gomez 2010) even 
see the different control mechanisms as cumulative.  
Concerning complementarities, some combinations are more likely to occur than others. 
Personal centralised control and bureaucratic formalised control are likely to be used together 
– with an emphasis on the first in smaller organisations and the second in larger ones – in 
situations with a low environmental variability, a simple technology and a good knowledge of 
the transformation process (Child, 1997). As indicated in Table 2.2, both control mechanisms 
aim at directly controlling employee behaviour. Some authors (Wilkinson et al. 2008; 
Andersson , Bjorkman,  & Forsgren, 2005) do not have different names for these two control 
mechanisms. Output control and control by socialisation and networks are likely to be used 
together – with an emphasis on the first if outputs are measurable, and on the second if they 




are not – in situations with high environmental variability, complex technology and limited 
knowledge of the transformation process (Child, 1997). Both control mechanisms direct 
behaviour in an implicit way and leave the employee a considerable amount of freedom. 
Although as discussed above some combinations of control mechanisms are more likely than 
others, in principle any combination is possible and control mechanisms are regarded as 
additive instead of substitutive (Birkinshaw et al. 1998). This means that some firms might 
have a high level of application of all types of control mechanisms, and thus have a relatively 
high overall level of control, while other firms rely on a heavy application of just one or two 
control mechanisms, thus displaying a lower overall level of control. (Birkinshaw et al. 
1998).  
In chapter four, we will discuss the applicability of different control mechanisms in different 
circumstances in much more detail. Now, we would like to discuss MNEs and the “country-
of-origin” influence of control mechanisms used in them. Section 2.4 will be devoted to this 
purpose. 
 2.3 Multinational Enterprises (MNEs)  
In this section, the relevant issues concerning MNEs will be discussed. We will pay attention 
to the changing international environment, the industry, and MNE’s strategy and structure. 
This description will serve to substantiate our reasoning in a subsequent chapter that 
changing environments are not only accompanied by changing strategies and structures, but 
also by different processes; i.e. control mechanisms. Table 2-3 summarises these ideas. It is 
based on the environment-strategy-structure paradigm, which assumes that superior 
performance comes from a good fit between strategy and environmental demands, and 
between organisational structure (and processes) and strategy.(Harzing , 2001).  
In contrast to earlier work on MNE strategy and structure (1988; Galbraith & Kazanjian, 
1986; Daniels, Pitts & Tretter, 1984, 1985)7, we do not pre-suppose a one-way deterministic 
relationship between any of these various variables. Especially as the link between strategy 
and structure has been discussed extensively since Chandler’s (1962) seminal work and 
various authors (see, for instance, Hedlund 2006) have argued that strategy might be just as 
                                                 
7
 These seminal work  discuss the relationship between two strategy variables; foreign product diversity and the 
percentage of foreign sales - Egelhoff (1988) added a third percentage of foreign manufacturing - and the type 
of organisational structure a MNE chooses (international division, area division, product division or global 
matrix) 
 




dependent on structure as structure is on strategy. Further, changes also do not necessarily 
result from the environment alone. 
Most of the authors discussing these issues belong to the process school of international 
management (Doz & Prahalad, 2007), that had its origins in the dissertations of Prahalad 
(1975) and Doz (1976), and adhere to a more flexible and less deterministic relationship 
between environment, strategy, structure and process.(Doz & Prahalad 2007).  
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Source: Adapted from Ann-Wil Harzing (2001) 
 
This section on multinational companies (MNEs) will be structured as follows. First, we will 
discuss the range of classifications –as we did in the first section with the control 
mechanisms- that are available in this field and try to bring some clarification of terms in use. 
Then, we will discuss the elements of structures and strategy, based on previous researches 
such as Bartlett & Ghoshal (2002) and Doz & Prahalad (2007). Subsequently, we will discuss 
a number of “traditional” organisation theories. We will try to discover whether there are 
some famous similarities or differences between international management literature and 
“traditional” management literature. 
Before discussing this, we would like to stress that there is one very important dominant 
variable in the development plans – the managers themselves. Changes in the environment 
will not influence strategy unless they are enacted (Child, 1997) and managers do have some 
choice of action (Child, 1997). An important influential factor in this process is the 
societal/cultural effect (see, for example, Harzing & Hofstede, 1995). Society/culture can 
form a constraint on certain choices (e.g. democratic leadership will not work in countries 
where people favour hierarchical decision processes) and influences the values of managers 
so that certain environmental changes are not enacted and certain options are not considered 
(see Harzing, 2000; Harzing and Noorderhaven 2009; Yaprak & Karademir, 2011). We will, 




therefore, discuss whether a country-of-origin effect is present in the application of the 
various organisational strategies and structures. 
2.3.1 Industry, Strategy and Structure  
In the analysis of the industry, strategy and structure, we use the four familiar terms identified 
in the literature: multidomestic, international, global and transnational (see e.g  Harzing, 1995 
and Bartlett & Ghoshal 1987). In a multidomestic industry, international strategy consists in 
fact of a series of domestic strategies. Competition in each country is essentially independent 
of competition in other countries. Typical industry characteristics are determined by cultural, 
social and political differences between countries. A classic example of a multidomestic 
industry is the branded packaged products industry (e.g. food and laundry detergents). 
(Harzig, 2001).  
 
Companies in these industries preferably follow a multidomestic strategy, which gives 
primary importance to national responsiveness. Products or services are differentiated to meet 
differing local demands. Policies are differentiated to conform to differing governmental and 
market demands. The competitive advantage of multidomestic companies often lies in 
downstream value chain activities, such as sales and marketing or service (Otalora & 
Casanova 2012).  
These activities are closely related to the buyer and are usually tied to the buyer’s location. 
Responsiveness to the differences that distinguished national markets led multidomestic 
companies to decentralise organisational assets and decision making. This resulted in a 
configuration that can be described as a decentralised federation, which is organised by area; 
i.e. geographical region (Leonidou, 2011).  
In the International industry, the adjective “international” refers to the international product 
life cycle, which describes the internationalisation process in this type of industry. The 
critical success factor in these industries is the ability to transfer knowledge (particularly 
technology) to units abroad. It involves sequential diffusion of innovations that were 
originally developed in the home market. A classic example of an international industry is 
telecommunications industry. (See e.g Rugman and Verbeke 2003 ;Björkman,  Barner-
Rasmussen. & Li, L., 2004). 




The international strategy is the preferred strategy in this industry, giving primary importance 
to the development and diffusion of worldwide innovations internationally. The competitive 
advantage of international companies often lies in research and development. New 
technologies are developed in the home country and transferred and adapted to foreign 
countries, following the product life cycle as discussed by Vernon (1966). They do not strive 
for the efficiency of global companies or the complete national responsiveness of 
multidomestic companies, but they do pay some attention to both of these goals. This is the 
strategy traditionally followed by American multinationals. (Harzing & Noorderhaven, 
2006).  
In the international organisational structure, transfer of knowledge and expertise to countries 
that were less advanced in technology or market development is the essential task. Local 
subsidiaries do still have some freedom to adopt new products or strategies, but coordination 
and control by headquarters is more important than in the multidomestic type. Subsidiaries 
are dependent on the parent company for new products, processes or ideas. 
In a global industry, standardised consumer needs and scale efficiencies make centralisation 
and integration profitable. In this kind of industry, a firm’s competitive position in one 
country is significantly influenced by its position in other countries. The global industry is 
not just a collection of domestic industries but a series of linked domestic industries in which 
the rivals compete against each other on a truly worldwide basis. An example of a global 
industry is consumer electronics industry.  
The preferred strategy in these industries is the global strategy that gives primary importance 
to efficiency. Global companies integrate and rationalise their production to produce 
standardised products in a very cost-efficient manner
8
. The competitive advantage of global 
companies often lies in upstream chain activities such as procurement, inbound logistics 
(warehousing, inventory control, material handling etc.) and operations (machining, 
assembly, testing, etc.). These activities are optimised on a worldwide scale. This is the 
strategy traditionally followed by Japanese multinationals. (Schmid & Kretschmer 2010) 
In a global organisational configuration, assets, resources and responsibilities are centralised 
and the role of subsidiaries is often limited to sales and service (Yamao et al., 2009). 
Compared with subsidiaries in multidomestic or international organisations, they have much 
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 See Cremer et al. (2009) for a fervent argumentation of the benefits of product standardisation. 




less freedom of action. The structural configuration can be described as a centralised hub and 
is usually based on a product structure. Within each product division, activities are 
centralised, and there is link between the world product groups.(Yamao et al., 2009) 
Transnational industries are characterised by a complex set of environmental demands. 
Companies in these industries must respond to the diverse and often conflicting strategic 
needs of global efficiency (as a characteristic of global industries), national responsiveness 
(as a characteristic of multidomestic industries) and transfer of knowledge (as a characteristic 
of international industries). 
Companies following the transnational strategy that fits the industry, recognise that they 
should pay attention to global efficiency, national responsiveness and worldwide learning at 
the same time. In order to do this, their strategy must be very flexible. The strategy (literally) 
is to have no set strategy (Scherer et al. 2012), but to let each strategic decision depend on 
specific developments. Strategy becomes unclear and it may become dissolved into a set of 
incremental decisions with a pattern that may only make sense later. Issues are shaped, 
defined, attended to, and resolved one at a time in a “mixed” process. A transnational strategy 
would be a deliberately planned strategy to have an “adaptive” ,”incremental”, “muddling 
through” or “emergent” strategy. (Mintzberg, 1994). 
The type of organisation structure that fits a transnational industry and strategy is very 
flexible. Bartlett & Ghoshal refer to an integrated network structure that links major sub-units 
of the company together. Assets, resources and capabilities are neither centralised nor 
completely decentralised. Expertise is spread throughout the organisation and subsidiaries 
can serve as a strategic centre for a particular product-market combination (Dörrenbächer et 
al 2011). To use a popular term, companies are creating “centres of excellence” for each 
activity. The company becomes a kind of network with different centres for different 
activities. Each centre can have a strategic role for a particular area.
9
 
2.3.2 Integration  
The four configurations – combinations of industry, strategy and structure (described above) 
– can be visually summarised in the integration/responsiveness framework which is explained 
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in Figure 2.1 (see Taggart below (1997) for a broad description). The vertical axis represents 
the level of global integration and, hence, of central coordination by headquarters; the 
horizontal axis represents the extent of national responsiveness or differentiation and, 
consequently, of the desired influence of subsidiaries in strategic and operational decisions.  
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2.3.3 Empirical studies of the configurations  
Although Bartlett & Ghoshal’s typology has received a lot of attention, by both academics 
and professionals, it is based on in depth case studies of nine MNEs only. In this section we 
will, therefore, explain some of the empirical support for their typology. First, we will discuss 
a number of replications of the typology as such and, second, we will investigate the 
occurrence of the transnational organisational model in practice. 
Empirical tests of the typology found a reasonable amount of support for the organisational 
models described by Bartlett & Ghoshal. Leong & Tan (1993) had senior executives of 
MNEs from all around the world classify their organisations as being multinational, global, 
international or transnational in nature. They further asked them to evaluate their 
organisation’s configuration of assets and capabilities, roles of overseas operations and 
development, and diffusion of knowledge. The global and multinational organisation types 
scored as hypothesised, but the international and transnational type did not differ significantly 
from each other or from the other types. 
Moenaart et al (1994) describe the organisational structural properties of 87 MNEs from the 
US, East Asia and Western Europe. The scales they used to measure multinational, global 
and transnational structures had reasonably high significance values. Transnational structural 
properties correlated positively with the level of multinational orientation and negatively with 
the global orientation of a company. A strong correlation was found between the global and 
multinational structural properties. The findings of these correlations support the models 
described by Bartlett & Ghoshal. 
 
In a survey of business units competing in global industries, Roth & O’Donnell (1996) found 
three clearly distinguishable clusters of firms following global integration, locally responsive 
and multifocal strategies, respectively. Johnson Jr. (1995) performed a similar study in one 
industry – the US construction equipment industry – and found the same generic strategies. 
Although these results conflict with Bartlett & Ghoshal’s typology in the sense that not all 
companies are following the strategies best suited to the particular industry
10
, they do provide 
support for the classification as such. Considering the various empirical tests of the Bartlett & 
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Ghoshal typology, we see that the global and multidomestic strategies emerge clearly and that 
all studies find a kind of “in-between” strategy that combines elements of global and 
multidomestic strategies. This strategy is usually called transnational or multifocal. In 
combination with the lack of an international strategy in many of the conceptual 
classifications as discussed previously, this leads us to limit our discussion to three 
international configurations: global, multidomestic and transnational. 
Thus, we can say that at present probably very few firms can be considered transnational in 
every sense of the word. The transnational model as an ideal-type, however, has taken a 
strong foothold in the world of academics, consultants and MNEs’ top executives alike. 
Later, we will discuss the implications of this movement for control mechanisms in MNEs. In 
the next section, we will see the country of origin effect on the strategy based on the 
international management and “traditional” management literature.  
2.4 Country of origin effect on strategy and structure  
Bartlett & Ghoshal indicated that the international organisational model was the dominant 
model for American MNEs, the global model for Japanese MNEs, and the multidomestic 
model for European MNEs. The adoption of these models would be mainly based on the era 
in which most of the American, Japanese and European firms internationalised. Their study 
was based on nine MNEs in three industries only. Furthermore, although most European 
firms, for instance, might have started with multidomestic models, they may have adjusted 
their strategies and structures in the course of time. As Ghauri (1995) comments, this 
classification is an oversimplification of a complex issue. According to him, we can find 
firms from Europe following the international and global model, and many Japanese firms 
following the international or multinational model. To the best of our knowledge, few 
detailed studies have empirically investigated the application of different organisational 
models as defined by Bartlett & Ghoshal. Legewie (2002) state that “awareness of local 
differences and a marketing focus oriented towards diversity in customer needs and profiles 
is at the core of quality and process management methods which are widespread in Japanese 
companies” (Legewie 2002:912). They therefore hypothesise that Japanese MNEs will 
pursue locally oriented strategies and simultaneous local (differentiation) and global 
(integration) strategies to a larger extent than American MNEs. No difference was 
hypothesised concerning global strategies. Strategies were measured at both HQ and 
subsidiary level, and all three hypotheses were confirmed at both levels. 




Doyle et al. (1992) investigated American and Japanese strategies in the British market and 
found, among others, that Japanese firms were more locally responsive in terms of adapting 
their promotion, pricing, distribution and overall strategies to the British market. It could, 
therefore, be concluded that Japanese firms would be more likely to follow multidomestic 
strategies than American firms
11
. 
In general, though, we would not expect to find many differences between countries in the 
application of the various international strategies and structures. The industry effect, 
discussed in the next section, is likely to have a strong effect as well on the strategy that is 
followed and the structure that is chosen by the company.  
2.5 Industry Effect on Strategy and Structure  
As indicated above, the industry in which a company operates is likely to have considerable 
influence on the preferred organisational model. Some industries are more likely to 
experience forces for global integration (global industries) or for local responsiveness 
(multidomestic industries), while in other industries firms have to respond to both these 
demands at the same time (transnational industries)
12
. 
Various authors have tried to classify industries in terms of these forces. In this section, we 
will review what these authors have said about the various industries included in our study: 
chemicals, petroleum, electronics, computer, motor vehicles, papers and food beverages.  
The electronics, computer and office equipment and automobile industries are usually seen as 
global industries, while the food industry is often considered to be the prototype of a 
multidomestic industry (Bartlett, 1986; Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1987; Doz, 1996; Doyle et aI., 
1992). Nohria & Ghoshal (2006) classify both the computer and the automobile industry as 
transnational, however. These industries are joined by the drugs & pharmaceutical industry. 
The food industry is again seen as multidomestic, while the paper industry is classified as 
operating in the relatively placid international industry. Nohria & Ghoshal (2006) indicate, 
however, that the forces of global integration appear to be getting stronger in the food 
industry. This would mean that the food industry is moving towards the transnational type. 
The chemical industry is seen as a global type of industry. Brinkgreve (1993) follows Nohria 
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& Ghoshal’s classification, but adds the petroleum industry in the global category. His results 
show that from the ten industries included in his survey, the food industry had the highest 
percentage of firms following a transnational strategy, with the chemical and computer 
industry the lowest. According to Li & Yao (2010), companies in the pharmaceutical and 
food industry have a higher than average trade among subsidiaries; a feature that can be seen 
as characteristic for a transnational model (integrated network with inter-subsidiary flows). 
In view of the observations above, the chemical, computer, automobile, electronics and 
petroleum industries are considered global industries. The food and pharmaceutical industries 
are considered transnational industries. Ghoshal & Nohria are the only authors that classify 
the paper industry using the international category but it is not distinguished as a separate 
category in their study. 
We would, of course, expect most companies to have strategies and structures that fit their 
type of industry. Consequently, we would not expect the absolute majority of firms in the 
food and pharmaceutical industries to have transnational strategies and structures. Many 
firms in the food industry are likely to follow multidomestic strategies, while many firms in 
the pharmaceutical industry will still follow global strategies. (Li & Yao, 2010). 
To summarise, we have discussed the strategy and structure of MNEs and its environments; 
all crucial elements for the MNE. A discussion of the various classifications used in the 
international management literature and a detailed description of one of these classifications 
led to the identification of three distinct organisational models for multinational firms: global, 
multidomestic and transnational. The transnational model is claimed to be the answer to 
changes in the international environment. Many of the elements discussed in the 
classification of multinational firms can be traced back to “traditional” management and 
organisation theory, as seen before.  
In chapter four, we combine what we learned about the control mechanism discussed 
previously with the theory on multinationals and their development, as discussed in this 
section. And we will see how the industries affect the performance of the subsidiary success. 
First, however, let’s discover the third main element of our study – international transfer.  
. 
.  




2.6 International Transfer and control by socialization 
The importance of international transfers to achieve control by socialisation and informal 
networks is emphasised by various authors. Most of them, however, tend to concentrate on 
one of the two elements: socialisation or creation of informal information networks. 
Therefore, these two elements will be discussed separately in the next sections. 
2.6.1 Socialisation  
Numerous authors (see Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1987; Jaeger, Baliga 2006; Li & Yau 2010 ; 
Merchant, 1996; Nohria & Ghoshal 1997; Birkinshaw & Hood, 1998) point to the fact that 
international transfers can foster socialisation in the company culture, either for the 
internationally transferred manager or for the company as a whole. Below, we have included 
some of the seminal quotations: 
 
“Another reason – other than management development – why sufficient scope for 
international job rotation should be maintained is the need for what I would call “corporate 
acculturation” (Kuin, 1972). 
 
“Philips found that the most effective way to manage complex flows of information and 
knowledge was through various socialisation processes: the transfer of people, the 
encouragement of informal communication channels that fostered information exchange, or 
the creation of forums that facilitated inter-unit learning” (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1987). 
 
“Such integration was typically the result of a high degree of organisational socialisation 
and was achieved through extensive travel and transfer of managers between 
headquarters and the subsidiary, and through joint-work in teams, taskforces, and 
committees” (Ghoshal &Bartlett, 1988). 
 
Another option is to transmit culture through a policy of intra-organisational transfers. These 
transfers tend to improve the socialisation of the individuals in an organisation and thereby 
inhibit the formation of incompatible goals and perspectives (Merchant, 1996). 
2.6.2 Informal information networks  
Edstrom & Galbraith (1977b) were probably one of the first to recognise the function of 
international transfers as network builders. Extensive transfers create a network of informal 
contacts that can be used to collect the information necessary to support local discretion. 
The creation of informal information networks through international transfers is identified by, 
among others, Egelhoff (1988), Evans (1991), and Bartlett & Ghoshal (2002).  




Bartlett and Ghoshal conducted a study in which they tried to relate Perlmutter’s 
classifications of multinational firms to various patterns of international HRM, among which 
were the functions of international transfers distinguished by Edstrom and Galbraith. 
Regiocentric and geocentric firms were hypothesised to make greater use of international 
transfers for management and organisation development (socialisation and creation of 
informal networks) than polycentric and ethnocentric firms. The sample of eight companies 
consisted of five regiocentric and three polycentric firms. The regiocentric firms did indeed 
transfer managers (parent, host and third-country nationals) for management development, 
while only one polycentric firm did this and then only for parent-country nationals. Transfer 
for organisation development occurred in only two of the regiocentric firms (for parent, host 
and third-country nationals). However, the value of international transfers in creating an 
international network (and socialisation) was recognised by all regiocentric firms. The high 
costs of transfers were the main reason for using substitutes, such as international meetings 
and training programs for organisation development purposes. Jaeger, Baliga (2006) points to 
the role of international transfers in creating an informal information network. His whole 
work is built on the information-processing perspective. The informal networks that 
international managers will be likely to maintain with previous co-workers can provide a 
considerable addition to the information processing capability between various parts of the 
company. Increasing the number of transfers, therefore, increases the information-processing 
capability in a multinational company. Evans (1991) also signals the influence of 
international mobility on the development of a “network of personal relationships based on 
long-term trust through which important horizontal initiatives get planned and implemented”. 
According to him, network theory and research show that this nervous system requires a large 
number of loose ties (knowing someone who knows someone who knows someone) to 
function. However, these can be based on a relatively small number of strong ties between 
key people in the organisation. This could mean that the potential impact of this nervous 
system could extend far beyond the managers that were actually transferred to the 
organisation as a whole. 
Bartlett & Ghoshal (2002) describe how Ikea realised control by socialisation and 
informal networks: “Throughout the 1980s, Kamprad (Ikea’s founder) led week-long 
training sessions on Ikea’s history, culture and values. Then, the company assigned 
the ambassadors who attended the sessions to key positions worldwide. By the early 
1990s, more than 300 cultural agents were serving as nodes in a personal 
communication network that could collect and transmit information without the 




distortion that more formal information systems often introduce”. (Bartlett & 
Ghoshal, 2002: 141).  
In a non-international setting, various authors have come to the same conclusion.
13
 
2.7 Chapter Summary  
 As indicated in the beginning of this chapter, this study focuses on control mechanisms in 
multinational enterprises (MNEs) and puts special emphasis on the role of the subsidiary and 
its performance in this respect. This chapter, therefore, reviewed the literature about control 
mechanisms, multinational companies and their organisations, and international transfers, 
respectively.  
We first identified ‘control’ and ‘coordination’ and made a distinction between these two 
concepts. Control refers to the mechanisms used to assure the execution of organisational 
goals and plans. Control is essentially concerned with regulating the activities within an 
organisation so that they are in accord with the expectations established in policies, plans and 
targets. This is consistent with Baliga & Jaeger’s (1968), in which they state that the 
importance of control is to ensure the achievement of the ultimate purposes of the 
organisation. We infer two elements in these types of control. First, management can use it as 
means to direct the behaviour of the individuals in an organisation towards the goals of the 
organisation. Second, there is an element of power in this relationship.  
Coordination, on the other hand, means integrating or linking together different parts of an 
organisation to accomplish a collective set of tasks. Coordination of sub-units may be defined 
as the function of ensuring that sub-units’ behaviours are properly linked, sequenced and 
timed so as to accomplish some joint activity or task. The fundamental theme in the definition 
of coordination appears to be the integration, harmonisation or linkage of different parts of an 
organisation towards a common goal. In contrast to control, the power element is much more 
implicit with coordination. The final aim, however, appears to be the same as in control, 
moving towards common organisational goals.  
We review the different control mechanisms that have been distinguished by a variety of 
authors. As discussed before, we deal with classifications that use the terms ‘control’ and 
‘coordination’, as long as the mechanisms have a bearing on the assurance that common 
organisational goals or objectives are met. The different classifications were fitted into four 
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distinct categories that were constructed heuristically in the process of comparing the various 
classifications, as summarised below. 
The first category consists of control mechanisms that denote the idea of some kind of 
hierarchy, of decisions being taken at the top level of the organisation and their execution 
supervised.  
The control mechanisms used in the second category are related in as much as they are 
impersonal (also called bureaucratic) and indirect. They aim at pre-specifying, mostly in a 
written form, the behaviour that is expected from employees. In this way, control can be 
impersonal because employees can and should refer to the ‘manual’ instead of directly being 
told what to do.  
The third category bears the greatest resemblance to the market aspect of coordination. 
Organisational theorists are perhaps more likely to neglect this category than the others. Of 
the thirteen authors who defined a control mechanism in this category, seven used the term 
‘output’. Basically, as we have noted before, the main characteristic of this category is that it 
focuses on the outputs realised instead of on behaviour (as the other three control 
mechanisms do). These outputs are usually generated by the use of reporting or monitoring 
systems, taking any form from rather general aggregated financial data to detailed figures 
regarding sales, production levels, productivity, investments, etc.  
The fourth category combines a lot of relatively diverse mechanisms. It is mainly defined by 
what it is not: it is not hierarchical, it is not bureaucratic, there are no fixed targets, it is 
usually not very formal, etc. Compared to the other categories, this control mechanism is 
rather informal, subtle and sophisticated. This type of control is called ‘control by 
socialisation and networks’.  
In this chapter we discussed the relevant issues concerning MNEs. We paid 
attention to the changing international environment, the industry, and MNEs’ 
strategies and structures. When analysing the environment on a global scale, one of 
the most important trends for MNEs is the increasing internationalisation of the 
world economy; we explained four phases in this internationalisation process. In the 
analysis of the industry, strategy and structure, we used the four familiar terms 
identified in the literature: multi-domestic, international, global and transnational. 
Lastly, we discussed the importance of international transfers in achieving control 




by socialisation and informal networks, as emphasised by various authors. We 
discussed some points highlighting the fact that international transfers can foster 
socialisation in the company culture, either for the internationally transferred 
manager or for the company as a whole. 





CHAPTER THREE CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND  
3.1 Introduction  
This chapter focuses on the examination of the factors that were derived in chapter 2. 
Therefore, this chapter aims to give the background of the theories that are implemented in 
the international business field, develop a framework for the research using the most 
appropriate model for the study, review the variables in the HQ–subsidiary relationship and 
develop the hypotheses of the study. 
3.1Control Mechanisms in MNEs  
Chapter 2 reviewed organisational control mechanisms in reference to the environment, 
strategy and structure of MNEs. This section combines these elements and explores what can 
be deduced about the use of various control mechanisms in MNEs. This is done using a two-
step approach. First, traditional organisation theory is reviewed in terms of its conception of 
the use of control mechanisms in different circumstances, allowing the study’s hypotheses to 
be refined. Subsequently, a number of HQ and subsidiary characteristics that are 
hypothesised to influence the use of the various control mechanisms are discussed. In 
discussing these HQ characteristics, several research streams are used. Birkinshaw (1994) 
distinguishes the strategy–structure stream, the HQ–subsidiary relationship stream, the MNE 
process stream and the subsidiary role stream. Elements of all four areas are incorporated in 
the formulation of the hypotheses.  
3.1.1 Operationalization of the Variables  
In this subsection, we will discuss the way in which we operationalized the variables used in 
our study. Before doing so, we would like to make some general remarks. Since low response 
rates frustrate useful conclusions in many international studies, generating a reasonable 
response rate is a major aim in our study. Using data from 35 methodological studies, Jobber 
& Saunders (1993) showed that for industrial populations, the length of the questionnaire was 
an important predictor of response rates: i.e. the longer the questionnaire, the lower the 
response rate. We, therefore, tried to limit the number of questions to the absolute minimum. 
This meant that no questions were asked on issues that could be verified using secondary 




data. However, another consequence was that we could not use ten-item scales to measure 
every construct in the study. Most constructs were, therefore, measured using two or three 
items. Furthermore, we could not differentiate control mechanisms for various functional 
areas. Many studies found that decisions in the field of marketing, HRM, industrial relations, 
production, R&D and finance are centralised to different degrees. Decisions in the first three 
fields are usually more decentralised than decisions in the latter three fields (see Yu, Wong & 
Chiao 2006; Asakawa 2001 for overview). In view of the size constraints, it was felt 
unfeasible to include both different control mechanisms and different functional areas. Since 
most previous studies focused on one control mechanism (centralisation) for various 
functional areas, we decided to focus on various control mechanisms without differentiating 
across functions. Since the managing director was judged to be the person most 
knowledgeable about the variety of issues dealt with in the questionnaire, we decided to 
combine Martinez & Jarillo (2005) and Harzing (2006) and phrase the questions on control 
mechanisms in general terms. Focusing on, for instance, marketing or HRM could give 
biased or missing data since the managing director might not be aware of the control 
mechanisms used in these areas. In the remainder of this section, we will discuss the 
operationalization of our variables. In doing so, we will start with the building stones: control 
mechanisms, MNEs and international transfers as discussed in Chapter 1. We then move to 
the headquarters characteristics and subsidiary characteristics as discussed in Chapter 2. The 
operationalization of variables related to the role of international transfers as a control 
mechanism is discussed under the building stone of international transfers.   
3.1.2 Control mechanisms 
After a review of the relevant literature, we identified in Chapter two four main control 
mechanisms: personal centralised control, bureaucratic formalised control, output control and 
control by socialisation and networks. To measure these different control mechanisms 
empirically, we adapted and supplemented the questions that were used by Martinez & Jarillo 
(2005) and Harzing (1995). These studies are one of very few studies that measured control 
mechanisms at subsidiary level, making the questions highly suitable for our purpose. In 
addition, they did not differentiate according to various functional areas, also conforming to 
our approach. Since Martinez & Jarillo only contrasted formal mechanisms with informal 
mechanisms, their questions for formal control mechanisms were not as differentiated as we 
would have liked them to be. Therefore, additional questions were constructed for the “direct 




supervision” aspect of personal centralised control and the “standardisation” aspect of 
bureaucratic formalised control. Phrasing the question in such a way could reduce the social 
desirability effect. In order to emphasise that we solicited information about the control 
mechanisms applied at the individual subsidiary, we added “towards your subsidiary” for 
every question. Finally, we made some slight adjustments in wording (e.g. multinational firm 
in every question instead of the variety of terms – firm, corporation, and company – used by 
Martinez & Jarillo (2005) and Harzing (2000). 
The final questions used are shown in table 3.4  
• Personal centralised control 
Centralisation aspect: please rate the following with respect to your subsidiary company; the 
level of this subsidiary’s autonomy to decide its own strategies and policies? 
The degree of personal surveillance that headquarters managers execute towards this 
subsidiary  
The degree to which headquarters uses expatriates to directly control this subsidiary’s. 
• Bureaucratic formalised control 
Standardisation aspect: In some multinational firms, all subsidiaries are supposed to operate 
in more or less the same way. In other firms, such standardised policies are not required. In 
general, what is the degree of standardisation that headquarters requires from this subsidiary? 
Formalisation aspect: Some multinational firms have written rules and procedures for 
everything and employees are expected to follow these procedures accurately. Other firms do 
not have such strict rules and procedures, or if they have there is some leniency towards 
following them. Please indicate the kind of rules and procedures that headquarters exerts 
towards this subsidiary. 
• Output control 
Output evaluation aspect: Some multinational firms exert a high degree of output control, by 
means of continuous evaluation of the results of subsidiaries. Other firms exert very little 
output control beyond the requirement of occasional financial reports. Please indicate the 
degree of output control that headquarters exerts towards this subsidiary. 
Planning aspect: Some multinational firms have a very detailed planning, goal setting and 
budgeting system that includes clear-cut (often quantitative) objectives to be achieved at both 
strategic and operational level. Other firms have less developed systems. Please indicate the 
type of planning/goal setting/budgeting that headquarters uses towards this subsidiary.  
• Control by socialisation and networks 




Socialisation aspect: Some multinational firms attach a lot of value to a strong “corporate 
culture”, trying to ensure that all subsidiaries share the main values of the firm. Others do not 
make these efforts (or, having made it, have had no success). To what extent do the 
executives in this subsidiary share the company main values? 
Informal communication aspect: Some multinational firms have a very high degree of 
informal communication among executives of the different subsidiaries and headquarters. 
Other firms do not foster that kind of informal communication and rely exclusively on formal 
communication channels. Please indicate the level of informal communication between this 
subsidiary and headquarters/other subsidiaries of the group. 
Formal networks aspect: Some multinational firms make extensive use of committees/task 
forces/project groups, both temporary and permanent, made up by executives from different 
subsidiaries and headquarters. To what extent has this subsidiary’s executives participated in 
this kind of groups in the past couple of years? Following Martinez & Jarillo (2005), other 
studies in this field and our discussion in Chapter 2, the various control mechanisms are 
regarded as additive, so that scores for the different control mechanisms can be summed to 
display the total level of control. Subsidiaries experiencing a relatively high level of all four 
control mechanisms are thus considered to be more strongly controlled by headquarters than 
subsidiaries that experience high levels of control on only one or two of the four control 
mechanisms, or medium levels on all four. In addition, we included two questions related to 
the role of international transfers as a control mechanism. First, we asked respondents for the 
application of the direct type of expatriate control in their subsidiary. Retrospectively, 
following our discussion in Chapter 2, we wished we had included direct expatriate control as 
one of the functions of international transfers, rather than as one of the control mechanisms. 
Secondly, we included one of the two major alternatives of international transfers to realise 
the informal communication and socialisation aspects of control by socialisation and 
networks, namely international management training. The other major alternative – formal 
networks – has already been included above. 
Direct expatriate control: In some multinational firms, parent country nationals are assigned 
to subsidiaries to ensure that headquarters’ policies are carried out. Others do not send out 
expatriates or do this for other reasons. Others do not send out expatriates or do this for other 
reasons. We use the following question in section 3 of the questionnaire; please indicate the 
degree to which headquarters uses expatriates to directly control this subsidiary’s operations. 





International management training: Some multinational firms make extensive use of 
international (as opposed to purely national) management training programs. In these 
programs, executives from different subsidiaries and headquarters follow courses that deal 
mostly with the transfer of company-specific knowledge. So we have asked the following 
question: what has been the participation of this subsidiary’s executives in this kind of 
training programs in the past couple of years? 
3.1.3 Multinational Enterprises  
In Chapter 2, we described the environment, strategy and structure of MNEs. Three main 
types of MNEs were derived from a review of relevant literature: global, multidomestic and 
transnational. In the empirical part of this thesis, industry will be used as a proxy for the 
international environment. As indicated, the industries included in our population are 
assumed to be spread throughout the global, multidomestic and transnational types of 
environment. Subsidiary managers were asked to indicate the industry in which the 
subsidiary was operating. If the subsidiary was operating in more than one industry, they 
were asked to indicate the industry that generated the largest percentage of its sales. Since no 
questions were readily available to measure the organisational model of MNEs, we adapted 
questions, based on the characteristics of the different types of firms, as described in Bardett 
& Ghoshal (1989, 1992a), Harzing (2001) and Kim, Park & Prescott (2003). 
Structure and strategy was measured by various types of structures and asking respondents to 
select which best described their organization.  Nine statements were constructed that 
measured aspects of organisational structure, nature of the firm, the role of subsidiaries, the 
dominant competitive strategy, etc. Respondents were asked to indicate the extent to which 
they agreed to the various statements. The introduction emphasised that we sought their 
opinion about the MNE overall, not about the specific subsidiary. The nine statements are 
reproduced below: 
1. Our company’s strategy is focused on achieving economies of scale by concentrating its 
important activities at a limited number of locations. 
2. Our company can be adequately described as a very loosely coupled and decentralised 
federation of rather independent national subunits. 




3. In our company, a typical subsidiary’s main function is to deliver company products and 
carry out headquarters’ strategies. 
4. Our company can be adequately described as an integrated and interdependent network of 
different but equivalent subunits, in which headquarters does not a priori play a dominant 
role. 
5. Our company not only recognises national differences in taste and values, but actually tries 
to respond to these national differences by consciously adapting products and policies to the 
local market. 
6. In our company, subsidiaries regularly act as a strategic centre for a particular product or 
process; in other words, subsidiaries regularly perform a role as “centre of excellence’’  
7. In our company, there are not only large flows of components and products, but also of 
resources, people and information among the company’s subsidiaries. 
8. Our company’s competitive position is defined in worldwide terms. Different national 
product markets are closely linked and interconnected. Competition takes place on a global 
basis. 
9. Our company’s competitive strategy is to let each subsidiary compete on a domestic level 
as national product markets are judged too different to make competition on a global level 
possible.  
In the questionnaire, the main concepts were put in bold type. Although some questions were 
aimed specifically at measuring a certain type of company (i.e. global: 1, 3, 8; multidomestic: 
2, 4, 9; transnational: 5, 6, 7), we did not create scales. Equally important as the score on 
these three key questions would be the relative position on the other questions. Following 
their conceptual description, transnationals would be expected to score “in between” on, for 
instance, economies of scale, differentiation and both global and local competition. 
Multidomestic companies, on the other hand, would be expected to score high on own their 
key questions and low on the key questions for global companies, and vice versa. In addition, 
global companies would be expected to score low on the network statement, since 
headquarters plays a dominant role in global companies. In the empirical part of this thesis, 




















   Source: Developed by the researcher for the purpose of the current study (2013) 
































Control Mechanism  
 




3.2 Country of origin and control mechanisms  
This section discusses the control mechanisms of our framework. In subsequent sections, we 
will show how these control mechanisms are affected by other factors. We will also outline 
the role the manager can play in this respect and will discuss the two other main blocks of the 
thesis: MNEs and international transfers as well and build all the hypotheses of the study.  
The belief in the universal nature of management or organisational science has often been 
discarded as a myth (Adler, 1983; Osigweh, 1989). Furthermore, as Clark & Mueller (1996) 
indicate: “The earlier tendency in management studies towards an intra-firm, universal, 
context-free and time-free analysis has been increasingly challenged over the last ten years or 
so” (1996:136). The cultural or societal
14
 effect might, therefore, be an important factor in 
explaining differences among companies, even if they are multinational. Therefore, we may 
find that the use of specific control mechanisms or even the relationship between various 
contingency factors and control mechanisms is influenced by the home country of the 
Multinational Company. Of course, this influence will not likely to be completely 
deterministic
15
, but it certainly is a factor to take into account. Later on the thesis, we will 
systematically analyse whether specific contingency relationships hold for different countries. 
In this chapter, we will formulate a number of hypotheses and develop our model on the 
influence of the home country of the multinational companies and other important factors on 
the control mechanisms used by MNEs towards their subsidiaries abroad.  
Many of the hypotheses report supposed differences between American and Japanese MNEs, 
the problem is that very few of the studies done on this subject so far, include individual 
European countries in the picture. We, therefore, agree with Ferner’s (1997) suggestion that 
“the choice of countries of origin for such research should reflect the need to overcome the 




3.3 Personal centralized control  
A relatively large number of studies have investigated the differences in decentralisation of 
decision making within Japanese and American companies. Sometimes a number of other 
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countries were included as well. Unfortunately, these studies do not show a consistent 
picture. We will first discuss a number of studies that claim that centralisation is rather high 
in Japanese companies and rather low in American companies. Subsequently, we will review 
the studies that come to the opposite conclusion and try to resolve these conflicting views. 
First, Legewie, (2002) hypothesises a positive relationship between power/distance and 
centralisation and a negative relationship between individualism and centralisation. He does 
not test these relationships in his study; later however Schaaper et al (2011) test similar 
hypotheses and find a significantly higher level of centralisation in companies located in 
Singapore or Hong Kong when compared to American and Australian companies. A positive 
relationship between country-of-origin power/distance and centralisation was also found by 
Wong & Birnbaum-More (1994) in a study of subsidiaries of foreign banks located in Hong 
Kong. Jain & Tucker (1995) assert that power is more centralised in Japanese companies than 
in American companies. This claim is confirmed indirectly, since Japanese MNEs had a 
larger observed need to delegate decision-making authority when extending operations 
abroad. Kustin & Jones (1996) find that the influence of Japanese headquarters on their 
American subsidiaries is larger than the influence of American headquarters on American 
subsidiaries. It may be argued, however, that this is not a valid comparison as subsidiaries 
located in the same country as headquarters might be treated differently anyhow. Zaheer 
(1995) found, contrary to their prediction, that Japanese banks showed higher levels of 
centralisation than American banks.  
In contrast to the studies discussed above, some studies come to the opposite conclusion as 
we seen in chapter two. Chow et al (1994) relate centralisation to a country’s score on 
Hofstede’s power/distance dimension and predict a higher preference for centralisation 
among Japanese respondents. Although not much difference was found, preference for 
centralisation turned out to be higher among American respondents. Legewie (2002) 
explicitly investigated decision-making autonomy in subsidiaries of Japanese and American 
MNEs. Questionnaires were distributed at both headquarters and subsidiaries. Their results 
consistently indicated a greater tendency for American MNEs to centralise decision making 
in the parent organisation. Negandhi (2007) found the decentralisation of decision making of 
subsidiaries of American MNEs to be lower than that of both German and Japanese MNEs. 
He found autonomy was highest for subsidiaries of British MNEs. Japan and Sweden were a 
close second and third, while subsidiaries of German MNEs had a much lower autonomy. 
The lowest amount of autonomy, however, was found in subsidiaries of American MNEs.  




Based on an extensive literature review, Noorderhaven & Harzing (2009) hypothesises 
centralisation to be higher in American MNEs than in German MNEs, while the latter will 
have higher levels of centralisation than other European MNEs. Previously, Yuen (1993) 
finds that American headquarters exercise a higher influence on the HRM policies of their 
Singapore’s subsidiaries than their Japanese counterparts. Finally, Johnston & Menguc 
(2007) investigated autonomy in subsidiaries of MNEs headquartered in a number of 
different countries. Japanese subsidiaries had a much higher level of autonomy than 
subsidiaries from all other countries in the survey, including the USA. 
 
The results of Spencer & Gomez (2010) might shed some light on these contradictory 
findings. They find that centralisation of formal authority (centralisation in theory) is higher 
in Japanese organisations when compared to their US counterparts. In contrast to this, 
centralisation of de facto decision making (centralisation in daily practice) is lower in 
Japanese companies than in American companies. The difference between formal and de 
facto centralisation is very small in American companies, but considerable in Japanese 
companies. Although the above studies do not provide enough information to verify whether 
formal or de facto authority was measured, this difference might very well explain some of 
the inconsistent results. As our study will focus on de facto centralisation and as most of the 
studies that focused specifically on MNEs found autonomy to be larger for Japanese 
subsidiaries, we come to the following hypothesis: 
H1: There is a difference between the Japanese subsidiaries and subsidiaries from US 
on the level of personal centralized control (PCC).  
In addition to the studies discussed above, some additional information is available for 
different European countries. Two of the studies referred to above (Otterbeck, 1981; 
Noorderhaven & Harzing 2009) already indicated a rather low level of autonomy for German 
subsidiaries when compared to subsidiaries from Japanese and other European MNEs. This is 
confirmed by Johnston & Menguc’s (2007) study, in which Germany had the second highest 
level of centralisation of the ten countries included. A very early study by Daniels & Arpan 
(1972) found autonomy to be very limited in subsidiaries of both German and British MNEs 
when compared to both Italian and Scandinavian (mostly Swedish) firms.  
We put forward the following hypotheses: 




H1b: There is a difference between German subsidiaries and subsidiaries from other 
European countries on the level of personal centralized control (PCC).  
H1c: There is a difference between German and Japanese subsidiaries on score for the 
level of personal centralized control (PCC).  
A related issue that might qualify the discussion on decision-making autonomy in Japanese 
subsidiaries is the relatively high presence of expatriates in Japanese subsidiaries (see e.g. 
Kopp, 1994; Ferner, 1997). Ferner (1997) refers to this practice as: “expatriate-intensive 
modes of control to allow the imposition of central authority through direct contract”. In this 
way, a larger amount of autonomy can be granted since committed Japanese expatriates 
represent “mini-headquarters” within the foreign subsidiary. Bartlett & Ghoshal (2002) also 
refer to this phenomenon when they claim centralisation to be the dominant type of control 
mechanism in Japanese MNEs
17
. This issue will be explored later, when we discuss the use of 
expatriates in a foreign subsidiary as a control mechanism. 
3.4 Bureaucratic formalized control  
Results in the area of formalisation are less contradictory. Chow et al (1994) found the 
preference for formal rules to be higher among Japanese managers than among their 
American counterparts (motivated by Japan’s higher score on Hofstede’s uncertainty 
avoidance dimension). Schaaper et al (2011) found a non-significant higher level of 
formalisation in firms located in Hong Kong or Singapore, when compared to Australian and 
American firms. In Zaheer’s (1995) study, Japanese banks showed significantly higher levels 
of formalisation than American banks.  
On the other hand, Bartlett & Ghoshal (2002), in their study of nine MNEs, report 
formalisation to be the dominant control mechanism in American MNEs. Birnberg & 
Snodgrass (1988) finds that American firms have more explicit control systems, while 
Japanese MNEs have more implicit systems. An implicit control system is defined as one in 
which the bureaucratic rules and standards are not clearly set out and readily knowable by 
both parties. In this context, explicit control systems may, therefore, be considered to be 
synonymous with formalisation. Ferner (1997) contrasts control rooted in formal systems, 
which is said to be typical of US companies with the more socially oriented control 
mechanisms supported by a heavy use of expatriates, as typical of Japanese MNEs. 
According to Hulbert (2003) some American MNEs follow the American mode of control to 
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the extreme and run the risk of drowning themselves in the morass of procedures and reports. 
Baliga & Jaeger (2006) use a similar distinction, when they claim that US companies will 
tend to use more bureaucratic control and Japanese companies more cultural control, which is 
seen as the internalisation of and moral commitment to the norms, values, objectives and 
ways of doing things of the organisation. 
Negandhi (2007) reports that 88% of the subsidiaries of American MNEs responded that they 
depended a great deal on written policies from headquarters, while this was the case for only 
32% of the subsidiaries of German and 12% of the subsidiaries of Japanese firms. 
Noorderhaven & Harzing (2009) finds standardisation in the American MNEs to be higher 
than in European MNEs. Standardisation in German MNE is also higher than in the other 
European MNEs. In their study of foreign banks in Hong Kong, Wong & Birnbaum-More 
(1994) find a negative relationship between uncertainty avoidance and formalisation. 
Countries in their sample with high uncertainty avoidance include Japan, France, Germany, 
and Switzerland, while the group of countries with low uncertainty avoidance hosts all the 
Anglo-Saxon countries. Although Germany is now in the low formalisation group, the scores 
of Japan and the US are consistent with the previous studies. Considering the relative weight 
of the evidence with regard to American and Japanese MNEs, Calori et al (1994) compared 
the control mechanisms applied by French and American MNEs towards their British 
acquisitions. American MNEs were hypothesised to exercise greater control through 
procedures. As in two studies, French MNEs were found to have low levels of control 
through procedures, when compared to American or Anglo-Saxon MNEs. We put forward 
the following hypothesis: 
H2a: Subsidiaries of the American MNEs differ from Japanese subsidiaries in 
bureaucratic formalized control (BFC). 
H2b: There is no difference between American MNEs and European MNEs in 
bureaucratic formalized control.  
 
3.5 Output Control  
Concerning output control, the picture is rather homogeneous. In an early study, 
Scholhammer (1971) found that American MNEs relied more heavily on reports than 




European firms. In addition, Hulbert (2003) found that American MNEs required higher 
levels of reports than either European or Japanese MNEs. Negandhi (2007) finds the 
frequency of reporting to be higher in American than in German and Japanese MNEs. In 
Barnard (2010) study American MNEs also tended to exercise relatively high levels of output 
control over their foreign subsidiaries, when compared to European firms. British MNEs 
were included as a separate group and showed output control levels between American and 
European MNEs. For financial matters, though, British MNEs had exactly as much output 
control as American MNEs. The differences between American and European firms did not 
disappear when controlling for age, size, subsidiary country, number of subsidiaries and the 
international experience of the company. Finally, many of the studies mentioned above under 
bureaucratic formalised control do not make a distinction between this type of control and 
output control, claiming both of them to be higher in American companies than in Japanese 
companies. In view of the observations above, we put forward the following hypotheses:  
H3a: Subsidiaries of the American MNEs have higher output control than subsidiaries 
of European MNEs.  
H3b: There is a difference between American and Japanese MNEs on the output 
control (OUT).  
3.6 Control by socialization and networks  
Although the use of cultural or clan control in Japanese companies is well known (see e.g. 
Paik, 2004; Zaheer, 1995; Schaaper et al. 2011) it is not clear whether the same type of 
control is present in Japanese MNEs. We can distinguish two different approaches in this 
respect. First, Japanese expatriates could indeed socialise foreign subsidiaries’ employees 
into the Japanese way of doing things. On the other hand, control could also rely on a 
socialised Japanese managing director that either has internalised headquarters decisions or 
directly supervises decisions taken at headquarters. In the Japanese firms in some studies, the 
strength of the hierarchy as a control mechanism was emphasised. Managers in American 
firms were significantly more homogeneous in their values, i.e. has a higher level of shared 
values, than managers in Japanese companies. Further, we should note that not every 
subsidiary of a Japanese MNE would have an expatriate as a managing director. With respect 
to subsidiaries of Japanese MNEs that have a low expatriate presence, shared values with 
headquarters is likely to be lower than for subsidiaries of American MNEs, simply because 
the difference with the idiosyncratic Japanese culture will be larger ( Lau 1996). 




When comparing the control mechanisms applied by French and American MNEs towards 
their British acquisitions, Calori et al (1994) found that American MNEs exercised higher 
level of informal control, in particular informal communication to achieve socialisation, than 
French MNEs. As this result relates back to Laurent’s (1983) finding that Anglo-Saxons view 
the organisation primarily as a network of individual relationships, which influence each 
other through negotiation and communication, we put forward the following hypotheses: 
H4a: Subsidiary control by socialization and networks (INFO) would be affected by 
the proportion of expatriate managers.  
H4b: The level of subsidiary control by socialisation and networks would be affected 
the role of expatriate managers.  
3.7 Nature of the firm  
Two organisational characteristics (size and interdependence) are usually considered to have 
the largest amount of influence on the applicability of different control mechanisms in 
organisations. To start with size: one of the results from the Aston studies (see among others 
Pugh et al. 1969) showed that the larger the organisation in terms of employees, the more 
important was standardisation and formalisation (bureaucratic formalised control) and the 
less important was centralisation (personal centralised control). The larger an organisation, 
the more likely it is that the centralised approach to control will generate top management 
overload (Subramaniam & Watson 2006). Not many studies have been conducted to measure 
the effect of size on output control or control by socialisation and networks. Concerning 
interdependence; the level of dependence of different parts of the organisation on each other, 
for example, for inputs. Thompson (1967) draws a parallel between different types of 
interdependence and different types of control. A small amount of interdependence can be 
handled by standardisation (bureaucratic formalised control). A moderate amount of 
interdependence (sequential interdependence) needs coordination by plans or schedules 
(output control category). A large amount of interdependence calls for mutual adjustment 
(categorised as one of the elements of the control by socialisation and networks). 
Output control would only be feasible if plans and budgets are stated in rather general terms 
and the requested reports are not too detailed. This leaves us with elements of control by 
networks or socialisation as the most appropriate control mechanism for uncertain 
environments (Child, 1997; Mintzberg, 1994). An environment is heterogeneous (also called 
diverse) if the organisation’s customers or markets have different characteristics and needs. 




Complexity is seen by some authors (e.g. Mintzberg, 1994) as a different environmental 
factor, and is then usually defined as technological complexity. 
Decentralised decision making presupposes freedom of action, which is mainly compatible 
with output control and control by socialisation and networks. Johnston & Menguc (2007) 
poses the relationship between diversity and control mechanisms in even more direct terms. 
According to this, organisations that are more diversified and more differentiated will use 
coordination by feedback or mutual adjustment rather than “a system of programmed 
interactions”. They furthermore argue that these organisations will rely heavily on 
socialisation. So, in general we can say that elements of our control by socialisation and 
network category will be the most preferred way of control in heterogeneous and complex 
environments, while output control would be in second place. 
We can say that large size results in a lower use of personal centralised control and a higher 
use of bureaucratic formalised control, with a high amount of interdependence, all lead to a 
larger use of either output control or control by socialisation and networks. 
What would be the consequence of these observations for multinational companies? 
Multinationals are undoubtedly large, which would result in a low use of personal centralised 
control, but a larger amount of bureaucratic formalised control. By definition, multinationals 
operate in heterogeneous/complex environments because of the geographical spread of their 
activities. 
Furthermore, the international environment per se is already more dynamic/uncertain than the 
domestic environment. Concerning interdependence in multinational companies, we can 
consider the different subsidiaries to represent the different organisational parts. We can then 
say that while some multinationals would have to deal only with some type of 
interdependence, the global and (in particular) the transnational type of multinational, with its 
integrated network structure, will certainly be characterised by interdependence. So for 
multinational companies – large size and high diversity – lead into the same direction, which 
is a more extensive use of output control and in particular control by socialisation and 
networks. What can be concluded at this stage is that we would expect that, in MNEs in 
general, the more indirect means of control (output control and control by socialisation) 
dominate over the more direct ways of control (personal centralised and formal bureaucratic 
control). Therefore, we hypothesise the following:  




H5: Multinational headquarters use indirect control mechanisms (INFO, OUT) to a 
larger extent in respect of their subsidiaries than direct control (PCC, BFC) 
mechanism.  
As our study focuses on a comparison between MNEs, however, these general indications do 
not provide us with enough information for a systematic comparison. Therefore, in the next 
sections we will deal with some headquarters and subsidiary characteristics that might 
explain differences in the type of control mechanisms that are used by headquarters towards 
their subsidiaries. 
3.8 Size of the MNE 
Since the Aston studies
18
, the influence of the size of the company on the application of 
particular control mechanisms, usually centralisation and formalisation, has received a lot of 
attention. As described above, among organisation theorist there is a consensus that a large 
size leads to more formalisation and less centralisation. Unfortunately, results in the 
international context are not always consistent. Some MNEs researchers look at the increased 
risk that is associated with a larger size and, therefore, predict an increasing level of 
centralisation. Others refer to the difficulty of directly controlling a large enterprise, and 
predict a negative relationship between size and centralisation. Empirically, a positive 
relationship between size and centralisation has been found by Johnston & Menguc (2007) 
and Zaidman & Brock (2009). Hedlund’s (2006) results are based on six firms only, but the 
two firms with the highest level of centralisation were large firms, while the two firms with 
the lowest of centralisation were small firms. Mixed results were found by Wolf and Egelhoff 
(2012), where decisions in the area of marketing were more centralised in larger firms, while 
decisions in the area of finance were more decentralised. Wolf & Egelhoff (2012) seems to 
support Gencturk & Aulakh’s (1995) study. These authors investigated the use of process and 
output control in American firms. Process control was defined as monitoring; a high level of 
monitoring meant a high level of process control. Output control was defined as the level of 
influence of headquarters. If this level were low, there would be a high level of output 
control. So defined, these different control mechanisms resemble surveillance (high process 
control) and centralisation (low output control), which are both elements of the personal 
centralised control. Gencturk & Aulakh found that a large size is associated with lower use of 
process controls (surveillance) and a higher use of output controls (autonomy). A number of 
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studies have investigated domestic firms in a number of different countries. Replicating the 
original Aston studies, Hickson et al (1974) found a positive relationship between size and 
centralisation for British and Canadian firms, but a non-significant relationship for American 
firms. Another replication in Britain, Japan and Sweden (Horvath et al, 1981) found a 
negative relationship for the first country and a positive one for the latter two. No 
significance levels were included in this study, however. Finally, Young (2004) found a 
negative correlation between size and centralisation for American firms, but a positive one 
for Japanese firms. In view of the mixed conclusions above, we conclude that in general 
MNE’s size will not be systematically related to the level of centralisation of decision 
making. Differences, however, were found between various countries. 
Therefore, we investigate whether the relationship between size and centralisation is constant 
across the various countries included in this survey. Henceforth, we put forward:  
H6a: There is an impact of the size of a subsidiary and level of personal centralised 
control (PCC) that HQ exerts over this subsidiary.  
The theoretical and empirical results concerning formalisation are more consistent with the 
consensus among organisation theorists. Hulbert (2003) found size of the company to be a 
major factor leading to formalisation and the use of bureaucratic control procedures. Harzing 
& Noorderhaven (2006) found a higher level of standardisation for larger firms. The studies 
that investigated domestic firms in various countries (Hickson et al, 2002; Young, 2004) 
Therefore, we put forward the following hypothesis:  
H6b: There is an impact of the size of MNE and the level of output control (OUT) 
that headquarters exerts over its subsidiary.  
Few previous studies have investigated the influence of size on our two other control 
mechanisms: output control and control by socialisation and networks. Harzing & 
Noorderhaven (2006) found a higher level of shared values for larger firms. Wolf & Egelhoff 
(2012) also found a non-significant positive relationship between firm size and output 
control. This positive influence would be expected as both mechanisms influence behaviour 
only indirectly (see Chapter 2). Larger firms will realise that direct personal centralised 
control will no longer be feasible and that they would have to rely on indirect mechanisms to 
achieve control. Although bureaucratic formalised control was also judged a direct type of 
control, larger firms are unlikely to get away from the pressures of bureaucratisation. In view 
of the argument above, we would expect, however, that the relation between size and both 




output control and control by socialisation and networks would be stronger than the relation 
between size and formal bureaucratic control.  
This section has investigated headquarters characteristics that might influence the use of 
various control mechanisms. We will now focus our attention on various characteristics at 
subsidiary level that might influence the use of the various control mechanisms. 
3.9 Subsidiary characteristics and control mechanisms  
As for the size of the parent company, the relationship between the size of the subsidiary and 
personal centralised control has received quite a lot of attention. Unfortunately, the results 
are just as mixed. A negative relationship between size and personal centralised control was 
found by Zang et al (2006) and Vora et al (2007), while a positive relationship was found by 
Young (2004). Harzing & Noorderhaven (2006) found a significant negative relationship 
only when relative size was measured. 
These contradictory empirical results could be explained by the equally contradictory 
theoretical motivations. As Vora et al (2007) explain: “From a theoretical standpoint, one can 
detect two conflicting forces at work. On the one hand, increased size means that the 
subsidiary can build up its own resources and become less dependent upon management. On 
the other hand, a very large subsidiary is of great importance to the whole company and may, 
therefore, require a lot of attention.” Vora et al (2007) conclude that a curvilinear relationship 
might be most likely. As with the size of the parent company, contradictory results might also 
be due to a different pattern of relationships across countries. 
In a domestic but cross-cultural setting, Crozier et al. (2009) found size to be positively 
related to autonomy for American firms, negatively for Canadian firms and unrelated to 
autonomy for British firms. In the comparative domestic study by Dow (1996), size was 
negatively related to centralisation for British firms, and positively for Swedish firms, while 
no significant relationship was apparent for Japanese firms.  
In view of these very mixed findings, we conclude that in general a subsidiary’s size will not 
be systematically related to the level of personal centralised control. As differences were 
found between various countries, we will investigate whether the relationship between size 
and centralisation is constant across the various countries included in this survey. 
Although, in general, size is expected to be related to a higher level of bureaucratic 
formalised control, we should not forget that in this study we look at the extent of 
bureaucratic formalised control that is exercised by headquarters towards its subsidiaries. 




Although larger subsidiaries might be more formalised, this is likely to be a self-induced 
formalisation, and not formalisation or standardisation forced upon them by headquarters. 
Few studies are found that relate subsidiary size to the level of bureaucratic formalised 
control exercised by headquarters. (Vora et al, 2007) found, contrary to their expectations, a 
negative relationship between both the relative and absolute size of the subsidiary when 
measured as turnover and formality. Harzing & Noorderhaven (2006) found no significant 
relationships for absolute size measured as both employees and turnover.  
 
The theoretical arguments for the relationship between subsidiary size and bureaucratic 
formalised control could go both ways. On the one hand, larger subsidiaries might be in a 
better position to resist this rather direct form of control, but on the other hand a larger size 
might induce headquarters to want to standardise and formalise operations to a larger degree. 
Since, both arguments are equally reasonable, we will not offer a specific hypothesis on this 
relationship. For the relationship between subsidiary size and output control the number of 
empirical investigations are again limited. Wolf & Egelhoff (2012) found a significant 
positive relationship for manufacturing, while for marketing and finance the relationships 
were not significant. Harzing & Noorderhaven (2006) found a generally positive relationship 
for absolute size only. In addition, a significant positive relationship between both relative 
and absolute size and shared values was found. Due to a complete lack of previous research, 
they did not offer a hypothesis about this. In his discussion of the findings, they refer to a 
control gap that could be filled by international travelling; a control mechanism that is not 
included in our study.  
In our view, a control gap could indeed be a problem in large subsidiaries. Precisely, because 
of their size, large subsidiaries are very important for headquarters. Headquarters would, 
therefore, be likely to prefer to have some level of control over these subsidiaries. As the 
discussion above showed, however, centralisation and formalisation are probably less feasible 
for large subsidiaries. Output control could fill part of this gap, but we consider it more likely 
that the even more flexible and less oppressive control by socialisation and networks would 
be used to fill this control gap. We would, therefore, expect that headquarters to exert a 
relatively large degree of control by socialisation and networks towards larger subsidiaries. 
Therefore, we hypothesise:  




H6c: Size of the subsidiary will have an impact on the level of control by socialization 
(INFO) that HQ exerts over this subsidiary. 
3.9.1 Age of subsidiary  
The age of the subsidiary has also received a relatively high amount of attention by MNEs’ 
researchers, especially what the relationship with personal centralised control is concerned. 
Fortunately, the empirical results are somewhat more homogeneous than the ones we 
discussed in the previous section. Although Johnston & Menguc (2007) found non-significant 
results, Wolf and  Egelhoff (2012) found a significant negative relationship for the finance 
area only, Hoffman (1988), Youssef (1975), and Harzing & Noorderhaven (2006) all found 
support for a negative relationship. This negative relationship seems very logical. 
Headquarters will tend to supervise young subsidiaries more closely and centralise decision 
making because the new investment brings specific uncertainties, which have already been 
eliminated in older subsidiaries. Also, younger subsidiaries probably do not have the same 
amount of qualified manpower that older subsidiaries have, so are less likely to be left taking 
decisions on their own. Therefore: 
H7a: The age of subsidiary is negatively related to the amount of personal centralised 
control (PCC) that HQ exerts over this subsidiary. 
Concerning the other control mechanisms, the state of empirical research is rare. Although 
Harzing & Noorderhaven (2006) investigated the relationship between age and 
standardisation and shared values, no significant results were found. Egelhoff (2010) found a 
negative relationship between age and output control only in the finance area. We believe that 
the “control mechanism” that is most affected by the age of the subsidiary is given with the 
level of expatriation, as was discussed in the second chapter. However, the fact that two 
personal types of control are expected to be negatively related to subsidiary age would lead 
us to expect that it might be the more impersonal types of control (bureaucratic formalised 
control and output control) that are more prominent in older subsidiaries. Therefore: 
H7b: The age of the subsidiary is positively related to the amount of bureaucratic 
formalised control (BFC) and output control (out) that HQ exerts over this subsidiary. 




3.9.2Interdependence   
In contrast to size and age, interdependence is an ambiguous concept. Before we discuss any 
possible impacts of this factor on the application of various control mechanisms, we will first 
explore the exact meaning of this concept. We would like to distinguish three different levels 
of interdependence. First, independence; where the subsidiary is not (or is only hardly) 
dependent on headquarters and is operating very much as a standalone company. This is the 
way in which subsidiaries in the so-called multidomestic MNEs would function. Second, 
dependence; where the subsidiary is dependent on headquarters, which is claimed to be 
typical of subsidiaries in global MNEs. Finally, actual interdependence; where the subsidiary, 
headquarters and other subsidiaries all form part of an interdependent network, such that they 
are in a sense all dependent on each other. This is assumed to be a typical description of the 
function of subsidiaries in a transnational company. Interdependence will be used when we 
refer to the interdependent network idea, in which subsidiaries are also dependent on each 
other. 
That an increasing interdependence should lead to a higher total level of control is assumed, 
explicitly or implicitly, in many publications. Anderson & Forsgren (1995), for instance, 
assume the extent of subsidiary embeddedness to be positively related to the amount of 
control exercised by headquarters. 
The study by Martinez & Jarillo characterises subsidiaries, as regards their interdependence 
in relation to headquarters and other subsidiaries, and finds that the higher the amount of 
interdependence, the higher the total amount of control exercised. In a discussion about 
different control mechanisms in relation to interdependence, Hennart (2011) argues that 
increasing interdependence doesn’t have to lead to increased centralisation as there are other 
ways to control subsidiaries, such as socialisation and output control. What he does argue 
implicitly is that increased interdependence should lead to increased control levels in one 
form or another. That an increasing level of interdependence should lead to higher control 
levels is easily comprehended. High levels of interdependence increase both the importance 
of subsidiaries for headquarters and the level of risk involved. Consequently, a higher level of 
control will be induced.  
Not all control mechanisms, however, will be equally affected by an increasing 
interdependence. Various authors have focused on the effect of interdependence on the level 
of centralisation (an element of our personal centralised control) and have generally found 
this relationship to be positive. In an early study, Picard (1979) forms an exception to this 




case as he found a significant negative relationship between interdependence and 
centralisation. In Hedlund’s (2006) study, the two firms with the lowest level of 
interdependence also showed the lowest level of centralisation. Johnston & Menguc (2007) 
found both affiliate sales to headquarters and affiliate purchases from headquarters to be 
strongly related to centralisation. In fact, these two variables were the only ones that showed 
consistent and very strong relationships with centralisation across the three samples discussed 
in his study. Knoerich (2010) also found the dependence of a subsidiary on the parent 
company to be the most important factor in determining the level of centralisation. In their 
conceptual article, Baliga & Jaeger (2006) hypothesise a positive relationship between 
interdependence and the level of centralisation. Gates & Egelhoff (1986) found mixed results; 
the relationship was negative for financial decisions, and positive for marketing and 
production decisions. Martinez & Jarillo (2005) found a strong positive relationship between 
subsidiary dependence on headquarters and headquarters’ influence over subsidiaries. In 
Forsgren & Holm (2010) study of the relationship between division management and 
subsidiaries in Sweden, resource independence is related to autonomy. Quester & Conduit 
(1996) argue that the greater the dependence of a parent company on its foreign operations, 
the greater the risk to the parent company and the stronger the tendency to centralise all 
decisions.  
H8a: There will be a positive relationship between interdependence and the 
personalized control. (PCC).   
Less empirical studies are available on the relationship between interdependence and 
bureaucratic formalise control. Consistent with their hypothesis, Vora et al (2007) found a 
positive correlation between cross-shipments of goods and the level of formality of 
headquarters-subsidiary relationships. Fan & Zhu (2008) found a positive, correlation 
between manufacturing interdependence and impersonal control mechanisms (standard 
operating procedures, reports, plans and schedules). Finally, Grant (1996) found a strong 
positive relationship between interdependence and standardisation of both policies and 
processes in all functional departments of 69 German MNEs. So we will put forward the 
following hypothesis: 
H8b: There will be a positive relation between the extent of interdependence of a 
subsidiary with the MNE as a whole and the amount of control (OUT) that is 
exercised by headquarters towards that particular subsidiary. 




3.9.3 Local responsiveness  
Local responsiveness is a very important concept in the studies of MNEs that we have 
described previously. Subsidiaries might differ in the extent to which they (are allowed to) 
respond to the local market. Not every subsidiary of a multidomestic company will be equally 
locally responsive. We will, therefore, also discuss the possible influence of a subsidiary’s 
extent of local responsiveness on the type of control mechanism that is used by headquarters 
towards this particular subsidiary. Martinez & Jarillo (2005) study deals explicitly with the 
concept of local responsiveness in relation to different control mechanisms. 
Martinez & Jarillo (2005) studied the relationship between various subsidiary roles and the 
amount of control exercised by headquarters towards a particular subsidiary
19
. Concerning 
the type of control, they only distinguished between formal and subtle control mechanisms. 
The formal control mechanisms, distinguished by Martinez & Jarillo, include all our control 
mechanisms except for control by socialisation and networks, which is represented by 
Martinez & Jarillo’s subtle mechanisms. As Martinez & Jarillo presented their results of 
subsidiaries on both interdependence and local responsiveness, what can be said, however, is 
that local responsiveness seems to be positively related to the total level of control exercised 
by headquarters. In order to be locally responsive, a subsidiary should not be strictly 
controlled by headquarters, to control its local responsiveness. We put forward the following 
hypothesis: 
H8c: There would not be a positive relation between the extent of local 
responsiveness of a subsidiary and the amount of control (PCC) that is exercised by 
headquarters towards that particular subsidiary. 
3.10 International Transfer (Expatriate Role) 
In previous sections, we discussed alternatives for international transfers in achieving control 
by socialisation and informal networks. 
Several authors (E.g. Bartlett & Ghoshal, 2002; Vachani 1999) suggest that international 
transfers would probably be the strongest alternative in providing socialisation and network 
building for expatriates themselves. Sturges & Liefooghe (2010), for instance, sees “career 
and mobility management” as a stronger “glue mechanism” providing more “inter-unit 
cohesion” than project groups and training. When transferred internationally, the employee is 
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immersed into the local culture and situation completely, has no way to escape and is 
dependent on his collaboration with people with different cultural backgrounds and 
perspectives to achieve results. This gives the best opportunity to provide long-lasting 
multiple dimensional attitudes. The contacts last longer and will be more intensive, which 
will give a better opportunity for long-lasting informal networks. For subsidiary managers 
themselves, however, the direct influence of the participation in management training 
programs or international task forces on informal networking would probably be stronger 
than the indirect effect of expatriate presence in subsidiaries. 
 
Therefore, a high level of shared values between a given subsidiary and headquarters and an 
intensive informal information network can probably be achieved in a more direct and less 
expensive way than by international transfers. This does not mean, however, that 
international transfers have become useless. First, they can provide an important support 
function for achieving control by socialisation and informal networks, and second, they can 
fulfil a number of other functions as discussed in Chapter 2. In an effective multinational 
company, we would, therefore, expect the use of both management training & task forces and 
international transfers to achieve control by socialisation and informal networks. 
3.10.1 International Transfer and Personal Centralized Control  
In Chapter 2, we distinguished four different control mechanisms. And then, we explained 
how international transfers facilitate control by socialisation and informal networks. In this 
section, we will show that international transfers can also be used to effectuate personal 
centralised control.  
Most of the authors refer to Edstrom & Galbraith (1977b) to substantiate their argument. 
Edstrom & Galbraith analysed the international transfer of managers in four multinational 
companies. One of these multinationals transferred a far greater number of managers than its 
direct competitor, despite being of the same size, operating in the same industry and having 
nearly identical organisation charts. Edstrom and Galbraith hypothesised that this 
multinational transfer of managers was being used to socialise managers and create informal 
verbal international information networks. However, few research studies (e.g. Ferner, et al. 
(2004) have attempted to test this hypothesis empirically. According to Ferner et al (2004) 
with regard to international transfers: ‘’These transfers were seen as a way for individuals to 
build up networks of contacts and to absorb the international ethos and practices of the firm: 




part, therefore, of what Edstrom & Galbraith (1977b) refer to as an international “control 
strategy based on socialisation” (Ferner et al, 2004:373). Although these studies provide 
some preliminary ideas on the validity of Edstrom and Galbraith’s hypothesis, a firm 
conclusion is hampered by the usual generalisation problems associated with case studies.  
Some studies, discussed in Chapter 2, empirically investigated the various roles of 
international transfers. Within the coordination role, however, the emphasis was mostly on a 
rather direct form of control (comparable to the personal centralised control). In addition, 
data were usually gathered at headquarters.  
To answer this contradiction, we tried to find a more quantitative way to test the hypothesis 
that international transfers serve to achieve control by socialisation and informal networks. 
One of our control mechanisms is control by socialisation and networks. If subsidiaries with a 
large proportion of internationally transferred managers have a higher amount of control by 
socialisation and informal networks, we may conclude that international transfers achieve 
control by socialisation and informal networks. As international transfers are hypothesised to 
influence the socialisation and informal network elements of control by socialisation and 
informal networks, but not necessarily the formal network element, this leads to the following 
hypotheses: 
H9: There is a positive relationship between expatriate numbers in the subsidiary and 
informal control (INFO).  
3.11 Performance differences between MNEs 
Above, we indicated that, in addition to organisational factors, differences in “economic” 
factors might also create performance differences between firms. In addition, many 
researchers in the field of international business, an area dominated by economists, have 
investigated the influence of International Strategic Structure (ISS) on performance. Since 
ISS is one of the headquarters characteristics included in our study, we will review the 
performance effects of this factor as well. Finally, many investigators of MNE performance 
have found the country of origin to be an important differentiating factor in firm performance 
(Tolentino 2010; Rao et al., 2007). Although country of origin is clearly not an economic 
factor, it can have political, social, cultural, legal, as well as economic aspects, and we will 
discuss its effects. Therefore, we will discuss the factors that may explain performance 
differences: country of origin, industry, ISS as nature of the firm.  




3.12 Country-of origin 
Quite a number of researchers have investigated differences in performance between firms 
from different countries. Since the firms included in these samples, were nearly always the 
largest companies of the respective countries, most of the studies concerned multinationals. 
Buckley et al. (1978) found the nationality effect on growth and profitability to be significant. 
They did not give any details, however, about the specific countries that were found to host 
either high- or low-performing firms. 
Rugman (1983) compared the performance of American and European MNEs over a period 
of ten years (1970-1979). Performance was measured as ROE. American firms outperformed 
European firms by a considerable margin; average ROE was 8.36% for European firms and 
12.95% for American firms. Soenen & Van den Bulcke (1988) took a slightly different 
approach and compared performance levels of Belgian MNEs with Belgian subsidiaries of 
European and American firms over a five-year period (1979-1983). American subsidiaries 
outperformed both European subsidiaries and Belgian companies, although the difference 
was larger for the latter. 
Geringer & Hebert (1989) included the 100 largest American and the 100 largest European 
MNEs in their study on the impact of different strategy and internationalisation on 
performance. In addition to the influence of these two variables that will be discussed below, 
the authors found large differences in performance between American and European firms. 
Over a five-year period (1977-1981), ROS was 5.16% for American and 1.52% for European 
firms, while ROA was 6.82% for American versus 2.05% for European firms. Ramaswamy 
(1995) studied the ROA of the 50 largest American, European and Japanese companies over 
the 1980-1985 period. In the regression analysis, however, nationality was only significant 
when past profitability (1975-1979) was excluded as a predictor variable. Brown et al. (1994) 
compare American and Japanese firms on a number of financial statement ratios for the years 
1985-1988. Since American firms turn over assets other than inventory more quickly than 
Japanese firms do, they have a significantly higher ROA. This difference increases over the 
years. Finally, Blaine (1994) concludes that in spite of the vast differences in the approaches 
used in previous studies it seems safe to say that American firms consistently outperformed 
similar Japanese and European firms during the period under study (1970-1987). Therefore, 
we will put forward the following hypothesis: 




H10: Performance of MNEs’ subsidiaries will differ based on the home country of the 
subsidiary.  
3.13 International Strategy and Structure  
In chapter two, we identified three main types of international companies: multidomestic, 
global and transnational. The multidomestic firm is characterised by decentralised network 
structure, in which subsidiaries operate rather autonomously and differentiate products and 
policies to the local market. The global firm operates in a much more integrated and 
centralised way. Subsidiaries have less freedom of action and the MNE’s strategy is focused 
on achieving efficiency with standardised products. The transnational firm combines 
integration and responsiveness and is characterised by an integrated network structure in 
which subsidiaries can play a strategic role. What would be the consequence of these 
different models for the application of the various control mechanisms? 
Let us look at the total level of control that is exercised. When reviewing the descriptions of 
the various MNEs types, it should immediately become clear that multidomestic MNEs 
would exercise a lower level of control towards their subsidiaries than global or transnational 
MNEs as argued by Roth, Schweiger & Morisson (2005). Moreover, Harzing et al.  (1996)  
found indeed that global firms had higher levels of formalisation, centralisation and 
integrating mechanisms than multidomestic firms. Global and transnational MNEs are 
assumed to have broadly comparable levels of control as both types of firms are highly 
integrated.  In addition, some authors have discussed the application of personal centralised 
control in “MNEs. Bartlett & Ghoshal (1989, 1992a) claim that centralisation is the dominant 
control mechanisms in global companies. Gerpott (2001) suggests that centralisation will be 
highest for global strategies, lowest for multidomestic strategies and in between for “hybrid” 
(transnational) strategies. Welge (1987b) contends that within integrated global structures 
there will be less room for autonomy for subsidiaries 
Concerning bureaucratic formalised, some of the authors above contrast informal control 
with bureaucratic and claim the latter to be less applicable in transnationals. A more focused 
motivation can be found in Harzing et al.  (1996). They refer to the fact that global companies 
try to sell standardised products, which would make a high level of standardisation a logical 
choice. Transnationals are much more differentiated and have to act in very flexible way. 




This would make standardisation and formal procedures unfeasible. This means that MNEs 
with the global strategy will experience higher BFC than MNEs with transnational strategy.  
Martinez & Jarillo (1989) suggest that changes in the international environment and 
international competition (from multidomestic and global to transnational) has resulted not 
only in changing strategies and structures for multinational companies, but also in a change in 
the combination of coordination mechanisms used by multinational companies. Co-ordinating 
mechanisms in multidomestic and global multinationals were mainly limited to structural and 
formal mechanisms, which comprise the first three groups we distinguished in Chapter two 
(personal centralised control, formalised bureaucratic control and output control). The 
complexity and uncertainty of a transnational environment, however, has forced multinational 
firms to adopt what Martinez & Jarillo call “more informal and subtle coordination 
mechanisms”. In this category, they distinguish three different mechanisms. First, “micro-
structural arrangements”, also called lateral relations that supplement the formal organisation 
structure.  
Also, “informal communication channels” supplementing the formal information system”. 
These informal communication channels consist of direct contact between managers, 
regardless of their location (headquarters or subsidiaries) or hierarchical position. Moreover , 
“the development of a strong organisational culture that includes both a deep knowledge of 
the company’s policies and objectives and a strong share of organisational values and beliefs” 
(Martinez & Jarillo, 1989:508). We clearly recognise the different subsidiary-categories of 
our control by socialisation and networks as distinguished previously: “socialisation”, or 
INFO control.   
Finally, As subsidiaries from multidomestic companies should have a high level of freedom 
to decide upon their own actions, we would expect that if any control is exercised, 
headquarters would choose for one of the more indirect ways of control: output control or 
Info control by socialisation and networks as we discussed in a previous hypothesis. Also 
Bartlett & Ghoshal (1989, 1992a) saw socialisation as the dominant control mechanism for 
multidomestic MNE, Therefore we put the following hypothesis:  
H11: INFO control would be expected to be the dominant type of strategy used in 
global, transnational and multidomestic MNEs.  





Another “economic” aspect that will be included in the analysis of performance differences is 
the industry in which a company operates. Many of the studies that we discussed did not pay 
attention to industry differences, and sometimes did not even include the industry distribution 
in their sample description. Buckley et al (1978), however, found industry effects significant 
for both growth and profitability. This was only the case for the American firms in their 
sample, however. For non-American firms, nationality of the parent had a higher explanatory 
power. No details are given as to which industries are either high or low performers. 
Pantzaliz (2001) study also found a significant explanatory power for industry. Again, no 
indication is given as to which industries are either high or low performers. Ramaswamy 
(1995) also found industry to be a significant explanatory factor, especially when past 
performance was excluded as a predictor variable. The industries included in Ramaswamy’s 
study were nearly the same as the ones included in our sample, except for the fact that the 
paper and pharmaceutical industry are found in the miscellaneous category, while 
Ramaswamy’s study also includes metal manufacturing and industrial and farm equipment. 
The following individual industry dummies were significant in the regression analysis: 
chemicals, metals, motor vehicles and industrial equipment. Unfortunately, the size and sign 
of their influence is again not revealed. Cool et al., (2006) also find industry to be a 
significant factor in explaining performance differences. However, once more in this study no 
additional information is given on the specific influence of an individual industry. Cool et al., 
refer to a study by Schmalensee (1985), however, in which industry differences (measured as 
industry ROA) explained almost all (at least 75%) of the variance in business unit 
performance. We will, therefore, put forward the following general hypothesis: 
H12: There will be significant differences in performance between different 
industries.  
3.15 Knowledge flows 
The knowledge transfer between the headquarters of MNEs and foreign subsidiaries is an 
important factor (Castro & Neira 2005). The knowledge flows from the subsidiary depend on 
the value the subsidiary has (Gupta & Govindarajan, 2000). Knowledge flows to the 
subsidiary will depend on the transmission channels and motivational disposition to acquire 
knowledge (Cantwell & Mudambi, 2005). Moreover, intra-MNE knowledge flows are a key 




determinant of subsidiary bargaining power, and subsidiary managers can exploit such power 
in order to pursue their own ends (Foss & Pederson, 2004). Notably, subsidiaries may have 
more control and autonomy depending on the flow of knowledge form the headquarters. 
In this regard, Harzing & Noorderhaven (2006) offer an empirical test and extension of Gupta 
& Govindarajan’s (2000) typology of subsidiaries’ roles based on knowledge flows and 
outflows. The results confirm that different subsidiary roles are associated with different 
coordination mechanisms, relative capabilities, and product flows. Espousing a hierarchical 
view of the MNE—and focusing particularly on knowledge as a strategic resource—the 
evolutionary theory of the MNE (Kogut & Zander, 1996), posits that the reason behind the 
MNE’s mere existence was its distinctive ability to absorb and disseminate knowledge within 
the boundaries of the firm. From this standpoint of firms as repositories of knowledge, the 
MNE was viewed as a vehicle for creating, integrating and applying knowledge across its 
different locations (Makela & Piekkari, 2007) In this view, proposed as an alternative 
explanation to the traditional economic theory arguments (Williamson, 1981), the 
multinational firm arose; not owing to market failure in transactions involving knowledge, 
but rather because of its superior ability to transfer knowledge and knowledge-related 
processes internally (Dimitratos, Liouka, & Young  2009 ;Kogut & Zander, 1996; Drogendijk 
& Holm, 2012). 
Literature on MNE subsidiaries has examined the importance of the subsidiary’s network for 
the creation of new knowledge and essential potentials at the subsidiary level (Andersson et 
al, 2007). Jaw, Yu Ping & Chen (2006) conducted a study to examine the relationships 
between knowledge flows and subsidiaries’ performance in the perspective of human capital, 
and found that there is a relationship between systematic perspectives of human capital and 
performance. Senior managers’ competence boosts the performance underlying the human 
capital system. Furthermore, knowledge flows can enhance performance, particularly in the 
early state of the subsidiary’s establishment. Subsidiaries with a high manager’s competence 
during their early establishment will have high knowledge flows from the headquarters, 
which will affect their performance both significantly and positively. Some subsidiaries can 
be affected by other subsidiaries facing difficulties in knowledge flows. In this vein, 
Monteiro, Arvidsson & Birkinshaw (2008) studied the knowledge flows from another 
perspective; they provided some initial insight to the little-researched phenomenon of why 
some subsidiaries are isolated from knowledge-transfer activities within the MNE. The study 




focused on the market-facing subsidiaries—units responsible for marketing and sales 
activities within a particular country of large MNEs. The first was sent to the managers of 
204 marketing subsidiaries in the six participating MNEs; the second part of the survey was 
filled in by executives from corporate headquarters. This study showed that there is a 
difference between market-facing subsidiary units; whilst some units were perceived to be 
highly capable, others were perceived not highly capable. This study focuses on the 
knowledge flows within these units. Knowledge flows are also associated with existing levels 
of communication and reciprocity. Such findings suggest that knowledge transfers in MNEs 
typically occur between highly capable members and the isolated minority. The isolated 
minority underperforms other subsidiaries, thus suggesting the possibility of a ‘liability of 
internal isolation’. 
H13: Knowledge flows are significantly related to perceived performance of the 
subsidiary.  
 




Figure 3.2    An overview of relationships that are covered in this study between the headquarter and subsidiary characteristics and control mechanisms 
 
 










3.16 Chapter Summary  
This chapter focused on the examination of the factors that had been derived from the 
literature review. Therefore, it gave the background to the theories that are implemented in 
the international business field; explained the framework for the research, which used the 
most appropriate model for the study; reviewed the variables that link the headquarters–
subsidiary relationship and explained the development of the hypotheses of the study.  
In Chapter 2, we discussed organisational control mechanisms and the environments, 
strategies and structures of MNEs. In this chapter, we combined these elements and explore 
what can be deduced about the use of various control mechanisms in these MNEs. In doing 
so, we take a two-step approach. First, we reviewed what ‘traditional’ organisation theory 
has to say about the use of control mechanisms in different circumstances and our 
hypotheses were drawn with regard to MNEs. Subsequently, we discussed a number of 
headquarters and subsidiary characteristics that are hypothesised to influence the use of 
various control mechanisms. In discussing the characteristics of subsidiaries and 
headquarters, we used a variety of research streams. Moreover, we showed how these 
control mechanisms are affected by other factors. We also outlined the role the manager can 
play in this respect and discussed the two other main blocks of the thesis: MNEs and 
international transfers.  
Additionally, we discussed all of the hypotheses that are related to our theoretical 
framework and explained how these can function. We also attempted to provide a clearer 
picture of what is meant by socialisation and network communication and the relation of this 
concept to international transfers and strategy and structure of the MNEs. We discuss the 
general claim that international transfers can be used to achieve control by socialisation and 
informal networks, explaining why each type of international manager is not equally 
effective in realising this goal. Subsequently, various alternatives to achieve control by 
socialisation and informal networks are discussed. Lastly, we discuss the factors that may 
explain performance differences: country of origin, industry, strategy, structure and 
knowledge flows.  
 




CHAPTER FOUR RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
4.1 Introduction  
This chapter provides a description of the research design and methodology. The 
methodology of a study is concerned with the choice of appropriate methods, by which the 
validity of the research is judged. Thus, it requires a clear and comprehensive rationalisation 
of how the study is to be done and why particular procedures would be preferred.  
The present research has been developed on the basis of a literature review and conceptual 
approach, as discussed previously. With the support of the conceptual approach, a few 
hypotheses have been developed in relation to independent and dependent variables.  
In order to select a methodological approach for a study, a philosophical stance is required to 
understand the relationship and justification for the adopted approach. This justification leads 
to an explanation for the use of the methods adopted. The discussion should be limited to the 
selection of a research strategy and the justification of the adoption of a strategy for the 
purpose of theory testing.  
 
Drawing on research approaches, a research design has been established to guide the present 
study in a systematic way. In this chapter, the researcher discusses in detail the empirical 
research methodology, including data collection and data analysis. The first section discusses 
the research philosophy; the next section deals with the research approach adopted for this 
study. This is followed by an explanation of the justification for the use of a quantitative 
approach in this study. The choice of the research method and the operationalisation of the 
variables included in this study are explained afterwards. A more detailed description of the 
research method selected to collect the data is then provided. The final section describes the 
sample and investigates whether it can be considered representative of the population of 
MNEs in general. The final section reviews different types of management studies and the 
methodological issues associated with this type of research.  
 
4.2 Research Philosophy 
The research philosophy reflects how a researcher considers or thinks about the effects of the 
approach adopted in the development of knowledge. Informally, it is the way in which 
research is conducted in order to ensure convincing research outcomes (Saunders et al., 




2009). Importantly, two main philosophical positions influence the designs of most 
management research: positivism and phenomenology. 
The key idea of positivism is that the social world exists externally; the properties of which 
should be measured through objective methods (Easterby-Smith et al, 2008). On the other 
hand, the phenomenology idea behind the framework is that reality is not objective and 
exterior, but rather is constructed socially and given meaning by people; thus, it focuses on 
the way in which people create logic within their world, particularly through sharing their 
experiences with others through the medium of language (Saunders et al, 2009). 
The idea of phenomenology is that reality is determined by people. Accordingly, focus 
should be directed towards what people are thinking and feeling, both individually and 
collectively. Thus, it is stated that ‘one should try to understand and explain why individuals 
have diverse experiences’ (Easterby-Smith et al, 2008, p. 58). 
 
To a significant extent, this study is based on positivism or on the existence of social facts. 
The positivist approach explains and predicts causal relationships between its elements, 
which occur in the social world, by searching for the regularities (Bryman, 2004). A positivist 
has a preference for empirical data, which can be observed and measured so that various 
components can be compared for their relative frequency. Using such a quantitative basis, it 
is possible to generate regularities which can then be generalised to broader populations. The 
philosophical assumptions of positivism are presented in Table 3.1. 
 
Table 4.1 Summary of philosophical stance of research approach 
Approach  Description  References  
Positivism  To develop valid and reliable 
ways of collecting “facts” about 
society, this can then be 
statistically analysed in order to 
produce explanations about how 
the social world operates. 
Gilbert (2001) 
Phenomenological  To gain deep understanding of 
human 
behaviour by revealing people’s 
values, interpretive schemes and 
belief systems. 
Cavana et al (2001) 
Source: Adapted by the author.  
 
Both traditions were revealed in their pure forms and found not only different but also 
mutually exclusive (Gilbert, 2001). From a philosophical stance, a positivism paradigm uses 




deduction, beginning with theory, developing hypotheses and collecting data, while the 
phenomenological follows induction, the process of finding a case, observing relationships 
and finally constructing a general theory to cover all cases. According to Cavana et al (2001), 
quantitative design starts from support of the theory, developing hypotheses, collecting and 
analysing data and then accepting or rejecting hypotheses. However, the phenomenological 
research method starts from observing phenomena, analysing patterns and themes, 
formulating relationships, and then developing a theory, supporting the theory, and 
developing hypotheses as shown in Figure 3.1. 
 
Figure 4.1 Deductive and inductive reasoning in research 
Source: Cohen et al. (2000, p-7) 
 
It has been realised in literature (e.g Cycyota & Harrison (2006)) that research methodology 
has a related philosophy within the different schools of thought. Ultimately, the aim of an 
approach is to develop valid and reliable facts from society. However, Easterby-Smith et al 
(1991, p-27) observed and found different features of the positivism and phenomenological 
paradigms, as shown in Table 3.2 
It is important to select the correct methodological paradigm in order to appreciate methods 
and decisions that can be controversial. It can be observed that both methods have some 
strengths and weaknesses. This is well defined by Amaratunga et al (2002), who stated that 
the positivist approach is faster, more economical and can cover a wider range of population, 
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gathering methods are seen as natural rather than artificial. This method supports easy 
understanding of people’s meanings and ideas. From the point of view of weaknesses, it can 
be tedious and requires more sources for data collection. It is more difficult in analysis and 
interpretation than the positivist approach. 
 
Table 4.2 Key features of positivist and phenomenological paradigms 
Theme Positivist Paradigm Phenomenological Paradigm 
Basic beliefs 
 
The world is external and 
objective 
Observer is independent 
 
Science is value free 
 
Focus on facts  
Look for causality and 
fundamental law 
 
The world is socially constructed 
and subjective 
Observer is part of what is 
observed 
Science is driven by human 
interest 
Focus on meaning  
Try to understand what is 
happing  
Research  should 
 
Reduce phenomena to simplest 
elements 
Formulate hypothesis and test 
them 
Use single concepts so that they 
can be measured  
 
Look at the totality of each 
situation 
Develop ideas through induction 
from data 
Use multiple methods to 
establish different views of the 
phenomena  
 
Preferred method in the 
research  
Taking large samples  Establish different views of the 
phenomena  
Small samples investigated in 
depth or over time  
(Adapted from Easterby-Smith et al (1991) 
 
In research, philosophy depends upon the ontology, epistemology, human nature and 
methodology which relate to reality, the relationship between reality and the researcher, and 
the techniques used by the researcher to discover the reality, respectively (Healy and Perry, 
2000). The researcher has discussed both paradigms of research in which the positivism 
paradigm is based on the ontology of the world that is external and objective, while the 
epistemology is based on the belief that observers are independent. According to Burrell and 
Morgan (1979), there are four pairs of assumptions of both subjective and objective 
paradigms in social science research. From an ontological assumption, the main concern is 
the very nature or essence of the social phenomena that are to be investigated. In this 
assumption, a nominalist looks at social reality, while an objectivist looks at realist position. 
In epistemology, there is an assumption that the researcher is concerned with nature and 
forms, whereas a subjective approach is based on the experience and insight of a personal 




nature, and an objectivist approach is observable and is firmly in the research domain. The 
third assumption involves human nature in relationship to human beings and the 
environment. In this approach, subjectivists consider individuals as initiators and 
voluntaristic, while objectivists portray their environment as deterministic. 
Finally, there are methodological issues related to measurement and identification of 
underlying themes. In the above approach, subjectivists try to understand individual 
behaviour, which may be ideographic, while the objectivist is characterised by procedures 
and methods which may be designed to discover a general law that is referred to as 
nomothetic. Table 3.3 given by Cohen et al (2000, p7), shows different research methods that 
influence the choice of methodologies. 
 
Table 4.3 Two traditions of social science approaches 
The subjectivist approach to 
social science  











Human nature Determinism 
(Adapted from Cohen et al (2000)) 
4.2.1 Research Approach Adopted for this Study 
This research study measures the relationship between independent and dependent variables. 
Initially, the research started from the review of a large amount of literature and developed a 
conceptual approach for the empirical examination. According to the conceptual approach, 
and with the support of theories, this research has developed hypotheses to examine the 
relations between independent and dependent variables. The procedure adopted for this 
research follows a quantitative approach for data collection and analysis. According to 
Gilbert (2001, p19), the positivism paradigm uses deduction, beginning with hypotheses. 
Hussey and Hussey (1997, p55) defined the normal process under a positivistic paradigm as 
the study of the literature to establish an appropriate theory and construct hypotheses. There 
are certain reasons to adopt a quantitative approach for data collection from the workplace. 
First, this study is going to measure the relationships between the variables. Second, the 
ontological position suggests the realist position that requires social facts. Third, the 
epistemological position allows independent observable facts in society. The fourth 




assumption identifies human nature, in relation to human beings according to their 
environment, as determinism. Finally, there are methodological issues relating to 
measurement and identification of underlying themes. In this approach, the objectivist is 
characterised by procedures and methods that may be designed to discover general laws 
which is referred to as nonmothetic. This research consists of an empirical study in which a 
survey questionnaire has been applied for data collection. This study was conducted in 
subsidiaries of multinational companies located in KSA where data was collected from a 
sample of managers of these subsidiaries. For analysis of the data, statistical measures were 
applied to test the hypotheses in relation to independent and dependent variables. Before 
collecting the data, a pilot study was conducted to measure the reliability of the survey 
questionnaire, the language used in the questionnaire and the time horizon to complete the 
survey.    
4.2.2 Justification for Quantitative Approach 
In this study, the researcher intends to investigate control mechanisms in multinational 
companies (MNEs). It is the intention to apply a quantitative approach, which is considered 
one of the major approaches in business and social sciences’ research methodology. This 
design is aimed at understanding control, and behaviour of different organizations towards 
their subsidiaries in different environments. A quantitative approach focuses on what, where 
and when (Collis and Hussey, 2003). It addresses the following questions related to this 
study: 
1-Which characteristics of both headquarters and subsidiaries of multinational companies can 
explain differences in the composition of the portfolio of control mechanisms that are used by 
headquarters towards its subsidiaries? 
2-What role do international transfers play in controlling MNE subsidiaries? Are there 
alternative ways to achieve a high level of informal control in MNE subsidiaries? 
3- Which of the MNE characteristics included in this study can be used to explain differences 
in performance between MNEs? 
The epistemology focuses strongly on hard human facts and causes. This research approach 
emphasises realism of context and the use of quantitative methods of research, such as facts 
and causes of social phenomena. It assumes that the social world is composed of relatively 
concrete empirical artefacts that can be identified, studied and measured through approaches 
derived from natural sciences. Thus, for the purpose of conducting this research, it was felt 




that understanding the nature of ‘individual behaviour’ demanded a more contextually-
oriented study perspective. The conceptual approach presented previously reports several 
behaviours and attitudes that can influence the individual during organisational change. These 
factors indicate that there are many organisational, environmental and social issues. Thus, 
this research was conducted in subsidiaries where companies can develop attitudes and 
behaviours on the basis of psychological and financial needs. There is, therefore, a need for a 
research approach that allows the researcher to understand the controls and thoughts of these 
subsidiaries from psychological and financial points of view.  




Table 4.4  Constructs and Corresponding Items generated from Literature Review 
CONSTRUCT ITEMS ADAPTED FROM  
Personal Centralized Control 
(PCC) 
i. Level of autonomy in the subsidiary to decide its own strategies 
ii. The degree “of personal surveillance that HQ managers execute 
iii. Degree “to which HQ uses expatriates to directly control subsidiary 
operations” 
Martinez & Jarillo (2005) 
 Harzing (2000). 
Bucratic Formalized Control 
(BFC) 
i. the degree of standardisation that HQ requires from the subsidiary 
ii. the kind of rules and procedures that HQ exerts towards the subsidiary 
Ghoshal and Nohria (1989) 
 
O'Donnell (2000) 
Output Control (OUT) i. the degree of output control that HQ exerts towards the subsidiary 
ii. the type of planning/goal setting/ budgeting that HQ uses towards the 
Chang & Taylor (1999) 
Informal Control (INFO) i. the degree of participation by executives in committees, taskforces, and 
project groups in the last two years  
ii.  to which extent executives in the subsidiary share company’s values  
iii. the degree of participation of executives in training programs  
iv.  The level of informal communication between the subsidiary and HQ and 
subsidiary.  
Harzing & Noorderhaven (2009) 
Interdependence i. From headquarters in relation to the total amount of purchases of this 
subsidiary 
ii. From other subsidiaries of the group in relation to the total amount of 
purchases of this subsidiary 
iii. Of this subsidiary that is sold or delivered to headquarters 
iv.  Of this subsidiary that is sold or delivered to other subsidiaries of the group 
O'Donnell (2000) 
 Chang and Taylor (1999) 
Local Responsiveness i. R&D incorporated into products sold by this subsidiary that is actually 
performed by this subsidiary 
ii. Company products sold by this subsidiary that have been manufactured (to 
any degree) by this subsidiary 
iii. Company products sold by this country that have been created or 
substantially modified for this market 
iv. Marketing for company products sold in this country that is consciously 
Martinez & Jarillo (2005)  
Luo (2001) 




adapted to local circumstances 
Role of the expatriates i. Improvising information and communication channels with headquarters or 
other subsidiaries of the group  
ii. Transferring specific technical or management knowledge from 
headquarters or other subsidiaries to this subsidiary  
iii.  Ensuring a homogeneous corporate culture throughout the company as a 
whole  
iv. Filling positions for which no local personnel is available in this country 
Training the expatriate in question for future positions at headquarters or 
other subsidiaries  
Sturges & Liefooghe (2010) 
Harzing (2001) 
Knowledge Flows i. this subsidiary possess some key strategic decision making authority 
concerning a mandated product or product line 
ii.  this Subsidiary is aware of any new products/services and new services 
from the HQs only 
iii. the flows of knowledge from the HQ will help this subsidiary to be more 
autonomous; 
iv.  The more the knowledge we get from the HQ the better the performance 
will be; 
v. we communicate with other subsidiaries in getting the right information 
from HQ 
vi. the employees and managers in the Headquarters believe they have unique 
knowledge to share with the subsidiary; 
Harzing & Noorderhaven (2006) 
Monteiro, Arvidsson & Birkinshaw 
(2008) 
 
International Strategy & 
Structure 
i. Our company's strategy is focused on achieving economies of scale by 
concentrating its important activities at a limited number of locations 
ii. Our company can be adequately described as a loosely coupled and 
decentralised federation of independent national subunits 
iii. In our company, a typical subsidiary's main function is to deliver company 
products and carry out headquarters' strategies 
iv. Our company can be adequately described as an integrated and 
interdependent network of different but equivalent subunits, in which 
Bardett & Ghoshal (1989, 1992a), 
 Harzing (2001) 
Kim, Park & Prescott (2003). 




Source: Developed by the researcher for current study
headquarters does not a priori plays a dominant role 
v. Our company not only recognises national differences in taste and values, 
but actually tries to respond to these national differences by consciously 
adapting products and policies to the local market 
vi. In our company subsidiaries regularly act as a strategic centre for a 
particular product or process, subsidiaries perform a role as "centre of 
excellence’’  
vii.  In our company, there are not only large flows of components and 
products, but also of resources, people and information among 
company's subsidiaries 
viii. Our company's competitive position is defined in world-wide terms. 
Different national product markets are closely linked and 
interconnected. Competition takes place on a global basis. 
ix. Headquarters’ competitive strategy is to let each subsidiary compete on a 
domestic level as national product markets are judged to be too 
different to make competition on a global level possible 
Age of the subsidiary   
 
 
Age was taken as the numeric variable equal to the exact number of years the 
subsidiary has had operations within the host country 
Fenton-O’Creevy, M., Gooderham, P. 
and Nordhaug, O. (2008). 
Size  Size was measured as the number of employees  Fenton O’Creevy et al., 2008; Ferner et 
al., 2011 
Performance i. How do you rate this subsidiary’s performance over the past three years 
relative to its objectives 
ii. This subsidiary’s performance over the past three years relative to this 
subsidiary’s main competitors 
iii. This subsidiary’s performance over the past three years relative to other 
sister subsidiaries operating in the same area of business activity 
iv. This subsidiary’s performance relative to the corporate Headquarters’ 
expectations 
Shaw and Wong, (1996) 
Birkinshaw and Morrison (1995) 




4.3 Headquarters characteristics 
In Chapter 2, four headquarters’ characteristics were identified: organisational model, size, 
extent of multinationality and complexity Heterogeneity as we have already indicated how 
the organisational model was standardized t, in this section we will discuss the 
 standardization and measurement of the other characteristics. 
4.3.1 Size 
There are different measures that are used to operationalize the size of MNEs: the number of 
employees, total worldwide sales and total worldwide assets. Although these measures will 
probably be highly correlated, they have a slightly different focus. In particular, size 
measured by the number of employees might differ from the two other measures. The natural 
logarithm of the number of employees was used as the final measure of size. As indicated by 
Miller & Droge (1986), this logarithmic scale is generally used to normalise this variable, 
which might otherwise be badly skewed. Since the same might be true for sales and assets, 
we will also use logarithmic values of these variables in the empirical part of this thesis. 
4.4 Subsidiary characteristics 
4.4.1 Home country, size and age 
The countries to which the questionnaires were sent were indicated on the questionnaire and 
the respondent was asked to tick the country of location of the headquarters. The size of the 
subsidiary was operationalized using two questions that asked for the total workforce of the 
subsidiary and its volume of turnover. Since, in many questionnaires, the currency and/or the 
actual turnover were illegible, we decided to use only the number of employees as an 
indication of size. As for headquarters’ size, the natural logarithm of the number of 
employees was used as the final measure. 
Data on the age of the subsidiary were collected by asking the respondent to indicate the year 
of foundation of the subsidiary. Since the time that the subsidiary is under the reign of 
headquarters might be as important for the type of control used as the actual age of the 
subsidiary, we also asked the respondent to indicate the year in which the subsidiary was 
acquired by its current owner (if applicable). 
 





Following many of the studies discussed in Chapter 2 and Martinez & Jarillo’s study referred 
to above, interdependence was operationalized using a relatively objective measure: the 
percentage of intra-company sales and purchases. However, in our discussion about 
interdependence we made a distinction between dependence and interdependence. The first 
refers to the dependence of subsidiaries on their headquarters, while the second refers to the 
interdependence between various subsidiaries. 
Dependence corresponds to the centralised hub organisational model that was indicated to be 
typical of a global company, while interdependence fits the integrated network model, typical 
of the transnational company. In the configurations of MNEs discussed in Chapter 2, we also 
indicated that global companies would be expected to have high levels of dependence, while 
transnational companies would be characterised by high levels of interdependence.  
In our questions on intra-company sales and purchases, we asked respondents to differentiate 
between their purchases from, or sales to, headquarters and subsidiaries. Four questions were 
constructed that asked for the percentage of purchases from or sales to either headquarters or 
subsidiaries in relation to total purchases or sales. As respondents would not be likely to 
know the exact percentages, six answer categories were included: 0%, 1-25%, 26-50%, 51-
75%, 76-99% and 100%. 
4.4.3 Local responsiveness 
As discussed in Section 2.1.4, Martinez & Jarillo’s study is one of the few that deal with the 
influence of the amount of local responsiveness of a subsidiary on the level and type of 
control mechanism used in this subsidiary. We, therefore, used a slightly adapted version of 
the questions originally constructed by Martinez & Jarillo (2005) and Luo (2001) to measure 
local responsiveness. Since their question about the percentage of value added was not well 
understood in the pre-test, we decided to substitute this question with one about marketing. 
The questions used are reproduced below. In the questionnaire, the main concepts were put in 
bold face. As for interdependence, six answer categories were created.  
• Please give your best estimate of the % of R&D incorporated into products sold by these 
subsidiaries that is actually performed by this subsidiary. 
• Please give your best estimate of the % of company products sold by this subsidiary that 
have been manufactured (to any degree) by this subsidiary. 




• Please give your best estimate of the % of company products sold by this subsidiary that 
have been created or substantially modified for this market. 
• Please give your best estimate of the % of marketing for company products sold by this 
subsidiary that is consciously adapted to local circumstances. 
4.4.4 Subsidiary function 
Since the subsidiary function, as defined in our study, is composed of a combination of the 
level of (inter) dependence and local responsiveness, no additional questions were necessary 
for this variable. The function of the subsidiary was measured with a simple tick-box 
question that asked respondents to indicate whether their subsidiary fulfilled the following 
functions: sales/distribution, service, assembly, production, R&D or country headquarters. Of 
course, more than one answer was possible. 
4.4.5 Performance 
Measuring subsidiary performance has been an inherent difficulty in the present study, given 
its generic orientation, i.e. studying subsidiaries involved in different types of value adding 
activities and operating in different industries. Hence, apart from a thorough review of 
relevant literature, some exploratory case studies ( see e.g Lane, Salk & Lyles (2001) 
provided a significant input in terms of identifying appropriate measures of subsidiary 
performance. Whilst the previous chapter (chapter two) provides a detailed analysis on the 
issue, it is important to refer to some key insights in the following paragraph. These insights, 
along with relevant literature, greatly assisted in the development of a measurement scale 
suitable for the purposes of the present study. 
Based on the exploratory case studies, a large part of the benefits of subsidiary tend to be 
non-financial in nature and thus difficult to quantify. Moreover, each subsidiary, depending 
on the nature of its main value-adding activity, uses different measures to quantify its 
performance. In addition, some subsidiaries may not be encouraged to measure their financial 
performance separately as a site (Andersson et al, 2001). As a result, measuring the impact of 
entrepreneurship on different types of subsidiaries might involve the use of dissimilar types 
of metrics. 
Therefore, in measuring the bottom-line effect of subsidiary entrepreneurship of subsidiary 
performance, this study focuses on managerial satisfaction with performance. This is based 
on subjective perceptions and may capture non-financial aspects of performance, while its 




use is also recommended in international business studies (e.g. Zou and Stan, 1998 and 
Beamish 2007). Further, Lumpkin and Dess (1996) in the entrepreneurship field posit that 
satisfaction of managers with performance may need to be weighted more heavily when 
estimating firm performance. 
The scale employed by this study is based on previous studies who asked respondents to rank 
their firm’s performance in terms of overall performance/success compared to other similar 
firms (e.g. Tan, & Meyer; Doyle et al, 1992; Priem et al, 1995; Shaw and Wong, 1996). Such 
a comparison to other similar firms provides a form of control for differences in performance 
that may be due to industry (Sumelius & Sarala 2008) and value adding activity. Subjective, 
self-reported performance measures – such as those used in this study – have been found to 
be highly correlated with objective measures of firm performance (Dossi, & Patelli, 2008; 
Robinson and Pearce, 1988; Venkatraman and Ramanujam, 1987; Geringer and Hebert, 
1989). Also, multiple relative measures were used to reflect the multidimensionality of the 
performance construct (Cameron, 1978; Chakravarthy, 1986). An important insight of the 
exploratory case study research was that, upon evaluating the impact of subsidiary 
entrepreneurship on subsidiary performance, four key dimensions should be taken into 
consideration (Taggart, 1999): First, performance is assessed based on the subsidiary’s 
individual objectives, as these have been set by the subsidiary management team, with or 
without involvement of the parent corporation (Andersson, et al, 2001). Second, performance 
is assessed based on the expectations of the parent corporation; this pressure translates into a 
need for the subsidiary to fulfil the parent’s expectations. Regarding this pressure for 
performance, Birkinshaw and Morrison (1995) note accordingly: “Subsidiary performance is 
a complex construct, because it depends on what the parent company is trying to achieve” 
(Birkinshaw and Morrison, 1995, p.740). The parent corporation may set its own private 
objectives based on which subsidiary performance is measured, which might differ 
significantly from subsidiary perspectives (Doz & Prahalad 2007; Andersson, et al. 2001 and 
Birkinshaw et al. 1998). Third, performance is assessed based on environmental pressures; 
several researchers have argued that firm performance is to a great extent determined by the 
degree of match with overall environmental pressures (Miller and Friesen, 1978; Porter, 
1985; Prahalad and Doz, 1999; Bartlett and Ghoshal, 2002; Westney, 1994). 




Fourth, performance is assessed based on industry and market norms (Porter, 1980); this 
pressure translates into a need for the subsidiary to differentiate and to out-innovate 
competition. 
The above four dimensions were taken into careful consideration when building the 
subsidiary performance measurement scale. In particular, respondents were asked to evaluate 
(through a Likert-type of scale ranging from 1 to 5, where 1 = low and 5 = high, their overall 
level of satisfaction with the following: 
1) The subsidiary’s performance over the past three years relative to the subsidiary’s 
objectives. 
2) The subsidiary’s performance over the past three years relative to the subsidiary’s main 
competitors. 
3) The subsidiary’s performance over the past three years relative to other sister subsidiaries 
in the same area of business activity. 
4) The subsidiary’s performance over the past three years relative to the corporate 
headquarters’ expectations. 
4.5 Data Management   
This study was undertaken from July 2011 to November 2011.  The survey questionnaire was 
distributed by post, email and personal visits to 350 participants who were selected by 
random sampling from total Multinational Companies which are based in KSA. In the 
random sampling, all categories of employees were considered proportionately. During data 
collection, due process was followed like sending reminders (at least two) to non-respondents 
after fifteen days. No any participants were forced to fill the form at particular time or in a 
particular place.  All participants were free to respond at anytime and anywhere. This study is 
primarily based on statistical package for social sciences (SPSS) version 20 for Windows to 
assess the descriptive statistics and exploratory factor analysis. After exploratory factor 
analysis, factors were confirmed via confirmatory factor analysis. SPSS programmes,  deal  
with  quantitative  data  to  run  the  objects,  thus  all  responses  of participants were entered 
according to the numeric response value. Before entering the data into SPSS spreadsheet 
columns and rows were developed by coding of question items. Therefore, any information 
about the case can be identified across the data editor. In the name column of SPSS, 
questionnaire items were coded with numbers along with an abbreviation of the variable. 
Similarly, in the label column question items were written in abbreviated format. The value 




section of the column was developed  from   “1” for “Strongly Agree” to “5” “Strongly 
Disagree” on a five-point Likert scale and ‘’1’’ for low to ‘’5’’ High on a five-pint Likert 
scale. After entering data, coding was done for variables, which consisted of a series of 
grouped question items. These variables are representing as independent and dependent 
variables used in the analysis. Finally data was cleaned by descriptive statistics tests to know 
the responses to each question according to column section entry to confirm the proper figure 
was entered.  
4.6 Pre-test of the Questionnaire 
According to Kriel (2006, p-109), pre-testing allows the testing of most aspects of the 
questionnaire with respect to time taken, ease of completion and ease of data collection. 
Since most of the variables were operationalized using existing scales or objective measures, 
a large-scale pre-test was deemed to be too costly and time-intensive. In the pilot mailing 
respondents were invited to note down any difficulties they had in answering the questions. 
Four respondents used this opportunity, with most remarks involving questions that were not 
completely clear. These questions were adjusted or deleted from the final questionnaire. The 
questionnaire was also sent to managers in 15 different companies. In general, the 
questionnaire was very well received. However, quite a number of recommendations were 
made concerning the wording of questions and scale markers. In addition, some questions 
were thought to be too difficult to answer for subsidiary managers. Most of the 
recommendations were included in the final version of the questionnaire and a number of 
questions (mainly concerning HQ characteristics) were deleted. 
4.7 Ethical Consideration  
Ethical issues play an important role when research is to be conducted among human 
subjects. According to Neuman (1995), the researcher must protect human rights, guide them 
and supervise the interests of people. Christians (2000) stated the minimum considerations 
such that informed consent, privacy and confidentiality, and accuracy. In this research, all 
ethical requirements are followed throughout all phases of the research. Before collecting 
data, permission was granted by the relevant organisations. 
 The survey questionnaire along with a cover letter was provided by personal visits or post or 
email addresses. The participants were asked to participate voluntarily and given the chance 
to withdraw from participation if they chose to do so. Participants were told that answering 




and returning the questionnaire assumed their consent to participate in this study. All 
participants were assured that anonymity and confidentiality of the responses was guaranteed. 
Also, the participants were told not to write their names on the questionnaires and data was 
coded to ensure anonymity and confidentiality throughout the research process. 
4.8 Chapter Summary  
 This chapter is devoted to providing a description of the research design and methodology. 
The methodology of this study is concerned with the choice of appropriate methods, by 
which the validity of the research can be judged. This research is developed on the basis of a 
literature review and conceptual approach, as discussed previously. With the support of the 
conceptual approach, the hypotheses were developed in relation to independent and 
dependent variables. In order to select a methodological approach, a philosophical stance was 
chosen to understand the relationship and justification for the adopted approach. The 
discussion is limited to the selection of a research strategy and the justification of the 
adoption of the strategy for the purpose of theory testing. Drawing on different research 
approaches, a research design was established to guide the study in a systematic way. We 
discussed in detail the empirical research methodology, including operationalization of the 
variables the data collection.  
The first part of the chapter discussed the research philosophy; the next section deals with the 
research approach adopted for this study, followed by the justification and rationale behind 
the choice of a quantitative approach for this study. The choice of the research method and 
the operationalization of the variables included in this study are explained. A more detailed 
description of the research method selected to collect data is then provided. The final section 
described the sample and investigated whether it can be considered representative of the 
population of MNEs in general. Similarly, we reviewed different types of management 
studies and the methodological issues associated with this type of research.  
In this study, the researcher intended to investigate the control mechanisms in multinational 
companies (MNEs). The study applied a quantitative approach, which is considered one of 
the major approaches in business and social sciences research. This design aimed at 
understanding control and the behaviour of different organisations towards their subsidiaries 
in different environments. 
The chapter also discussed the pre-testing of the questionnaire. After comparing various 
survey methods, the survey was distributed by post, email and personal visits for data 




collection. Further, a deliberate choice was made to collect the main data at the subsidiary 
level, since respondents at this level were thought likely to give more truthful and reliable 
answers. A key informant approach was chosen as the best method of data collection. The 
limitations of this approach and its possible remedies are duly discussed.  
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CHAPTER FIVE DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS 
5.1 Introduction  
In order to achieve the research objectives, this chapter analyses and uncovers the 
relationships between the independent and dependent variables. The previous chapter 
provided details about the research methodology and the methods used in the study. The data 
collection adopted a quantitative method, in which a survey questionnaire was applied to 
obtain the data. This chapter provides the data analysis with subsequent discussions.  
Using the quantitative data, various statistical techniques are used to analyse the data, 
utilising the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) (version 20).  
This chapter comprises the following sections: data management, data screening prior to 
analysis, demographic characteristics, factor loading and descriptive analysis. The main 
analysis and hypotheses testing are discussed in the next chapter.  
5.2 Data screening prior to analysis 
Ensuring the accuracy of data is necessary in order to analyse the responses of participants. 
One of the main accuracy issues is related to data inputting. Moreover, issues like missing 
data, outliers, linearity, normality and homoscedasticity have an impact on the relationships 
between variables or on the outcomes of variables. Indeed, the objective of data screening is 
as much to reveal what is not apparent as it is to portray the actual data, as ‘hidden’ effects 
are easily overlooked (Hair et al., 2006, p.37). Thus, for the correct analysis of data, these 
issues must be considered and resolved (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007). 
5.2.1 Missing Data 
Missing data is one of the most pervasive problems in data analysis. It is a fairly common 
occurrence in certain areas of research which can affect the results of research objectives. 
Missing data occurs for a variety of reasons but the most common reasons in social science 
research are long questionnaires and/or participants who accidently miss out questions.  
According to Tabachnick and   Fidell (2007, p-62), missing data depend on the pattern of 
how much is missing, and why it is missing. However, the pattern is more important than the 
number missing. In social science research, there are various suggestions like using the mean 
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of the scores on the variance (Stevens, 1992) or removing sample(s) who do not responding 
to a question (Norusis, 1995).  According to Tabachnick and Fidell (2007, p-63), if only few 
data points, say, 5% or less, are  missing in a random pattern from a large data set, the 
problem is less serious and almost any procedure for handling missing values yields similar 
results. To find the missing data, this study applied SPSS package of missing value and found 
all question data less than 5% of the total data. Thus, the removal of all missing data such that 
7 samples out of 154 samples is 4.516% which does not cause problems with the outcome of 
the analysis. 
5.2.2 Outliers  
An outlier is a score with a distinct characteristic from the rest of the data. It occurs with an 
extreme value on one variable or a combination of scores on two or more variables to deviate 
the statistics (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007). According to Hair et al. (2006, p-73) an outlier is 
judged to be an unusually high or low value on a variable, or a unique combination of values 
across several variables that make the observation stand out from the others. Hair et al. (2006, 
p-73) have classified outliers into one of four classes based on the source of their uniqueness. 
a.   It can arise from a procedural error, such as a data entry error or mistake in coding. 
b. It is an observation that occurs as the result of an extraordinary event, which accounts for 
the uniqueness of the observation 
c.   It comprises extraordinary observations for which the researcher has no explanation. 
d. It contains observations that fall within the ordinary range of values on each of the 
variables. 
There are three methods to detect outliers (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007; Hair et al., 2006, p-
73 and Field, 2006). Such as: 
a. Univariate detection b.   Bivariate detection c.   Multivariate detection 
Univariate outliers are cases with an extreme value on one variable which can be identified 
by examining the distribution of observations for each variable (Hair et al., 2006). By 
applying a distribution test, outliers can be detected with those cases falling at the outer 
ranges of the distribution or by applying z scores test in which cases with operationalized 
scores in  excess  of 3.29 (p<.001, two tailed test) are potential outliers (Tabachnick and 
Fidell, 2007). According to Tabachnick and Fidell, (2007, p-73) the extremeness of a 
standardized score depends on the size of the sample; with a very large N, a few standardized 
scores in excess of 3.29 are expected. 
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Bivariate outliers can be identified by applying a pair of variables jointly in a scatter plot in 
which if case(s) fall markedly outside the range of the other observations will be seen as 
isolated points (Hair et al., 2006). 
Multivariate outliers are a combination of scores on two or more variables. It is a better 
solution than bivariate because of a large number of graphs and limited numbers of variables 
observations. Thus for multidimensional position of variables, the multivariate detection 
method of dealing with outliers is more useful. According to Hair at el. (2006) and Field 
(2006) multivariate outliers can be identified by Mahalanobis D2 measure in which 
assessment of each observation can be done across a set of variables. In this test if D2/df 
(degree of freedom) value exceeds 2.5 in small samples and 3 or 4 in  large samples it can be 
designated as a possible outlier (Hair, at el., 2006, p-75).  
After detecting  multivariate  outliers,  these  can  be  examined  by  univariate  or  bivariate 
methods for fully understanding the nature of its uniqueness.  
Outliers cannot be categorically characterized as either beneficial or problematic (Hair, et al. 
2006) but they can bias the mean and inflate the standard deviations (Field and Hole, 2003). 
Thus, the researcher should be aware of such values because they bias the model research fit 
to the data (Field, 2006). This  research study applied a graphical method  for  detecting  the  
univariate  outliers  and  Mahalanobis’s  distance  case  was applied for finding multivariate  
Outliers to confirm their effect on the objectives of the study.  
5.3 Normality, linearity and Homoscedasticity 
Before going on to infer results from the data, it should be ensured that data is normally 
distributed and also to confirm the relationship between variables.  In multivariate analysis, a 
fundamental assumption is shaping the data to show the variation. According to Tabachnick 
and Fidell (2007), variables related with each other must be normally distributed. This 
research study is going to confirm the data by screening the normality, linearity and 
homoscedasticity before inferring results from the data. 
In statistics, normality refers to the data distribution which is a fundamental assumption in 
measuring the variation of variables. For analyzing the data, it is not always required but it 
becomes necessary if the variables are normally distributed (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007). 
According to Hair et al. (2006, p-79), if the variation from the data normal 
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distribution  is  sufficiently  large,  all  resulting  statistical  tests  are  invalid,  because 
normality is required to use the F and t statistics. 
Normality of data can be assessed by statistical methods (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007 and 
Hair et al., 2006).  In statistical method, normality of data distribution can be measured by 
Kurtosis and Skewness test and Kolmogorov and Shapiro method (Field, 2006; Tabachnick 
and Fidell, 2007; Hair et al., 2006). For that, initially descriptive statistics were applied in 
SPSS 20.0 for Windows to know the skewness and kurtosis (Table 5.1). All variables were 
found normally distributed; however, values for skewness were found negative and for 
kurtosis values were mixed such that negative and positive. In addition, Kolmogorov and 
Shapiro test (Field, 2006) was applied to find the data normality.  
5.3.1 Assessment of Normality  
Prior to commencing parametric statistical analysis, the interval variables should be checked 
to ensure the general assumptions of normality. As its name implies, to meet the normality 
assumption, the distribution of variables to be used in the analysis should be normally 
distributed (Hair et al, 2006; Tabachnick and Fidell, 2008). There are a number of methods to 
determine whether a variable is normally distributed. The most common method is to 
superimpose a normal curve on a histogram normality plots, and showed normal Q-Q plots 
for each variable. Another method often used to examine normality is to examine skewness 
and kurtosis. According to Hair et al (2006, p.37), skewness refers to the “measure of 
symmetry of a distribution; in most instances the comparison is made to a normal 
distribution,” while kurtosis refers to the “measure of the peakedness or flatness of 
distribution when compared with a normal distribution”. SPSS offers these tests for any given 
variable along with standard error measures. In this formulation, both skewness and kurtosis 
should be zero for a perfectly normally distributed variable; authors vary in the rules of 
thumb they propose to determine the extent to which these measures can deviate from perfect 
normality. Some researchers are satisfied to accept variables with skewness values in the 
range +2 to -2 as near enough normally distributed for most purposes, while values outside 
this range indicate a normality problem. Others are slightly stricter and use a +1 to -1 range 
(Hair et al, 2006). Still other scholars (e.g. Brown, 1997) argue that to assess whether a 
distribution is normal one should consider not only the values of skewness but more 
importantly their respective standard errors. Thus, if kurtosis or skewness exceeds twice the 
absolute value of the standard error of skewness, the normality of the data is problematic. 




Table 5.1 illustrates the properties of the interval level scales to be used in this analysis. As 
the table shows, Skewness was not problematic as skewness statistics were below 1.0. The 
standard error of skewness, was -.40 to .40 (± 2 × .20) and the value for skewness of most 
variables fall within this range. The values of INTER and OUT were slightly above this 
range, but it is statistically negligible. In general, while the data was not perfectly normal, the 
robustness of the statistics to be used in this analysis indicated it was not necessary to 
transform any of the data. The nature of this survey data, the small number of items and a 
restricted range of some of the scales due to the small number of items may have contributed 
to the kurtosis of three of the variables; however, they are not far over the 1.0 expected and 
kurtosis was not deemed to be problematic. Inspection of the Q-Q plots also indicated the 
data for this analysis formed almost a linear pattern.  It should also be noted that multivariate 
and univariate, as well as regression analyses are robust to violations of normality and other 
assumptions (Mertler & Vannata, 2001). 




Table 5.1: Descriptive Statistics 
The Variable Name  Min Max Mean STD Skewness Kurtosis 
Performance (PER) 10.00 20.00 15.40 3.06 -.168 1.182 
Interdependence (INTRA) 4.00 20.00 11.91 4.84 .253 -1.189 
Local Responsiveness (LOCL) 4.00 20.00 10.40 3.95 .880 .147 
Knowledge Flows (KN) 7.00 21.00 13.10 4.54 .069 -1.360 
Strategy and Structure (INSS) 14.00 37.00 24.48 5.52 .104 -.468 
Personal Centralized Control (PCC) 3.00 15.00 9.67 2.96 -.280 -.486 
Formalized Control (BFC)  4.00 10.00 8.21 1.7 -.593 .036 
output control (OUT) 5.00 10.00 8.38 1.37 -.680 -.447 
Informal  control ( INFO) 11.00 20.00 16.09 2.58 -.434 -.959 
*p < .05; **p < .01 Valid N 147 (list wise). Source: Developed by the researcher for current study (2013)





Linearity means that the correlation between variables which is represented by a straight line. 
In data analysis, it is important to know the level of relationship of variables. An implicit 
assumption of all multivariate techniques based on co-relational measures of association, 
including multiple regression, logistic regression, factor analysis (Hair et al., 2006, p-85). 
Thus, examining the relationships of variables is important to identify any departures that 
may affect the correlation. In statistics, linearity can be measured by Pearson’s correlations or 
a scatter plot (Field, 2006; Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007; Hair et al., 2006). This study applied 
Pearson’s correlations and found independent variables correlated to the dependent variable 
(Table 5.2).  




Table 5.2 Correlations between Variables 
 PCC BFC OUT INF INTR PRES INSS KN PERF 
Personal Centralized Control PCC 1         
Bureaucratic Formalized Control BFC .11 1        
Output control OUT .27** .59** 1       
Informal control INFO .33** .45** .50** 1      
Interdependence INTRA .02 .04 .28** .09 1     
Local presence and responsiveness LOCL .37** -.12 -.03 .16 .59** 1    
International strategy and structure INSS .15 .17* .31** .52** -.05 .11 1   
Knowledge Flows KN .23* -.09 -.01 -.16 .06 .18* -.35** 1  
Perceived Performance PERF .08 .00 .24** .46** .34** .34** .33** -.12 1 
* = p<.05, ** = p<.01, N=147 Source: Developed by the researcher for current study 




Homoscedasticity estimates the variance of dependent variables with independent variables.  
In multiple regression analysis, the assumption of variation of variables should be constant 
(Field, 2006). According to Hair et al. (2006, p-83) homoscedasticity is the assumption that 
dependent variable(s) exhibit equal levels of variance across the range of predictor 
variable(s). Thus, it refers to the assumption of normality because when the assumption of 
multivariate normality is met, the relationships between variables are homoscedasticity 
(Field, 2006; Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007). Homoscedasticity can be measured by 
graphical and statistical methods (Hair et al., 2006; Field, 2006). In research, when data are 
grouped, homoscedasticity is known as homogeneity which can be measured by Levene’s test 
of homogeneity of variances (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007). Thus, this study applied 
Levene’s test of homogeneity of variance to confirm the results of variability of dependent 
variables with independent variables.  
5.4 Validity and Reliability 
As indicated in methodology chapter, this study conducted factor analysis to ensure the 
construct validity of instrument and applied a Cronbach alpha test to ascertain the reliability 
and internal consistency of any section scales or subscales. Numerous methods are available 
for factor analysis. Among these, the principal component analysis (PCA) method which is 
the most common and default in SPSS programme was used to extract minimum set of 
variables accounted for the maximum variance in the data (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007). 
Several ways are available to assess the adequacy of extraction and the number of factors but 
most the common are Eigenvalues greater than one and Scree plot. Before going to extract 
factors, it is important to calculate the variability in scores (the variance) for any given 
measures (or variables) (Field, 2006). According to Heir et al. (2007, p-102), communality is 
the total amount of variance an original variable shares with all other variables included in 
the analysis. A variable that has no variance would have a communality of 1; a variable that 
shares nothing with other variables would have a communality of 0 (Field, 2006, p-630). 
Communality can be calculated from factor loading in which a model containing multiple 
constructs with communalities of less than .5 are required and for a larger sample size less 
than .7 is required (Heir et al., 2007). This research applied variables with a communality 
value above .5.  
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By the same token, there are different methods for use in establishing reliability; such as test-
retest, Kuder-Richarson (KR and KR-20), alternate forms, split-half, and parallel forms. A 
Cronbach alpha is a mathematical formula for calculating the internal consistency and 
reliability of a scale or subscale. A Cronbach alpha can range from 0 to +1 and the closer 
coefficient alpha is to +1, the higher the internal consistency and reliability. However, there 
are also factors that need to be considered when interpreting reliability alpha coefficients. Ary 
et al. (2009), noted alpha is a function of the length of the scale or subscale, reliability is a 
function of the heterogeneity of the group, and the alpha is a function of the specific method 
used for its estimation, as well as the nature of the variable being measured. The degree of 
reliability can depend upon the type of instrument being measured. It is expected that 
academic measures will have a higher level of reliability than some softer measures, such as 
psychological, business, or marketing types of surveys. In this study for reliability 
assessment, Cronbach’s alpha technique was applied to the factors derived from the 
exploratory factor analysis to test the internal consistency of factors (Churchill, 1979; Peter, 
1979; Litwin, 1995; De Vaus, 2002). Result values equal to or above 0.70 were considered to 
be an acceptable level of reliability (Nunnally, 1978; De Vaus, 2002).   
Control Mechanism Variables 
Section 3 of the questionnaire asked about the relationship between headquarters and the 
subsidiary. There were 11 items in this scale and these were planned to measure personal 
centralized control (PCC), output control (OUT), bureaucratic formalized control (BFC), and 
control by socialization (INFO). Each of the subscales in this scale was designed to measure 
some aspect of control between headquarters and the subsidiary. Table 5.3 presents the 
proposed subscales and the calculated Cronbach alpha for each subscale. The alpha ranged 
from .653 to .728, indicating an acceptable level of reliability and internal consistency for 
each of the subscales. The reliability coefficients while acceptable are lower than some of the 
other scales in the subsequent sections, perhaps due to the low number of items in each of 
these subscales (i.e. from 2 to 4). The number of items in any subscale or scale can be 
affected by the number of items in the scale or subscale.  




Table 5.3 Section 3 Headquarters/Subsidiary Relations – Control Mechanisms  
 Number of Items Cronbach Alpha 
Personal centralized control (PCC) 3 .728 
Output control  (OUT) 2 .760 
Bureaucratic Formalized Control (BFC) 2 .733 
Control by socialization (INFO) 4 .653 
Source: Developed by the researcher for current study (2013) 
 
The items in Section 3 were submitted to principal components factor analysis (CFC), using a 
varimax rotation and a promax rotation. However, the results of the factor analysis failed to 
confirm the subscales as planned. As a way of checking if the subscales were viable, a 
Cronbach alpha was completed for each of the subscales proposed by the factor analysis. The 
analysis found that the alpha were lower than the original proposed subscales indicating the 
new subscales were not as reliable or internally consistent. Inspection of the items in each of 
the subscales identified by the factor analysis failed to make sense. The items in the subscales 
did not make sense together and this analysis resulted in factors that were not useful or 
meaningful for the study. The decision was made to retain the original arrangement of the 
items as they were planned for the study, with the higher level of internal consistency and 
reliability.  
Subsidiary Performance 
Section 4 contained four items addressing the subsidiary’s performance in the last three years 
compared to objectives, competitors, business activity and headquarters expectations. A five-
point Likert type response scale of Low (1) to High (5) was used for the four items in this 
scale. The calculated Cronbach alpha for the Section 4 performance scale was α = .837. The 
factor analysis indicated this was a unitary scale and accounted for 67.917% of the variance. 
Since this was a unitary scale, there was no rotation involved in this analysis. Table 5.4 
presents the results of the analysis of performance scale and, as can be seen in the table, each 
of the items loads well on one, and only one, factor.  




Table 5.4 Principal Components Loadings for the Performance 
Item  Loading Initial 
Eigenvlaue 
This subsidiary’s performance over the past three years relative to this 
subsidiary’s main competitors. 
.770 2.717 
 
This subsidiary’s performance over the past three years relative to other 
sister subsidiaries operating in the same area of business activity. 
.750 .641 
How do you rate this subsidiary’s performance over the past three years 
relative to its objectives? 
.634 .473 
This subsidiary’s performance relative to the corporate headquarters’ 
expectations. 
.562 .169 
Source: Developed by the researcher for current study (2013) 
  
Subsidiary performance was assessed using two initial sections, where respondents rated 
performance relative to other parties, from “low” to “high” on a five-point scale, and in terms 
of specific business goals such as increasing market share, where choices were between 
“lower than expected” and “better than expected” on a five-point Likert type scale.  There 
were four items in the first section, and seven in the second section.  No items were 
considered to be reverse-coded.  Therefore, the average of all items taken together was used 
as the final score. 
The Cronbach’s alpha statistic recorded a very high (α= .895) degree of reliability for the 11 
items.  The individual variable of “General Performance” was also considered to be a proxy 
for performance overall and so was correlated with the sum of the other items; they were 
significantly positively correlated, as r=.58, p<.001, thus lending further validity to the scale.   
Local Presence and Responsiveness 
Section 5 of the questionnaire contained two sections addressing the best estimate of the 
percentage of purchases to include parts and semi-manufactured articles. The first set of items 
in Section 5 (INTRA) utilized response choices of 0% (1) to 76-100% (5). There were four 
items in this section addressing the sale, delivery or amount of purchases between the 
subsidiary and headquarters. The Cronbach alpha for this section of the questionnaire was α = 
.931 indicating a high level of internal consistency and reliability. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin 
measure of sampling adequacy (.840) indicated the data was acceptable for factor analysis, 
the results of which indicated this was a unitary factor and accounted for 83.095% of the 
variance. Principal components analysis (Table 5.14) indicated this was a unitary factor and 
no rotation was used as only one component could be extracted.  
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Table 5.5 Principal Components Loadings for Percentage of Purchase 
Item  Loading Initial 
Eigenvalue 
Of this subsidiary that is sold or delivered to headquarters . .935 3.324 
From other subsidiary of the group in relation to the total amount of 
purchases of this subsidiary. 
.928 .336 
Of this subsidiary that is sold or delivered to other subsidiaries of the 
group. 
.903 .185 
From headquarters in relation to the total amount of purchases of this 
subsidiary. 
.879 .155 
Source: Developed by the researcher for current study (2013) 
 
The second part of Section 5 (INTER) asked respondents to provide their best estimate of the 
percentage of research and development, products sold and manufactured by subsidiary, 
products modified to be sold in the subsidiary market, and marketing adapted to local 
circumstances. Respondents were asked to complete percentage of response as follows: 0% 
(1) to 76-100% (5). The four items had a Cronbach alpha of α = .906 indicating a high level 
of internal consistency and reliability. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling 
adequacy (.773) indicated the data was suitable for factor analysis. As with the first part of 
Section 5, this was a unitary factor analysis and accounted for 78.319% of the variance. Since 
this was a unitary scale, only a principal components’ analysis was completed (Table 5.6). 
 
Table 5.6 Principal Components Loadings for local Presence and Responsiveness 
Item  Loading Initial 
Eigenvalues 
Company products sold by this country that have been created or 
substantially modified for this market. 
.931 3.132 
R&D incorporated into products sold by this subsidiary that is actually 
performed by this subsidiary. 
.919 .431 
Marketing for company products sold in this country that is consciously 
adapted to local circumstances. 
.846 .318 
Company products sold by this subsidiary that have been manufactured 
(to any degree) by this subsidiary. 
839 .119 
Source: Developed by the researcher for current study (2013) 
International Strategy and Structure (INSS) 
Section 6 of the questionnaire addressed how effective company strategy was in dealing with 
local circumstances, competitive strategy, and company integration. Respondents were asked 
to indicate their level of agreement with each statement using a five-point Likert response 
scale of Disagree (1) to Agree (5). There were nine items in the strategy scale, as can be seen 
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in Table 5.7. The calculated Cronbach alpha for the construct was α = .845 indicating the 
scale had a high level of internal consistency and reliability. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin 
measure of sampling adequacy (.802) indicated the data was suitable for factor analysis. 
Findings of the analysis indicated no rotation was possible as this was a unitary factor and 
accounted for 51.178% of the variance.  Two items (8 and 9) asked about whether the 
company did not load adequately on the scale (.148 and .102); however, the decision was 
made to leave the two items on the scale as it may have been a factor of how respondents 
Agreed or Disagreed with this item, or it might have been a factor of the respondents’ 
knowledge of the information asked for in the item. Thus, Section 6 was a unitary scale.  
Table 5.7 Principal Components Loadings for Percentage of Purchase 
Item  Loading Initial 
Eigenvalue 
1. Our company’s competitive position is defined in worldwide 
terms. Different national product markets are closely linked and 
interconnected. Competition takes place on a global basis. 
.889 4.606 
2. In our company, subsidiaries regularly act as a strategic centre for 
a particular product or process; subsidiaries perform a role as 
“centre of excellence’’. 
.858 1.350 
3. In our company, there are not only large flows of components and 
products, but also of resources, people and information among 
company’s subsidiaries, 
.823 1.029 
4. Our company can be adequately described as an integrated and 
interdependent network of different but equivalent subunits, in 
which headquarters does not a priori play a dominant role 
.803 .610 
5. Headquarters’ competitive strategy is to let each subsidiary 
compete on a domestic level as national product markets are 
judged to be too different to make competition on a global level 
possible. 
.785 .462 
6. Our company not only recognises national differences in taste and 
values, but actually tries to respond to these national differences 
by consciously adapting products and policies to the local market. 
.749 .412 
7. In our company, a typical subsidiary’s main function is to deliver 
company products and carry out headquarters’ strategies. 
.741 .243 
8. Our company’s strategy is focused on achieving economies of 
scale by concentrating its important activities at a limited number 
of locations. 
.148 .158 
9. Our company can be adequately described as a loosely coupled 
and decentralised federation of independent national subunits. 
.102 .130 
Source: Developed by the researcher for current study (2013) 




Knowledge Flows   
In Section 7 of the questionnaire, respondents were asked to indicate on a five-point Likert 
response scale their level of agreement using a response scale of Disagree (1) to Agree (5). 
The seven items in this scale asked about authority for decision making, awareness of the 
subsidiary, and knowledge flow from headquarters to the subsidiary. The calculated 
Cronbach alpha for the Section 7 knowledge scale was α = .894, indicating a high level of 
internal consistency and reliability. Table 5.8 presents each of the items and their principal 
components’ loading as the scale was a unitary scale and no rotation was possible. The 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin statistic (.768) indicated the data was appropriate for factor analysis.  
 
Table 5.8 Principal Components Loadings for Knowledge flows 
Item  Loading Initial 
Eigenvalues 
1. We communicate with other subsidiaries in getting the right 
information from HQ. 
.901 4.340 
2. Inflow of knowledge from HQ will help this subsidiary to be more 
autonomous. 
.859 .822 
3. The more knowledge we get from the HQ, the better the 
performance will be. 
.838 .623 
4. Subsidiary possesses some key strategic decision making authority 
concerning a mandated product or product line. 
.829 .456 
5. Employees and managers in HQ are able to explain the knowledge 




6. Subsidiary is aware of any new products/services and new services 
from the headquarters only.  
.683 .263 
7. Employees and managers in HQ think they have unique 
knowledge to share with subsidiary. 
.616 .105 
Source: Developed by the researcher for current study (2013) 
5.5 Data examination 
A total of thirteen hypotheses were posed for this study. Each hypothesis will be addressed 
separately in the next chapter. The hypotheses each has its own statistical analysis including 
analysis of variance (ANOVA), correlation, Liner and multiple regression, and Chi Square. 
Prior to commencing statistical analysis of each hypothesis, the data was checked to ensure 
the assumptions of normality, skewness, kurtosis, and linearity as we discussed. 
Homogeneity of variance using the Levene test and homoscedasiticity assumptions will be 
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tested using the data necessary for the appropriate hypothesis. Homogeneity is the 
assumption the variabitliy in a continuous dependent variable is expected to be roughly 
consistent at all levels of the independent or discrete grouping. This assumption will be tested 
for univariaite ANOVAs for the appropriate hypothesis. The Levene test provides a 
conservative estimate the come from the same population. If the Levene’s test is small 
(p<.05) the null hypothesis is rejected; however the decision to reject the null is not fatal to 
the analysis. Homoscedasiticity is related to normality since if the assumption of multivariate 
normality is met, the two variables must be homoscedastic (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996). The 
failure of the relationship between two variables to be homoscedastic is caused either by the 
non-normality of one of the variables. Errors in measurement may also be a cause of 
homoscedasticity. A scatterplot of the variables or the Box’s test for equality of variance-
covariance matrices. The Box’s test allow testing evaluate the hypothesis the covariance 
matrices are equal. Like the Levene test, Box’s test is calculated when the appropriate 
statistic is calculate with the variables needed to test the research hypothesis. It is not 
necessary to test for homogeneity of variance or homoscedasiticy unless univariate or 
multivariate statistics are involved. These tests will be completed and reported with the 
appropriate statistical test. 
As we mentioned Table 5.1 illustrates the properties of the interval level scales to be used in 
this analysis. Inspection of histograms, normality plots, and detreded normal Q-Q plots for 
each variable also indicated outliers were not problematic especially for survey data of this 
type. Skewness was not problematic as skewness statistics were below 1.0. The Kolmorogov-
Smirnov test for normality is based on a quantification of the discrepancy between observed 
and expected distributions. However, this is not always and adequate method for testing 
normality. The Shapiro-Wilk normality test does not work well when several values in the 
data set are the same as was the case in this data set. Inspection of the Q-Q plots indicated the 
data for this analysis formed a linear pattern.   
5.6 Description of the respondents   
As indicated before, a total of 147 respondents participated in this study.  The participants 
represented 17 different countries across eight industries. The largest number of MNEs was 
headquartered in the United States (n=23, 15.6%), the United Kingdom (n=15, 10.2%), and 
Australia (n=14, 9.5%). Other well represented countries included Japan, China, South 
Korea, and Jordan. Table 5.9 presents all of the headquarter countries of individuals 
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participating in the study. MNE headquarter countries were also inspected by region of the 
world where they were located. While the United States had the highest number of firms in 
KSA, there were only 28 firms from North America (19.0%), while European countries 
(n=52, 35.4%) and Asian/Pacific countries (n=42, 28.6%) accounted for the majority of MNE 
headquarters countries. MNEs from the Middle East only accounted for a total of 25 firms 
(17%). Table 5.10 presents the MNEs by region of the world.  
 
Figure 5.1 MNE Headquarters Country and their distributions   
 
   Source: Developed by the researcher for current study 
 
 
Table 5.9 MNE Headquarters Country by Region of the World 
World Region  Observations Percentage 
North America 28 19.0% 
Europe 52 35.4% 
The Middle East 25 17.0% 
Asia/Pacific 42 28.6% 
Total  147 100.0% 
Source: Developed by the researcher for current study 
 
The MNEs operated in a variety of industries in KSA but the largest percentage were in 
chemicals (n=51, 34.7%), followed by petroleum (n=24, 16.3%) and electronics/electrical 
equipment (n=18, 12.2%). However, there were a number of different industries represented 
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by the individuals responding to this survey. Table 5.11 presents the industries represented by 
survey respondents and their firms. 
 
Table 5.10 MNEs by Industry and their percentage in the sample of the study 
Industry type  Observations  Percentage % 
Petroleum 24 16.3% 
Chemicals 51 34.7% 
Electronics/electrical equip 18 12.2% 
Food/Beverages 12 8.2% 
Computers 5 3.4% 
Motor vehicles and parts 9 6.1% 
Papers 10 6.8% 
Other 18 12.2% 
Total 147 100 % 
Source: Developed by the researcher for current study 
 
 
 Figure 5.2 Industries of the study and their distributions in the sample  
 
Source: Developed by the researcher for current study 
 
 
North American subsidiary firms were engaged only in the fields of petroleum and chemicals, 
while none of the Middle Eastern firms were engaged in these fields, instead operating in 
food/beverages, papers and other fields. Asian/Pacific subsidiaries were also engaged in 
petroleum, chemicals, and electronics/electrical equipment. European firms were active in all 
fields but predominately in chemicals. Table 4 presents industry by world region for the 
companies. 
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Table 5.11 MNE by Industry and World Region 
Industry type  N. America Europe Middle  East Asia/Pacific 
 N % N % N % N % 
Petroleum 5 17.9 9 17.0 0 0 10 23.3 
Chemicals 23 82.1 14 26.4 0 0 14 32.6 
Electronics/electrical equipment 0 0 0 0 0 0 18 41.9 
Food/beverages 0 0 1 1.9 11 47.8 0 0 
Computers 0 0 5 9.4 0 0 0 0 
Motor vehicles/parts 0 0 9 17.0 0 0 0 0 
Papers 0 0 5 9.4 4 17.4 1 2.3 
Others 0 0 10 18.9 8 34.8 0 0 
Total  28 100.0 53 100.0 23 100.0 43 100.0 
Source: Developed by the researcher for current study (2013) 
  
The subsidiary type included marketing and sales as the predominant type of MNE subsidiary 
(n=54, 36.7%), followed by subsidiaries engaged in production (n=28, 19.0%). Table 5.4 
presents the subsidiaries by type of business activity. Subsidiaries were also in services, 
manufacturing operations, or were country headquarters or product design.  
 
Table 5.12 functions of the subsidiaries and their percentage  
Subsidiary function  Observations Percentage 
Marketing/sales 54 36.7% 
Manufacturing Operations 14 9.5% 
Services 15 10.25% 
Assembly 9 6.1% 
Product design 13 8.8% 
Production 28 19.0% 
Country HQ 14 9.5% 
Total 147 100% 
Source: Developed by the researcher for current study 
 
Subsidiaries were also compared by region of the world and type of business, as can be seen 
in Table 5.14 More European countries had country headquarters in KSA and they also 
represented the largest number in the marketing/sales type, while Asian/Pacific countries 
were engaged in all types of subsidiaries. North Americans were predominately in 
marketing/sales, production and product design. Middle Eastern countries were in 
marketing/sales, services, product design, and production.  
 
 




Figure 5.3 Functions of the subsidiaries and their distributions 
Source: Developed by the researcher for current study 
 
 
Table 5.13 Subsidiary function by World Region 
Function of the Subsidiary  N. America Europe Mid East Asia/Pacific 
 N % N % N % N % 
Marketing/sales 10 35.7 19 35.8 11 47.8 14 32.6 
Manufacturing Operations 0 0 9 17.0 0 0 5 11.6 
Services 0 0 10 18.9 4 17.4 1 2.3 
Assembly 0 0 0 0 0 0.0 9 20.9 
Product design 4 14.3 0 0 4 17.4 5 11.6 
Production 14 50.0 5 9.4 4 17.4 5 11.6 
Country HQ 0 0.0 10 18.9 0 0.0. 4 9.3 
Total 28 100.0 53 100.0 23 100.0 43 100.0 
Source: Developed by the researcher for current study 
 
Survey respondents were also asked when the subsidiary was established. Responses to this 
question were categorised as follows: 1-5 years, 6-10 years, 11-15 years, 16-20 years, and 21-
30 years. The majority of the subsidiaries had been established between 16 and 20 years 
(n=53, 36.1%) or 11-15 years ago (n=43, 19.7%), with only 10 subsidiaries established 
between 21 and 30 years ago (6.8%). It was interesting there were only 12 firms established 
within the last 1-5 years (8.2%) or between 6 and 10 years (19.7%). Most of the firms had 
been established in KSA for more than 11 years.  




Table 5.14 Age of subsidiaries in the sample 
Age of the subsidiary  Observations  Percentage % 
1-5 years 12 8.2 
6-10 years 29 19.7 
11-15 years 43 29.3 
16-20 years 53 36.1 
21-30 years  10 6.8 
Total 147 100.0 
Source: Developed by the researcher for current study 
 
All of the North American subsidiaries (n=28, 100%) had been established 16 or more years 
ago; however, only 20 of the European (37.7%), none of the Middle Eastern, and only 15 of 
the Asian/Pacific subsidiaries had been in KSA for 16 or more years. Table 5.16 presents the 
data for the number of subsidiary employees by region of the world. 
 
Table 5.15 Subsidiary Years of Establishment by World Region 
 N. America Europe Mid East Asia/Pacific 
 N % N % N % N % 
1-5 years 0 0 0 0 12 52.2 0 0 
6-10 years 0 0 15 28.3 4 17.4 10 23.3 
11-15 years 0 0 18 34.0 7 30.4 18 41.9 
16-20 years 23 82.1 15 28.3 0 0 15 34.9 
21-30 years  4 17.9 5 9.4 0 0 0 0 
Total 28 100.0 53 0.0 23 100.0 43 100.0 
Source: Developed by the researcher for current study 
 
The number of employees per subsidiary varied from 1000 to 15,000. Subsidiaries typically 
had between 501 and 1000 employees in KSA (n=62, 42.2%), or between 101 and 500 
employees (n=36, 24.5%), or between 1001 and 5000 employees at the subsidiary (n=32, 
21.8%). There were only five firms with between 10,001 and 15,000 (3.4%) and just 12 
subsidiaries had between 5,001-10,000 employees (8.2%).   
Table 5.16 Subsidiary number of employees and their percentage 
Number of Employees  Observations Percentage % 
101-500 employees 36 24.5 
501-1000 employees 62 42.2 
5001-5000 employees 32 21.8 
5001-10000 employees 12 8.2 
10001-15000 employees 5 3.4 
Total  147 100.0 
Source: Developed by the researcher for current study 
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Five of the European firms had the highest number of employees (10,001-15,000) and 11 of 
the North American subsidiaries had between 5001 and 10,000 employees. Table 5.18 
presents the data for the number of firm employees worldwide by region of the world. 
 
Table 5.17 Subsidiary Number of Employees by World Region 
Number of Employees  N. America Europe Mid East Asia/Pacific 
 N % N % N % N % 
101-500 employees 5 17.9 10 18.9 16 69.6 6 11.6 
501-1000 employees 8 28.6 28 52.8 3 4.8 23 53.5 
5001-5000 employees 4 14.3 10 18.9 4 12.5 14 32.6 
5001-10000 employees 11 39.3 0 0.0 0 0 1 2.3 
10001-15000 employees 0 0 5 9.4 0 0 0 0 
Total  28 100.0 53 100.0 23 100.0 43 100.0 
Source: Developed by the researcher for current study (2013) 
 
Respondents were also asked for the total number of employees worldwide for their firm. 
Responses were grouped into: 1,001-5,000, 5,001-10,000, 10001-20,000, 20,000-50,000, and 
more then 50,000.  Forty-eight of the respondents indicated their firm had more than 50,000 
employees worldwide (32.7%) and 41 worked for firms between 5,001 and 10,000 (27.9%) 
This was followed by 37 respondents working for firms between 20,000-50,000 (25.2%), 
10,001-20,000 (n=4, 2.7%), and smaller firms with between 1,001 and 5,000 worldwide 
employees (n=17, 11.6%).  
 
Table 5.18 Subsidiary Number of Employees by World Region 
Number of Employees Worldwide  Observations  Percentage % 
1001-5000 employees 17 11.6 
5001-10,000 employees 41 27.9 
10,001-20,000 employees 4 2.7 
20,000-50,000 employees 37 25.2 
More than 50,000 employees 48 32.7 
Total  147 100.0 
Source: Developed by the researcher for current study (2013) 
 
The majority of the North American firms had over 20,000 employees worldwide and 23 of 
the Asian/Pacific firms were over 20,000 employees. However, the greatest number of firms, 
with over 20,000 employees worldwide, was the Europeans. Table 5.8 presents the number of 
subsidiary employees by world region.  
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Table 5.19 Subsidiary Number of Employees by World Region 
Subsidiary employees N. America Europe Mid East Asia/Pacific 
 N % N % N % N % 
1001-5000 employees 0 0 4 7.5 8 34.8 5 11.6 
5001-10,000 employees 10 35.7 9 17.4 7 30.4 15 34.9 
10,001-20,000 employees 1 0 0 0 4 17.4 0 0 
20,000-50,000 employees 4 14.3 15 28.3 4 17.4 14 32.6 
More than 50,000 employees 14 29.2 25 47.2 0 0 9 20.9 
Total  28 100.0 53 100.0 23 100.0 43 100.0 
Source: Developed by the researcher for current study 
 
Respondents were asked to indicate the nationality of the manager of the subsidiary. This was 
done to identify where the managers were from. Fifty managers were from KSA (34.0%) and 
58 were from the headquarters country (39.5%). There were also 39 managers (26.5%) from 
another third country. 
Table 5.20 Nationality of the subsidiary manager 
Nationality of the manger  Observations  Percentage % 
KSA 50 34.0 
Headquarters country 58 39.5 
Third country national 39 26.5 
Total  147 100.0 
Source: Developed by the researcher for current study 
 
Asian/Pacific had the highest number of managers from the headquarters country (79.1%) 
and no KSA nationals with only 9 from a third country (20.9%). North Americans firms 
employed KSA nationals (n=18, 64.3%), Middle Eastern firms employed 11 KSA nationals 
(47.89%), and Europeans employed 21 KSA nationals (39.6%). Figure 5.4 illustrates the 















 Figure 5.4 Nationality of the manger and their distributions by the World Region  
Source: developed by the researcher for current study  
 
Expatriates play a variety of roles when working for subsidiary firms in KSA. The majority 
of expatriates fill positions for which there are no local personnel available (n=50, 34.0%), 
indicating that trained and educated staff are not available in KSA. Expatriates also serve to 
ensure a homogeneous corporate culture throughout the company and subsidiary (n=35, 
23.8%), and work to transfer specific technical or managerial knowledge from the 
headquarters office. Fewer expatriates work to improve information and communication 
channels with headquarters (n=18, 12.2%). It was interesting to note that only 16 of the 
respondents indicated expatriates were being trained for future positions at headquarters 
(10.9%).  
Table 5.21 Expatriates role in the Subsidiary 
Expatriate role in the subsidiary  Observations  Percentage% 
Improving information and communication 
channels with headquarters  
18 12.2% 
Transferring specific technical or 
management knowledge from headquarters  
28 19.0% 
Ensuring a homogeneous corporate culture 
throughout the company  
35 23.8% 
Filling positions for which no local 
personnel are available  
50 34.0% 
Training the expatriate in question for future 
positions at headquarters  
16 10.9% 
Total  147 100% 
Source: Developed by the researcher for current study (2013) 
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Figure 5.5 Expatriates role in the Subsidiary and their percentages  
Source: Developed by the researcher for current study  
 
None of the Asian/Pacific firms were using expatriates in the subsidiary to train for future 
headquarters positions; however, eight of the Middle Eastern firms were using the subsidiary 
as training for future positions at headquarters (34.8%). Nineteen of the North American 
headquartered firms were using expatriates to fill positions where there was no local 
personnel (n=19, 67.9%). Table 5.24 present the roles expatriates play in the subsidiary by 
world region.  
 
Table 5.22 Role of Expatriates by World Region 
 N. America Europe Mid East Asia/Pacific 
 N % N % N % N % 
Improving information and 
communication channels with 
headquarters  
0 0 9 17.0 0 0.0 9 20.9 
Transferring specific technical or 
management knowledge from 
headquarters  
0 0 21 39.6 7 30.4 0 0 
Ensuring a homogeneous 
corporate culture throughout the 
company  
5 17.9 10 18.9 4 17.4 16 37.2 
Filling positions for which no 
local personnel are available  
19 67.9 9 17.0 4 17.4 18 41.9 
Training the expatriate in 
question for future positions at 
headquarters  
4 14.3 4 7.5 8 34.8 0 0 
Total  28 100.0 53 100.0 23 100.0 43 100.0 
Source: Developed by the researcher for current study (2013) 




Subsidiary firms in KSA included majority-owned firms (51%+) (n=30, 20.4%) and 
minority-owned firms (less than 50%). However, the majority of the subsidiary firms were 
joint ventures (n=82, 55.8%). There were fewer joint ventures with North American firms 
(n=11, 39.3%) than with Middle Eastern firms (n=16, 65.2%) or Asian/Pacific firms (n=29, 
67.4%). Majority and minority-owned firms were fairly evenly spilt across each of the four 
world regions. Table 5.25 presents the subsidiary ownership by world region.  
 
Table 5.23 Subsidiary Ownership by World Region 
Ownership of the subsidiary  N. America Europe Mid East Asia/Pacific 
 N % N % N % N % 
Majority owned (51%+) 10 35.7 11 20.89 4 17.4 5 11.6 
Minority owned (less than 50%) 7 25.0 15 28.3 4 17.4 9 20.9 
Joint Venture  11 39.3 27 50.9 15 65.2 29 67.4 
Total  28 100.0 53 36.1 23 100.0 43 100.0 
Source: Developed by the researcher for current study 
 
Figure 5.6 Subsidiary ownership by the World Region 
 
Source: Developed by the researcher for current study (2013) 
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5.7 Chapter Summary 
This chapter is concerned with analysing and uncovering the relationships between the 
variables used in the study in order to achieve the research objectives. The study adopted a 
quantitative method, whereby a survey questionnaire was applied to obtain the data.  
Based on the quantitative data, various statistical techniques based on Statistical Package for 
Social Sciences (SPSS) version 20 software were used to analyse the data. Before entering 
the data into SPSS, spread sheet columns and rows were developed by coding the question 
items. Therefore, any information about the case could be identified across the data editor. In 
the ‘name’ column of SPSS, the questionnaire items were coded with numbers along with 
abbreviations of the variables. Similarly, in the ‘label’ column, the question items were 
written in an abbreviated format. The value section of the column was developed from “1” 
for “Strongly Agree” to “5” meaning “Strongly Disagree” on a five-point Likert scale. After 
entering the data, coding was done for the variables, which consisted of a series of grouped 
question items. These variables represented the independent and dependent variables used in 
the analysis. Finally, the data was cleaned by descriptive statistics tests. The responses to 
each question according to the column section entry were checked to confirm that the proper 
figures had been entered Accuracy of data is necessary for analysing the responses of 
participants. Many issues relate to the accuracy with which data was entered into the data file. 
Issues like missing data, outliers, linearity, normality and homoscedasticity have an impact 
on the relationships between variables or on the outcomes of variables. Indeed, the objective 
of data screening is as much to reveal what is not apparent as it is to portray the actual data, 
given that the ‘hidden’ effects are easily overlooked (Hair et al., 2006, p.37). Thus, for the 
accurate analysis of the main data in this study, these issues were considered and addressed 
appropriately. 





CHAPTER SIX DATA ANALYSIS 
6.1 Introduction  
This chapter reports the results of testing 13 hypotheses that examine various aspects of the 
conceptual model (Figure 4.2). This was done using parametric statistics (including 
independent sample t-tests, one-way between-group analysis of variance, Pearson correlation 
analysis, linear regression and hierarchical multiple regression) to examine the relationships 
between MNE HQ characteristics, subsidiary characteristics, control mechanisms, dominant 
strategies and subsidiary managers’ perceptions of subsidiary performance in KSA. The 
parametric assumption of normality was largely met. Any non-normally distributed variables 
were log transformed prior to formal analysis, to meet the normality assumption.  
The analysis of the survey data was performed using SPSS (version 20.0), with a significance 
level of p<.05 used as the criterion for statistical significance for each hypothesis test: an 
alpha level of p<.05 was significant; p<.01 was very significant; and p<.001 was highly 
significant (Field, 2009). Assumptions for each test were checked and reported. Graphs, 
including histograms and scatterplots, were used to evaluate the assumptions of the 
regression analyses. A summary of the results from the hypotheses testing is detailed in Table 
21 at the end of this chapter.  
6.2 Correlation and Regression Analysis 
A Pearson product-moment correlation was performed to examine the relationship between 
the study variables, prior to regression analyses. The correlation coefficients are shown in 
Table 1. Perceived subsidiary performance was strongly, positively correlated with MNE 
control of output (r=.557, p<.01), and strategy (INSS) (r=.414, p<.01), global strategy 
(r=.458, p<.01), control by socialisation and networks (INFO) (r=.359, p<.02), multi-
domestic strategy (r=.332, p<.01), transnational strategy (r=.322, p<.01), personal centralized 
control (PCC) (r=.295, p<.01), interdependence (r=.280, p<.01), local responsiveness 
(r=.235, p<.01),  and bureaucratic formalized control (BFC) (r=.206, p<.05), with higher 
scores on these variables associated with higher perceptions of subsidiary performance.  The 





proportion of expatriate managers per subsidiary, size of subsidiary (no. of employees), and 
knowledge flows were not significantly related so perceived subsidiary performance. See 




Table 6.1 Pearson Correlation Matrix of all the variables 
Variables  Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1. Subsidiary Performance 3.85 .766               
2. Control.PCC 3.22 .988 .295
**
              
3. Control.BFC 4.11 .736 .206
*
 .116             
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7. Log of proportion of expatriate 
managers 






         








        
9. Knowledge flows 1.87 .649 -.108 .190
*
 -.093 -.013 -.132 -.086 -.145 -.160       
10. Interdependence 2.98 1.21 .280
**
 .031 .036 .280
**
 -.032 .129 .117 .131 .056      








     
















    












   










































Note: Control PCC = personal centralized control, Control BFC = bureaucratic formalized control, Control OUT = output control, Control INFO = control by socialisation, 
MNE = multinational headquarters.   **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed), *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). N = 147. 
Source: Developed by the researcher for current study 





6.3 Hypotheses Testing  
The following section report the results of thirteen hypothesis tests in order to understand the 
above relationships in more detail, and to verify the conceptual model based on the literature 
in previous chapters.  
Hypothesis 1:  
There are three separate hypotheses for the first hypothesis, which are as follows. 
H1a: Japanese and US subsidiaries would differ on the level of PCC. 
H1b:  German other European subsidiaries would differ on level of PCC  
H1c: German and Japanese subsidiaries would differ on level of PCC. 
Overall, Hypothesis 1 asked about how headquarters countries differed from other countries 
in their level of personal centralized control.   
Hypothesis 1 is evaluated using independent samples t-tests. The results are as follows: 
H1a: An independent samples t-test found that USA (M=3.36, SD=.948) and Japanese 
subsidiaries (M=3.50, SD=.527) did not differ significantly in their level of PCC, 
t(28)=.533, p<.01, as shown in Table 6.2. Levene’s test indicated unequal variances. 
H1b: Consistent with H1b, an independent samples t-test found that German subsidiaries 
(M=4.00, SD=1.05) had significantly higher PCC than other EU subsidiaries (M=3.38, 
SD=.795), t(145)=-.533, p<.01, d=.79, medium effect size (see Table 6.2). Levene’s test 
indicated equal variances. See Table 6.2 
H1c: An independent samples t-test found that German subsidiaries (M=4.00, SD=1.05) 
and Japanese subsidiaries (M=3.50, SD=.527) did not differ significantly in their level of 





PCC, t(145)=-1.34, p=.196 (see Table 6.2). Levene’s test indicated equal variances. See 
Table 6.2 
These results suggest that German subsidiaries really do have higher levels of personal 
centralized control, than the other EU country subsidiaries. In addition, there are no 
differences in the levels of personal centralized control between US and Japanese 
subsidiaries, or between German and Japanese subsidiaries, in KSA.  
Table 2 shows the means, standard deviations and 95% confidence intervals for the level of 
Personal Centralized Control (PCC) by home country of the subsidiary. 
  
Table 6.2 Mean Personal Centralized Control (PCC) by Country of Subsidiary 
Home Country N Mean SD 95% CI- 95% CI+ 
United States (US) 23 3.36 .948 2.95 3.77 
Other EU Countries 28 3.38 .795 3.07 3.69 
Japan 10 3.50 .527 3.12 3.88 
Germany 10 4.00 1.05 3.25 4.75 
Note: SD=standard deviation, 95% CI=95% upper and lower confidence interval of the mean.                   
Source: Developed by the researcher for current study 
Hypothesis 2:  
There were two hypotheses included in Hypothesis 2, these were as follows: 
H2a: US and Japanese subsidiaries differ in bureaucratic formalized control (BFC).  
H2b: US and EU subsidiaries will not differ in bureaucratic formalized control (BFC).  
Hypothesis 2 was also evaluated using independent samples t-tests (two-tailed), as follows:  
H2a: Consistent with H2a, an independent t-test found that Japanese subsidiaries (M=4.75, 
SD=.264) reported significantly higher bureaucratic formalized control than US subsidiaries 
(M=3.93, SD=.590), t(30)=5.49, p<.001 (see Table 6.3). Levene’s test had equal variances.  





H2b: Consistent with H2b, an independent samples t-test found that US subsidiaries (M=3.93, 
SD=.590) and EU subsidiaries (M=3.98, SD=.419) had similar levels of bureaucratic 
formalized control, t(135)=.132, p=.189 (see Table 6.3). Levene’s test had equal variances. 
These results suggest that in KSA, Japanese subsidiaries really do have higher levels of 
bureaucratic formalized control, than US subsidiaries; and that US subsidiaries have 
similar levels of bureaucratic formalized control as other EU countries.    
 
Table 6.3 Mean Bureaucratic Formalized Control (BFC) by Country of Subsidiary 
Home country of the  
subsidiary 
N Mean BFC  SD 95% CI-   95% CI+ 
USA 23 3.93 .590 3.68 4.19 
EU Countries 28 3.98 .419 3.82 4.14 
Japan 10 4.75 .264 4.56 4.94 
Germany 10 4.00 1.05 3.25 4.75 
Note: SD=standard deviation, 95% CI=95% upper and lower confidence interval of the mean.                      
Source: Developed by the researcher for current study 
 
Hypothesis 3:  
Two separate hypotheses for hypothesis three, as follows: 
H3a:  US subsidiaries have higher output control (OUT) than EU subsidiaries.  
H3b:  US subsidiaries have higher output control (OUT) than Japanese subsidiaries.  
Hypothesis 3 was tested using independent samples t-tests (one-tailed). The results found: 
H3a: An independent samples t-test found that US subsidiaries (M=4.20, SD=.719) have 
significantly higher output control than other EU country subsidiaries (M=3.27, SD=.585), 
t(135)=.099, p=.922, d=0.01, small effect size (see Table 6.4). Levene’s test indicated equal 
variances.   
H3b: an independent samples t-test found that US subsidiaries have significantly higher 
output control (M=4.20, SD=.719) than Japanese subsidiaries (M=3.50, SD=.527), t(135) =-





1.201, p=.239, d=0.42, small effect size (see Table 6.4). Levene’s test indicated equal 
variances.  
These results suggest that in KSA, the North American, other EU countries and Japanese 
subsidiaries really do have different levels of output control, although the control of output 
is slightly higher in US subsidiaries, as shown in Table 6.4    
 
Table 6.4 Mean Amount of Output Control (OUT) by Home Country of the Subsidiary 
Home Country of the 
Subsidiary 
N Mean  
OUT 
SD 95% CI- 95% CI+ 
 USA 23 4.20 .719 3.88 4.51 
EU Countries 28 3.27 .585 4.04 4.49 
Japan 10 3.50 .527 4.12 4.88 
Germany 10 4.00 1.05 3.25 4.75 
Total 71 4.24 .701 4.07 4.41 
Note: SD=standard deviation, 95% CI=95% upper and lower confidence interval of the mean.                   
Source: Developed by researcher for current study  
 
 
Hypothesis 4:  
Hypothesis 4 included two sub-hypotheses: 
H4a:  The level of subsidiary control by socialization and networks (control.INFO) would be 
affected by the proportion of expatriate managers  
H4b: The level of subsidiary control by socialisation and networks (control.INFO) would be 
affected the role of expatriate managers  
Hypothesis 4 was evaluated using linear regression and one-way analysis of variance. 
H4a: Hypothesis 4a sought to understand, to what extent does the number of expatriate 
mangers in an MNE subsidiary impact on the level of subsidiary control by socialization and 
networks. A linear regression revealed a significant model as y=3.58 + 2.19x, where y 
represents control.INFO and x represents the log of proportion of expatriate managers, 
supporting H4a. The assumptions of linearity and homoscedasticity were met after visually 





inspecting the residual diagnostics and scatterplots. The results in Table 6.5 show the log of 
proportion of expatriate managers explained 4.8% of the variation in control.INFO (R
2
=.048, 
F(1,145)=7.27, p<.01), and had a significantly positive effect on increasing control.INFO 
(β=.219, t=2.70, p<.01). For every one-unit increase in the log of expatriate managers, 
control.INFO increases by .266 points (based on the unstandardized regression coefficient).    
Table 6.5 Linear regression of the log of the proportion of expatriate managers on the level of 
subsidiary control by socialization and networks 
Model Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized 
Coefficients 
 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
 (Constant) 3.584 .194  18.495 .000 
Log of the proportion of 
expatriate managers 
.266** .099 .219 2.697 .008 
Dependent Variable: Control.INFO.  R = .219, R2 = .048, Adjusted R2 = .041, Model Fit: F(1,145)=7.27, p<.01. Regression 
Equation: y = 3.58 + .219x** p< 01.   
Source: Developed by researcher for current study  
 
H4b: One-way between groups analysis of variance (ANOVA) was performed to compare the 
impact of the expatriate manager’s role on the level of control.INFO. Respondents were 
divided into five groups according to their management role. There was a statistically 
significant difference in level of control.INFO for the five expatriate manager roles, [F(4, 
412)=3.20, p<.01] (see Table 6.6). Despite being statistically significant, the actual difference 
in mean scores between the groups was small. The effect size, calculated using eta-squared 
was small (η
2
=.03). Post-hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test indicated that the mean 
score for expatriate managers’ involved in ‘training the expatriate for future positions at 
headquarters or other subsidiaries’ (M=4.50, SD=.172), was significantly higher (p<.05), than 
for expatriate managers who ‘transfer specific technical or management knowledge from 
headquarters or other subsidiaries to this subsidiary’ (M=3.81, SD=.681); but did not differ 
significantly from other groups. These results suggest that the expatriate manager’s role 
moderates the level of control.INFO. Levene’s test indicated equal variances.  






Table 6.6 One-way ANOVA of role of expatriate manager on level of control by socialization 






Improvising information and communication 
channels with headquarters or other subsidiaries of 
the group 
18 3.87 .678 3.53 4.21 
Transferring specific technical or management 
knowledge from headquarters or other subsidiaries 
to this subsidiary 
28 3.81 .681 3.55 4.07 
Ensuring a homogeneous corporate culture 
throughout the company as a whole 
35 4.14 .720 3.90 4.39 
Filling positions for which no local personnel is 
available in this country 
50 4.14 .753 3.93 4.35 
Training the expatriate for future positions at 
headquarters or other subsidiaries 
16 4.50 .172 4.41 4.59 
Total 147 4.08 .703 3.97 4.20 
Note: SD=standard deviation, 95% CI=95% upper and lower confidence interval of the mean. F(4,412)=3.20, 
MS
Err
=1.49, p<.01. Source: Developed by  researcher for current study  
 
Hypothesis 5: 
H5: Multinational headquarters will use indirect control mechanisms (INFO, OUT) to a 
larger extent in respect of their subsidiaries than direct control (PCC, BFC) mechanism  
Hypothesis five was evaluated using a paired-samples t-test to analyse the impact of the use 
of direct versus indirect control mechanisms by multinational headquarters on their 
subsidiaries. Consistent with hypothesis 5a, there was statistically significant higher use of 
indirect control mechanisms by multinational headquarters on their subsidiaries (M=4.14, 
SD=.60) than use of direct control mechanisms (M=3.66, SD=.65), t(146)=10.67, p<.001. As 
SPSS does not calculate an effect size for the paired samples t-tests, the effect size (eta-
squared) was obtained using the formula below (Pallant, 2001, p.212). The eta squared 
statistic (.44) indicated a medium effect size.  
  
Hypothesis 6: 
There are three separate hypotheses for the sixth hypothesis, these are as follows: 
H6a:  There is no relationship between the size of a subsidiary and level of personal 
centralised control (PCC) that HQ exerts over this subsidiary.   
= (10.671*10.671)/((10.671*10.671)+147-1) = 0.44 





H6b: There is a positive relationship between the size of MNE and the level of bureaucratic 
formalized control (BFC) that headquarters exerts over its subsidiary. 
H6c: Size of the subsidiary will have an impact on the level of control by socialization 
(INFO) that HQ exerts over this subsidiary. 
H6a: Hypothesis 6a sought to understand, to what extent does the size of a subsidiary impact 
on the level of personal centralised control (PCC) that HQ exerts over this subsidiary. A 
linear regression revealed a non-ssignificant model as y=2.95 + .039x, where y represents the 
dependent variable of PCC and x represents the independent variable of log of size of the 
subsidiary. The results are shown in Table 6.7. Consistent with hypothesis H6a, the size of 
subsidiary explained only .2% of the variation in PCC (R2=.002, F(1,145)=.225, p=.636), and 
did not predict the level of PCC (β=.039, t=.475, p=.636). Inspection of the scatterplot 
revealed acceptable linearity and heteroscedasticity.  
Table 6.7 Linear regression of log of size of subsidiary on personal centralised control 
Model Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized 
Coefficients 
 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
 (Constant) 2.954 .575  5.140 .001 
Log of the size of 
subsidiary 
.086 .182 .039 .475 .475 




.041, F(1,145)=.225, p=..636 
Regression Equation: y = 2.95 + .039x. 
Source: Developed by researcher for current study 
H6b: Hypothesis 6b sought to understand, to what extent does the size of MNE impact on the 
level of bureaucratic formalized control (BFC) that headquarters exerts over its subsidiary. A 
linear regression revealed a significant model as y=5.29 - .164x, where y represents the 
dependent variable of BFC, and x represents the independent variable (log of the size of 
MNE), to evaluate how well x predicted y. The linear results appear in Table 6.8. Consistent 





with hypothesis 6b, the log of the size of MNE explained 2.7% of the variance in BFC 
(R
2
=.027, F(1,145)=3.99, p<.05). The log of the size of MNE significantly positive effect on 
decreasing the level of bureaucratic formalized control (β=-.164, t=-1.99, p<.05). For every 
one additional employee in the MNE, bureaucratic formalized control decreased, on average, 
by .117 points (based on the unstandardized regression coefficient). Inspection of the 
scatterplots indicated acceptable linearity and homoscedasticity.  
Table 6.8 Linear regression of log of size of MNE on bureaucratic formal control 
Model Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized 
Coefficients 
 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
 (Constant) 5.295 .598  8.852 .001 
Log of the size of MNE -.117* .059 -.164 -1.998 .048 




.020, F(1,145)=3.99, p<.05 
Regression Equation: y=5.29 - .164x* p< .05. 
 Source: Developed by researcher for current study 
 
 
H6c: Hypothesis 6c sought to understand, to what extent does the size of subsidiary impact 
on the level of control by socialization (INFO) that HQ exerts over this subsidiary. A linear 
regression revealed a significant model as y=2.76 + 2.72x, where y represents subsidiary 
control by socialization, and x represents the log of size of subsidiary, to evaluate how well x 
predicted y. As shown in the model in Table 6.9, the results of the regression indicated the 
predictor explained 7.4% of the variance in subsidiary control by socialization and networks 
(R
2
=.074, F(1,145)=11.59, p<.001. This result indicates that the level of subsidiary control by 
socialization and networks is only partly explained by the log of the proportion of expatriate 
managers. This means that other factors, not entered in this regression model, also play a role. 
It was found that the log of size of subsidiary had a significantly positive effect on increasing 
subsidiary control by socialization and networks (β=.272, t=3.40, p<.001). For every one 
additional employee in a subsidiary, the level of control by socialization and networks 





increased by .424 points (based on the unstandardized regression coefficient). Inspection of 
the scatterplots indicated acceptable linearity and homoscedasticity. Hypothesis 6c was 
confirmed. 
Table 6.9 Linear regression of the log of size of subsidiary on control by socialization 
Model Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized 
Coefficients 
 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
 (Constant) 2.756 .394  6.995 .001 
Log of size of subsidiary .424*** .125 .272 3.404 .001 




.068, Model Fit: F(1,145)=11.59, p<.001. 
Regression Equation: y = 2.76 + .272x 
*** p< .001. Source: Developed by the researcher for current study 
Hypothesis 7: 
There were two hypotheses included in Hypothesis 7, these were as follows: 
H7a: The age of subsidiary is negatively related to the amount of personal centralised control 
(PCC) that HQ exerts over the subsidiary  
H7b: The age of the subsidiary is positively related to the amount of bureaucratic formalised 
control (BFC) and output control (OUT) that HQ exerts over this subsidiary 
Hypothesis 7 was evaluated using one-way ANOVA. 
H7a: One-way between groups analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted to compare the 
impact of the age of the subsidiary on the amount of personal centralised control that 
multinational headquarters exerts over its subsidiary. Respondents were divided into five 
groups according to the age of the subsidiary (Group 1: 1-5 years, Group 2: 6-10 years, 
Group 3: 11-15 years, Group 4: 16-20 years, and Group 5: 21-30 years). The results found a 
significant subsidiary age effect on levels of personal centralised control [F(4,142)=10.09, 
p<.001]. Despite being statistically significant, the actual difference in mean scores between 





the groups was small. The effect size, calculated using eta-squared was small (η
2
=.22). Post-
hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test indicated that the mean score for the subsidiaries 
aged 21-30 years was significantly higher (p<.05), than for subsidiaries aged 1-5, 6-10, 11-15 
and 16-20 years; also subsidiaries aged 11-15 years had significantly higher mean scores 
(p<.05) than subsidiaries aged 6-10 years. These results suggest that subsidiary age has a 
moderating effect on the amount of personal centralised control that multinational 
headquarters exerts over its subsidiary, so that, in general, the longer established a subsidiary 
is, the higher the amount of personal centralised control that headquarters tends to exert over 
it. Hypothesis 7a is refuted. However, the Levene’s test of equality of error variances shows 
that the variances of the five subsidiary age groups are significantly different from each other 
(p=.012).  
Table 6.10 Mean level of personal centralised control by age of the subsidiary 
Age of the subsidiary  N Mean PCC SD 95% CI- 95% CI+ 
1-5 years 12 3.33 .752 2.86 3.81 
6-10 years 29 2.66 .932 2.30 3.01 
11-15 years 43 3.52 .915 3.24 3.80 
16-20 years 53 3.03 .930 2.78 3.29 
21-30 years 10 4.50 .176 4.37 4.63 
Total 147 3.22 .988 3.06 3.39 
Note: SD=standard deviation, 95% CI=95% upper and lower confidence interval of the mean. 
F(4,142)=10.09, p<.001. Source: Developed by the researcher for current study (2013) 
 
H7b(i): A one-way ANOVA with age of the subsidiary as factor and level of bureaucratic 
formalized control as dependent variable revealed a statistically significant difference in the 
amount of bureaucratic formalised control for the five subsidiary age groups [F(4,146)=8.56, 
p<.001]. Despite being statistically significant, the actual difference in mean scores between 
the groups was small. The effect size, calculated using eta-squared was small (η
2
=.19). Post-
hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test indicated that the mean score for subsidiaries 
aged 11-15 years was significantly higher at the p<.05 level, than for subsidiaries aged 6-10 





years and 16-20 years. These results show the moderating effect of a subsidiary’s age on the 
amount of bureaucratic formalised control that headquarters exerts over its subsidiary. Table 
10 shows that subsidiaries aged 11-15 years had the highest bureaucratic formalised control, 
followed by subsidiaries aged 21-30 years. Hypothesis H7b(i) is refuted. However, the 
Levene’s test of equality of error variances shows that the variances of the five subsidiary age 
groups are significantly different from each other (p=.001).  
Table 6.11 Mean level of bureaucratic formal control by age of the subsidiary 
Age of the subsidiary  N Mean BFC SD 95% CI- 95% CI+ 
1-5 years 12 4.00 0.426 3.73 4.27 
6-10 years 29 3.90 1.00 3.51 4.28 
11-15 years 43 4.58 0.607 4.39 4.77 
16-20 years 53 3.83 0.580 3.67 3.99 
21-30 years 10 4.25 0.264 4.06 4.44 
Total 147 4.11 0.736 3.99 4.23 
Note: SD=standard deviation, 95% CI=95% upper and lower confidence interval of the mean. 
F(4,146)=8.56, p<.001. Source: Developed by researcher for current study  
 
H7b(ii): A one-way ANOVA with age of the subsidiary as factor and amount of output 
control as dependent variable revealed a statistically significant difference in the amount of 
output control for the five subsidiary age groups [F (4,146)=8.56, p<.001). There was a 
statistically significant difference in amount of output control for the five subsidiary age 
groups [F(4,146)=7.76, p<.001]. Despite being statistically significant, the actual difference 
in mean scores between the groups was small. The effect size, calculated using eta-squared 
was small (η
2
=.18). Post-hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test indicated that the mean 
score for subsidiaries aged 21-30 years was significantly higher than for younger subsidiaries 
aged 1-5, 6-10, 11-15 and 16-20 years. These results show the moderating effect of a 
subsidiary’s age on the amount of output control that headquarters exerts over its subsidiary. 
Table 6.12 shows that subsidiaries aged 21-30 years had the highest output control, followed 
by subsidiaries aged 11-15 years. Hypothesis 7b(ii) is confirmed. However, the Levene’s test 





of equality of error variances shows that the variances of the five subsidiary age groups are 
significantly different from each other (p=.001),  
Table 6.12 Mean amount of output control by age of the subsidiary 
Age of the subsidiary   N Mean OUT SD 95% CI- 95% CI+ 
1-5 years 12 4.17 .651 3.75 4.58 
6-10 years 29 4.22 1.01 3.84 4.61 
11-15 years 43 4.36 .398 4.24 4.48 
16-20 years 53 3.90 .566 3.74 4.05 
21-30 years 10 5.00 .000 5.00 5.00 
Total 147 4.19 .689 4.08 4.31 
Note: SD=standard deviation, 95% CI=95% upper and lower confidence interval of the mean. 
F(4,146)=7.76, p<.001. Source: Developed by the researcher for current study (2013) 
 
Hypothesis 8:  
 There are three hypotheses included in Hypothesis 8, which are as follows: 
H8a: There is a positive relationship between interdependence and the level of personalized control 
(PCC).  
H8b: There is a positive relationship between the extent of interdependence of a subsidiary with the 
MNE as a whole and the amount of control (OUT) that is exercised by headquarters towards that 
particular subsidiary 
H8c: There is no positive relationship between the extent of local responsiveness of a subsidiary and 
the amount of personalised control (PCC) that is exercised by headquarters towards that particular 
subsidiary 
Hypothesis 8 is evaluated using a linear regression. The results are as follows:  
H8a: Hypothesis 8a sought to understand, to what extent does the extent of interdependence 
impact on the level of control by socialization (INFO) that HQ exerts over this personalized 
control (PCC). A linear regression revealed a significant as y=3.15 + 0.31x, where y 
represents the amount of PCC, and x represents the extent of interdependence, to evaluate 
how well x predicted y. The extent of interdependence explained only .01% of the variation 









=.133, p=.713, and did not predict the 
level of PCC (β=.031, t=.368, p=.713). Inspection of the scatterplots indicated acceptable 
linearity and homoscedasticity. Hypothesis 8a was refuted. 
Table 6.13 Linear regression of the extent of interdependence on personalized control 
Model Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized 
Coefficients 
 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
 (Constant) 3.150 .218  14.482 .001 
Extent of 
interdependence 
.025 .068 .031 .368 .713 




-.006, F(1,145)=.135, p=.713 Regression 
Equation: y=3.15 + 0.31x = 3.58 + .219x. Source: Developed by the researcher for current study (2013) 
 
H8b: Hypothesis 8b sought to understand, to what extent does the extent of interdependence 
impact on the level of the amount of control (OUT) that is exercised by headquarters towards 
that particular subsidiary. A linear regression revealed a significant relationship as y=3.72 + 
.280x, where y represents the amount of output control, and x represents the extent of 
interdependence, to evaluate how well x predicted y. The regression results appear in Table 
6.14. Consistent with hypothesis 8b, the extent of interdependence explained 7.8% of the 
variation in the amount of output control (R
2
=.078, F(1,145)=12.31, p<.001), and had a 
significantly positive effect on increasing the amount of output control (β=.280, t=3.51, 
p<.001). For every one-unit increase in interdependence, the amount of output control 
increased by .159 points (based on the unstandardized regression coefficient). Inspection of 
the scatterplots revealed acceptable linearity and homoscedasticity.  
Table 6.14 Linear regression of the extent of interdependence output control 
Model Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized 
Coefficients 
 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
 (Constant) 3.720 .146  25.544 .000 







.159*** .045 .280 3.508 .001 




.072 F(1,145)=12.31, p<.001 
Regression Equation: y = 3.72 + .280x  *** p< .001.  
Source: Developed by the researcher for current study (2013) 
 
H8c: Hypothesis 8c sought to understand, to what extent does the extent of local 
responsiveness of a subsidiary impact on the level of the amount of control (OUT) that is 
exercised by headquarters towards that particular subsidiary. A linear regression revealed a 
significant relationship as y=2.36 + .334x, where y represents level of personalized control, 
and x represents the extent of local responsiveness, to evaluate how well x predicted y.  As 
shown in the model in Table 6.15, the extent of local responsiveness explained 11.2% of the 
variation in the level of PCC (R
2
=.112, F(1,145)=18.21, p<.001). The extent of local 
responsiveness had a significantly positive effect on increasing the level of personalized 
control (β=.334, t=4.27, p<.001). For every one-unit increase in local responsiveness, the 
level of personalized control increased by 0.333 points (based on the unstandardized 
regression coefficient). Inspection of the scatterplots indicated acceptable linearity and 
homoscedasticity. Hypothesis 8c was refuted.  
Table 6.15 Linear regression of extent of local responsiveness on personalized control 
Model Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized 
Coefficients 
 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
 (Constant) 2.358 .217  10.853 .000 
Extent of local 
responsiveness 
.333*** .078 .334 4.267 .001 




.105, F(1,145)=18.21, p<.001 
Regression Equation: y=2.36 + .334x 
*** p< .001. Source: Developed by the researcher for current study (2013) 
 
 





Hypothesis 9:  
H9: There is a positive relationship between expatriate manager (not Saudi) in the subsidiary 
and informal communication (control.INFO)  
H9: A one-way between groups ANOVA was conducted to compare the impact of the 
expatriate manager (not Saudi) in the subsidiary and informal communication. Respondents 
were divided into three groups according to their nationality (Group 1: Saudi national, Group 
2: headquarters country, Group 3: third country national) The Levene’s test indicated unequal 
variances. There was no statistically significant difference in levels of informal 
communication for the three manager nationalities [F(2,144)=2.59, p=.078] (see Table 6.16). 
The effect size calculated using eta-squared was small (η
2
=.03). These results suggest that the 
expatriate manager (not Saudi) really does use the same level of informal communication as 
the Saudi managers in the subsidiary. Hypothesis 9 is refuted.  
Table 6.16 One-way ANOVA of effect of expatriate manager (not Saudi) on the level of informal 
communication (INFO) 
Subsidiary Manager   N Mean INFO SD 95% CI- 95% CI+ 
Saudi National 50 3.93 .700 3.73 4.13 
HQ Country 58 4.24 .720 4.05 4.42 
Third Country National 39 4.05 .651 3.84 4.26 
Total 147 4.08 .703 3.97 4.20 
Note: SD=standard deviation, 95% CI=95% upper and lower confidence interval of the mean. 
F(2,144)=2.59, p=.078.  
Source: Developed by the researcher for current study (2013) 
 
Hypothesis 10:  
H10: Performance of MNEs’ subsidiaries would differ based on the home country of the 
subsidiary.  
H10: A one-way between groups ANOVA was conducted to compare the impact of the home 
country of the subsidiary on performance of MNEs’ subsidiaries. Respondents were divided 





into 17 home country subsidiaries. The results are shown in Table 6.17. Consistent with 
hypothesis 10, there was a significant difference in levels of overall performance for the 17 
home countries of subsidiaries [F(16,130)=6.27]. The actual difference in mean scores was 
quite large (η
2
=.44). Post-hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test indicated that the mean 
performance for USA is significantly higher than Britain and Egypt is significantly lower 
than USA, Switzerland, Australia, Netherlands, and Lebanon. Sweden is significantly lower 
than Switzerland and Netherlands. Japan is significantly lower than Switzerland and 
Netherlands. China is significantly lower than Switzerland, Netherlands and Australia is 
significantly higher than Sweden, Japan, China, USA, Kuwait and Egypt. Australia is 
significantly higher than Britain, China, Egypt and Kuwait. Canada is significantly higher 
than Egypt. Lebanon is significantly higher than Britain and Egypt. Finally, Egypt is 
significantly lower than USA, Switzerland, Australia, Netherlands, Canada, and Lebanon. 
These results show the moderating effect of the home country on subsidiary performance in 
KSA. Levene’s test indicated unequal variances. Figure 6.6 further illustrates the mean 

















Table 6.17 Ranking of MNE’s subsidiary performance from highest to lowest performance 
Mean Ranking Home country of the subsidiary Observations Mean SD 95% CI 
1 Switzerland 5 5.00 .000 5.00 - 5.00 
2 Netherlands 5 5.00 .000 5.00 - 5.00 
3 Lebanon 4 4.50 .000 4.50 - 4.50 
4 Canada 5 4.25 .000 4.25 - 4.25 
5 Australia 14 4.23 .207 4.11 - 4.35 
6 South Korea 8 4.00 .802 3.33 - 4.67 
7 Jordan 13 4.00 .612 3.63 - 4.37 
8 Germany 10 4.00 1.05 3.25 - 4.75 
9 USA 23 3.98 .626 3.71 - 4.25 
10 Italy 5 3.75 .000 3.75 - 3.75 
11 Denmark 4 3.75 .000 3.75 - 3.75 
12 Sweden 8 3.63 .134 3.51 - 3.74 
13 Japan 10 3.50 1.05 2.75 - 4.25 
14 Britain 15 3.25 .732 2.84 - 3.66 
15 China 10 3.25 .527 2.87 - 3.63 
16 Kuwait 4 3.00 .000 3.00 - 3.00 
17 Egypt 4 2.75 .000 2.75 - 2.75 
Note: SD=standard deviation, 95% CI=95% upper and lower confidence interval of the mean.  
Source: Developed by the researcher for current study (2013) 
 





Figure 6.6 Mean values for MNE’s subsidiary performance by home country of the subsidiary 




Hypothesis 11:  
H11: INFO control will be the dominant type of strategy used in global, transnational and 
multi-domestic MNE, as compared with control.PCC, control.BFC, and control.OUT. 
Table 6.1 illustrates that most correlations between the four control mechanisms (PCC, BFC, 
OUT, INFO) and global, multi-domestic, and transnational strategy were significant and 
positive. Consistent with hypothesis 11, the strongest correlations were between 
control.INFO and transnational strategy (r=.682, p<.01), multi-domestic strategy (r=.513, 
p<.01), and global strategy (r=.410, p<.01),, with higher control of INFO associated with 
higher use of transnational, multi-domestic, and global strategy. Three standard multiple 
regression were determined to further evaluate H11. The results appear in Table 6.18 (below).  
All three regression equations were statistically significant. The linear combination of four 
control mechanisms were most strongly related to transnational strategy, R
2
=.509, F(4,142) = 





36.82, p<.001, followed by multi-domestic strategy, R
2
=.283, F(4,142) = 14.03, p<.001, and 
global strategy, R
2
=.257, F(4,142) = 12.27, p<.001. These results indicate that the four 
control mechanisms, together, accounted for approximately 50.9% of the variation in 
transnational strategy, 28.3% of the variation in multi-domestic strategy, and 25.7% of the 
variation in global strategy. The strength of each predictor variable is as follows: 
Control.INFO was significantly, positively related to global strategy (β=.447, p<.001), and 
multi-domestic strategy (β=.537, p=.088), and transnational strategy (β=.768, p<.001), and 
was the dominant type of strategy used in global, transnational and multi-domestic MNE’s, as 
compared with PCC, BFC, and OUT control mechanism. Conversely, BFC had a significant, 
negative and weak relationship with global strategy (β=-.317, p<.001), and transnational 
strategy (β=-.252, p<.001), and no relationship with multi-domestic strategy (β=-.159, 
p=.088). PCC and OUT control mechanisms were not significantly related to global, multi-
domestic, or transnational strategy. Hypothesis 11 is thus confirmed, as the strongest control 
mechanism exerted was control.INFO. 
Table 6.18 Multiple regression results for control mechanisms on strategy 
 Dependent Variables 
Predictor Variables Global strategy Multi-domestic strategy Transnational strategy 
Control.PCC  (β) .140 (1.77) .052 (.674) -.120 (-1.86) 
Control.BFC  (β) -.317*** (-3.73) -.159 (-.172) -.252*** (-3.29) 
Control.OUT  (β) .145 (1.50) .074 (.775) .146 (1.85) 
Control.INFO  (β) .447*** (5.08) .537*** (6.22) .768*** (10.74) 
R .507 .532 .714 
R
2
 .257 .283 .509 
Adj. -R
2
 .236 .263 .495 
F-ratio 12.27*** 14.03*** 36.82*** 
The figures in the table are standardized beta coefficient regression weights, figures in parentheses are t-values. 
***p<.001. Source: developed by the author for the purpose of the study.  






Post Model Checks 
The assumptions and residual diagnostics were checked to assess the accuracy of the above 
multiple regression model. There was no evidence of multicollinearity or singularity, with no 
correlation above .9 between variables, and all variance inflation factors (VIF) were below 2, 
as recommended. Examination of the Mahalanobis and Cooks maximum distance measures 
did not identify any multivariate outliers. Inspection of the residual scatterplots indicated 
acceptable linearity and heteroscedasticity (Field, 2009). 
Hypothesis 12:  
H12: The industry type will have an effect on the performance of the subsidiary.  
A one-way between groups ANOVA was performed to compare the impact of eight different 
industries on perceived subsidiary performance. Respondents were divided into eights groups 
according to their industry (Group 1: Computers, Group 2: Paper, Group 3: Electronics / 
Electrical Equipment, Group 4: Chemicals, Group 5: Others, Group 6: Food / Beverages, 
Group 7: Petroleum, and Group 8: Motor Vehicles and Parts). Consistent with hypothesis 12 
was supported, there was a statistically significant difference in perceived subsidiary 
performance for the eight industries, F (7, 139) = 7.18, p < .001, η
2
=.27. The effect size, 
calculated using eta-squared was medium. Post-hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test 
indicated that, at the p<.05 level, the mean performance for petroleum industry was 
significantly lower than for computers, paper, and electronics/electrical equipment industries. 
Chemicals industry performance was significantly lower than the computer industry, but was 
significantly higher than the motor vehicles and parts industry. The food / beverages industry 
performance was significantly lower than the computer industry, but was significantly higher 
than the motor vehicles and parts industry. The motor vehicles and parts industry 
performance was significantly lower than the computers and paper industries (Refer to 
Appendix 6 for detailed post hoc test results). Levene’s test indicated unequal variances. 
Table 18 shows a mean ranking of subsidiary perceived subsidiary performance by industry 
type, from lowest to highest performance. The highest subsidiary performance rating was 
given for the petroleum industry (M=5.00). Followed by the computer industry (M=4.50), 





electronics / electrical equipment industry (M=4.00), chemicals industry (M=3.99), other 
industry (M=3.76), food / beverages industry (M=3.67), paper industry (M=3.34), and motor 
vehicles and parts industry (M=3.19). Figure 6.7 further describes the lowest to highest 
perceiving performing subsidiaries by industry as ranked by respondents. 
Table 18 Mean ranking of performance by different industries, from highest performance to lowest 
performance 
Mean Ranking Industry of the subsidiary Observations  Mean SD 95% CI- 95% CI+ 
1 Petroleum 5 5.00 .000 5.00 5.00 
2 Computers 10 4.50 .527 4.12 4.88 
3 Electronics / Electrical 
Equipment 
18 4.00 .549 3.73 4.27 
4 Chemicals 51 3.99 .584 3.82 4.15 
5 Others 18 3.76 1.06 3.24 4.29 
6 Food / Beverages 12 3.67 .807 3.15 4.18 
7 Paper 24 3.34 .650 3.07 3.62 
8 Motor Vehicles and Parts 9 3.19 .527 2.79 3.60 
Note: SD=standard deviation, 95% CI=95% upper and lower confidence interval. 
Source: Developed by the researcher for current study  
 
Hypothesis 13: 
H13: Knowledge flows are significantly related to perceived performance of the subsidiary. 
Hypothesis 13 sought to understand, to what extent do knowledge flows impact on the 
perceived performance of the subsidiary. A linear regression revealed a significant 
relationship as y=4.09 - .108x, where y represents perceived performance, and x represents 
knowledge flows, to evaluate how well x predicted y. The results appear in Table 6.19. 
Contrary to expectations, knowledge flows explained only 1.2% of the varition in overall 
performance (R
2
=.012, F(1,145)=1.71, p=193), and was not a significant predictor. Inspection 
of plots indicated acceptable linearity and homoscedasticity. Hypothesis 13 is refuted.  
 
Table 6.19Linear Regression for Perceived Performance of the Subsidiary 
Model Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized 
Coefficients 
 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 





 (Constant) 4.089 .193  21.193 .000 
Knowledge flows -.127 .097 -.108 -1.308 .193 




.005, Model Fit: F(1,145)=1.71, 
p=.193. Regression Equation: y = 4.09 -.108x. Source: Developed by the researcher for current study  
 
Multiple regressions for the different control mechanism  
Personal Centralised Control (PCC)  
Multiple regression analysis was used to test if Interdependence, Local Responsiveness, 
Knowledge Flows and Type of Strategy (Global, Multi-domestic or Transnational) 
significantly predicted Personal Centralised Control (PCC). The results of the regression 
indicated that the predictors explained around 26.5% of the variance (R
2
 = .228, F (5,147) = 
7.1, p<.00). It was found that Interdependence significantly predicted PCC (β = .311, p = 
001), as did Local Responsiveness (β = .464, p<.00) and Knowledge Flows (β = .244, 
p<.001). For the Global, Multi-domestic and Transnational strategies, it was found that they 
were not predictors of PCC. The results of the regressions were (β = .218, p = .145), (β = 
.099, p = .418) and (β = .140, p = .300), respectively. The standardised regression coefficients 
of the predictors, together with their beta values and their significance levels, are shown in 
Table 6.20.  
 
 Table 6.20: Multiple regression of Personal Centralised Control (PCC)  
 
                         Model Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta 
 
(Constant) .218 .624  .350 .727 
Interdependence -.254 .078 -.311 -3.245 .001 
Local responsiveness .463 .111 .464 4.189 .000 
Global Strategy -.308 .210 -.218 -1.467 .145 
Multi-domestic Strategy .157 .194 .099 .813 .418 
Transnational Strategy .189 .181 .140 1.041 .300 
Knowledge Flows .371 .136 .244 2.732 .007 











Bureaucratic Formalised Control (BFC) 
 
Multiple regression analysis was used to test if Interdependence, Local Responsiveness, 
Knowledge Flows and Type of Strategy (Global, Multi-domestic or Transnational) predicted 
Bureaucratic Formalised Control (BFC). The results of the regression indicated that the 
predictors explained only 10.4% of the variance (R
2 
= .147, F (5,147) = 6.9, p<.00). It was 
found that Global Strategy significantly predicted BFC (β = .424, p = 009). The results of the 
other regressions were as follows: Local Responsiveness (β = -.143, p = .234), Multi-domestic 
Strategy (β = -.215, p = .104), Transnational Strategy (β = .93, p = .045) and Knowledge Flows 
(β = .129, p = .182). The standardised regression coefficients of the predictors, together with 
their beta values and their significance levels, are shown in Table 6.21. 
 
Table 6.21: Multiple regression of Bureaucratic Formalised Control (BFC)  
 
 
                         Model Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta 
 
(Constant) 2.453 .501  4.895 .000 
Interdependence .067 .063 .111 1.069 .287 
Local responsiveness -.106 .089 -.143 -1.197 .234 
Global Strategy -.447 .168 .424 -2.656 .009 
Multi-domestic Strategy .254 .155 .215 1.636 .104 
Transnational Strategy .294 .146 .293 2.020 .045 
Knowledge Flows .146 .109 .129 1.342 .182 
 
Source: developed by the researcher for the current study (2013) 
 
 
Output Control mechanism (OUT) 
 
Multiple regression analysis was used to test if Interdependence, Local Responsiveness, 
Knowledge Flows and Type of Strategy (Global, Multi-domestic or Transnational) 
significantly predicted the Output Control mechanism (OUT). The results of the regression 
indicated that the predictors explained around 51.4% of the variance (R2 = .49, F (5,147) = 
.717, p<.00). It was found that four independent variables significantly predicated OUT: 
Interdependence (β = .399, p<.00), Local Responsiveness (β = .373, p<.00), Global Strategy 
(β = .270, p = .027) and Multi-domestic Strategy (β = .117, p = .239). The results of the 
regressions for Transnational Strategy and Knowledge Flows were (β = .415, p<.00) and (β = 
.279, p<.00), respectively.  







Table 6.22: Multiple regression of Output Control (OUT) 
 
                         Model Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta 
(Constant) .970 .354  2.741 .007 
Interdependence .227 .044 .399 5.113 .000 
Local responsiveness -.259 .063 .373 -4.140 .000 
Global Strategy -.266 .119 -.270 -2.238 .027 
Multi-domestic Strategy 
.130 .110 .117 1.183 .239 
Transnational Strategy 
.390 .103 .415 3.789 .000 
Knowledge Flows .296 .077 .279 3.843 .000 
 Source: developed by the researcher for the current study (2013) 
Informal Control Mechanism (INFO) 
 
Multiple regression analysis was used to test if Interdependence, Local Responsiveness, 
Knowledge Flows and Type of Strategy (Global, Multi-domestic or Transnational) 
significantly predicted Informal Control (INFO). The results of the regression indicated that 
the predictors explained around 55.5% of the variance (R
2 
= .532, F (5,147) = .745, p<.00). It 
was found that Global Strategy, Transnational Strategy and Knowledge Flows significantly 
predicted INFO. The results for these variables were (β = .452, p<.00), (β = .895, p<.00) and 
(β = .261, p<.00), respectively. Interdependence, Local Responsiveness and Multi-domestic 
Strategy were not predictors of INFO. The results of the regressions for these variables were 
(β = -.073, p = .327), (β = .121, p = .163) and (β = .119, p = .211), respectively. The 
standardised regression coefficients of the predictors, together with their beta values and their 
significance levels, are shown in Table 6.23.  
 
 
Table 6.23: Multiple regression of Informal Control (INFO) 
 
                         Model Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta 
 
(Constant) .719 .346  2.077 .040 
Interdependence -.043 .043 -.073 -.984 .327 
Local responsiveness .086 .061 .121 1.404 .163 
Global Strategy -.455 .116 .452 -3.917 .000 





Multi-domestic Strategy .135 .107 .119 1.255 .211 
Transnational Strategy .857 .101 .895 8.525 .000 
Knowledge Flows .283 .075 .261 3.762 .000 
Source: developed by the researcher for the current study (2013) 
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 β = .219 *** 



















 β = .031 
Figure 6.8: the full model with relationships between the different variables included in the study  
 
* = p<.05, ** = p<.01 ***= p<.001 
Source: developed by the author for the purpose of the study (2013).   
 





Summary of Hypotheses Testing Results 
Table 21 displays a summary of the hypothesis test results in this study. 
Table 21: Summary of assessed hypotheses 
Hypothesis Test Results 
H1 There is a difference between the Japanese and US 





H1b There is a difference between German and other 
European countries subsidiaries on the level of 




H1c There is a difference between German and Japanese 





H2a There is a difference between US and Japanese 





H2b There are no differences between American MNEs and 





H3a Subsidiaries of the American MNEs have higher 





H3b There is a difference between American and Japanese 




H4a Subsidiary control by socialization and networks 
(INFO) is positively related to the proportion of 
expatriate managers  
Linear regression  Confirmed 
H4b The level of subsidiary control by socialisation and 




H5 Multinational headquarters will use indirect control 
mechanisms (INFO, OUT) to a larger extent in respect 





H6a The size of a subsidiary  will have an impact on the 
level of personal centralised control (PCC) that HQ 
exerts over this subsidiary 










Table 21 Continued: Summary of assessed hypotheses 
 
 Hypothesis Test Results 
H6b The size of MNE  will have an impact on the level of 
bureaucratic formalized control (OUT) that 




H6c The size of the subsidiary would have an effect on the 





H7a The age of subsidiary have a negative impact to the 
amount of personal centralised control (PCC) that HQ 




H7b The age of the subsidiary have an impact to the 
amount of bureaucratic formalised control (BFC) and 




BFC Refuted  
OUT Confirmed 
H8a There is a positive relationship between 
interdependence and personalized control. (PCC).   
Linear 
regression 
Refuted   
H8b There will be a positive relation between the extent of 
interdependence of a subsidiary with the MNE as a 
whole and the amount of control (OUT) that is 





H8c There is a positive relation between the extent of local 
responsiveness of a subsidiary and the amount of 
control (PCC) that is exercised by headquarters 




H9 There is a positive relationship between expatriate 





H10 Performance of MNEs’ subsidiaries will differ based 




H11 INFO control will be the dominant type of strategy 




H12 There will be significant differences in performance 




H13 Knowledge flows are significantly related to perceived 




Source: Developed by the researcher for current study  
 





6.4 Chapter Summary  
This chapter presents the inferential statistics that are used to test our main 
hypotheses used in the study. It presented the overall relationships between the 
variables in order to make inferences about the population of multinational 
subsidiaries in KSA, from which the sample was drawn. Specifically, in this 
research, inferential statistics (e.g., t-tests and analyses of variance, correlations and 
regressions) were expected to provide better insights into the relationship between 
multinational headquarter characteristics, subsidiary characteristics, control 
mechanisms, dominant strategies and the outcome measure of perceived 
performance of the subsidiary. The analysis of the data was performed using SPSS, 
with a significance level of p<.05 used as the criterion for statistical significance for 
each hypothesis test: an alpha level of p<.05 is significant; p<.01 is very significant; 
and p<.001 is highly significant (Field, 2009).  
A series of post-hoc power analyses were conducted to determine the appropriate sample size 
and to achieve statistical power for correlations, multiple regressions, hierarchical regression 
and one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA). Some detailed results are presented in the 
appendix. The power analyses confirmed that the correlation analysis achieved 98% power; 
multiple regressions (H11) achieved 97% power; and hierarchical regression achieved 99% 
statistical power. All these power values were well above the 80% threshold needed to detect 
all the significant results in the data. By contrast, the one-way ANOVA tests were relatively 
underpowered. Hence, the ANOVA tests may not have detected all significant results. For the 
correlation analysis, the analysis (two-tailed) was performed to determine the degree of the 
relationship between fourteen predictor variables and the outcome measure of respondents’ 
perceptions of subsidiary performance.  
Given the variety of hypotheses and types of variables, a corresponding variety of statistical 
procedures were used to test our hypotheses. For H1, H2, H8, H9 and H11, one-way ANOVA 
was used with planned linear contrasts. This is because the variables involved were 
continuous-interval scales, analysed along categorical-nominal variables. For H3, regular 
one-way ANOVA was also used, but emphasising post-hoc comparisons using the Games-
Howell procedure. A paired-samples t-test was used for H6, since two standardised scale 
variables were compared within respondents. This was combined with Levene’s test for 
equality of variances. Spearman’s rho rank order coefficient was used to verify the results for 





H5 and H6, while Pearson’s correlation coefficient was used for H7 and H10, since the 
variables involved were continuous scales. 
 
To test our model, a three-stage hierarchical regression model was determined with 
perceived subsidiary performance as the dependent variable. The four control 
mechanisms (i.e., control.PCC, BFC, OUT, and INFO) were posited as the 
independent variables in Step 1 of the model. In Step 2, the overall strategy (INSS) 
and knowledge flow were posited as the independent variables, to examine their 
additional influence on perceived subsidiary performance, over and above the 
control mechanisms. In Step 3, interdependence and local responsiveness were 
posited as the independent variables, to examine their additional influence on 
perceived subsidiary performance, over and above control.PCC, BFC, OUT, INFO, 
overall strategy (INSS) and knowledge flow. Tables 6.20, 6.21.6.22 and 6.23 
present the results of the multiple regression analyses.  





CHAPTER SEVEN FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 
 
7.1 Introduction  
This study was conducted in the private sector of KSA. All the subsidiaries studied were 
located in KSA and selected from those in the Directory of Foreign Companies in KSA, 
published by the Saudi Investment Authority (SAGIA). A total of 350 subsidiaries were 
initially contacted in person, via telephone or through e-mail. A total of 147 subsidiary 
managers agreed to respond to the survey (42.8% response rate). A random sample was taken 
for data collection (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007; Hair et al., 2006). This study provides a 
large sample and a substantive representation of the total population of the private sector 
organisations that were asked to participate voluntarily (see chapter 4).  
This chapter explores the outcomes concerning the three central aspects of this study: control 
mechanisms, MNEs and international transfers. Testing the different sets of hypotheses 
provides external validation for the empirical data used to answer the study’s main research 
questions. Confidence in the validity of research instruments considerably increases if most 
of the hypotheses, constructed after an extensive review of previous research in the field, 
prove acceptable and correct. This was the case in this study. The study focuses on the 
integration between these variables and attempts to elucidate the sum of these variables in a 
broader sense. 
As discussed in the last chapter, dealing with missing data is important. Precedents in social 
science research suggest using the mean of the scores on the variance (Stevens, 1992) or 
removing unresponsive sample(s) (Norusis, 1995). Specifically, this study contained eight 
samples of missing data out of 156 samples (5.01%), which did not significantly affect the 
outcome of the analysis. Thus, these eight samples were deleted from the data; then, the data 
was tested to locate outliers, as discussed in the previous chapters.  
The following section explores the application of control mechanisms in MNEs. The results 
of the study are reviewed and linked to the current stream of international business literature. 
The theoretical and practical contributions of the study are described and the characteristics 
of the HQ–subsidiary mechanisms are emphasised. The study then shifts focus to the 
influence of the environment and home country of the HQs by testing different sets of 





hypotheses. The influence of different variables is discussed and the effects on performance 
are summarised. Moreover, the different types of strategy and structure applied by MNEs are 
discussed. Finally, the effects that international transfers of managers have on subsidiaries are 
explored.  
7.2 Control mechanism  
This section discusses the first component of our thesis: control mechanisms. After a review 
of the relevant literature, we identified four control mechanisms: personal centralised control, 
bureaucratic formalised control, output control, and control by socialisation and networks. 
Further, we discussed the reliability of the scales used to measure these various control 
mechanisms. Also, we tested the hypotheses that have been posited concerning the country of 
origin effect in the application of control mechanisms in chapter four (H1, H2 and H3). 
By virtue of the analysis of the first set of hypotheses in the previous chapter, we can 
conclude that subsidiaries of German MNEs experience a very high level of control; indeed, 
the only control mechanism for which German MNEs are not among users proves the control 
by socialisation and networks. German firms exhibit a much more horizontal differentiation 
of tasks and functions, and in particular have a much greater overlap of operations of 
functions and of technical and supervisory work this results coincide with other studies, e.g. 
(Lane, 1989; Sparrow and Hiltrop, 1994). German and Japanese MNEs, rooted in business 
systems are concerned with the management of the issue internationally than perhaps 
American or British companies. 
The second group reflects the Anglo-Saxon countries and they heavily use the impersonal 
types of control mechanisms, specifically bureaucratic formalised control and output control. 
These results concern the debate on the level of autonomy exercised in Oriental vs. US 
subsidiaries. Our results showed that, when compared to the US, the level of control in 
Oriental subsidiaries is less; or, put differently, the latter enjoy a greater degree of autonomy 
than US subsidiaries. It seems that, once a unit is operational, Oriental parents grant many 
more degrees of freedom than US parents. The relatively significant amount of freedom in 
Oriental societies becomes understandable, as trust and bonding are much stronger within 
Oriental societies than among US or Anglo-Saxon societies, leading to greater autonomy, 
particularly in short- to medium-term decision-making. The results, however, do not align 





with the findings of Jain & Tucker (1995), who report that power is more centralised in 
Japanese companies, as well as the work of Kustin & Jones (1996) and Zaheer (1995). 
When we deconstruct the results for Europe, we find support of a hypothesis in the literature 
that states that controls exercised by German and British MNEs are generally higher than 
other European countries. However, comparing German and British as a group to Oriental 
MNEs reveals the latter as possessing greater overall controls. With regard to the output and 
bureaucratic controls, we found that both US MNEs and those from the Middle East 
exercised higher controls than Oriental MNEs. These results prove explicable when 
considered through the lens of the generally understood obsession of US firms, entities that 
use short-term (often quarterly) results as a gauge of success of their long-term operations. 
These results also align with the work of O’Donnell (2000) and Harzing (2001). The 
literature has also reported that firms can also exercise controls often through means of non-
measurable cultural bindings, commonly referred to as control by informal and social means 
(Ferner, 1997). Thus, HQ can strategize to implement this method by positioning a sizeable 
number of managers from home within the subsidiary. Indeed, the results reveal this as true. 
The presence has positive and significant effects on most levels of control: personal, output, 
bureaucratic, and informal.  
Contrary to this, however, we found that the presence of a sizeable number of expatriates (as 
opposed to HQ managers) leads to greater autonomy in subsidiaries. These results provide us 
with insights that suggest two opposing forces are at play in subsidiaries: one exerted by 
managers from the home country, loyal to implementing the ways of the HQ; the other force 
is exerted by expatriates who, possibly as a result of being on fixed-term assignments, speak 
their minds and bond better with local employees, providing them with either an actual or 
imaginary sense of well-being and freedom.  
MNEs operate globally in a competitive environment. In order to survive in this, they have to 
have stricter quality controls in the front line services and products on which they will 
exercise strict surveillance. Logic dictates that, whereas in sectors where employees (most 
probably the local) are in direct touch with the customer (in marketing or insurance sales, for 
example), it is not feasible to exercise direct control, and the local employee to whom the task 
has been assigned should be trusted with this task. However, in sectors such as manufacturing 
or assembly lines, direct control can be exercised and might be desirable, and this study’s 
results reflect this as correct. The same analogy applies to high-tech sectors where, for a 





variety of reasons (such as to protect technical know-how, for example), tight control may 
have to be exercised (Richards, 2000), and, again, results prove this supposition to be correct. 
Echoes of internalisation theory (Buckley & Casson, 1976) are detectable here.  
This first section has discussed the empirical results concerning the first building block of our 
thesis: control mechanisms. We then tested the hypotheses concerning the country of origin 
effect in the application of control mechanisms and now turn to the second building block of 
our study: the MNE. 
7.3 Strategy and Structure  
In chapter 4, we indicated that the three distinct organisational models identified for MNEs 
could be recognized in the study. The global organisational model is most popular in our 
sample, while the transnational model is least popular. The fact that the transnational model is 
least prevalent conforms to the findings of Leong and Tan (1993), as well as Harzing (2001); 
this fact also coincides with the general idea that the transnational model is an ideal-type, 
realised by a minority of firms only. However, contrary to these researchers’ findings, the 
global model proved the most prevalent model, rather than the multi-domestic.  
Turning back towards the individual control mechanisms, we predicted multi-domestic 
companies to employ socialisation and networks (INFO) control as their dominant control 
mechanisms. Since these control mechanisms are relatively indirect and less obtrusive, they 
were hypothesised to fit the rather independent subsidiaries of multi-domestic companies 
better than the direct personal centralised control and bureaucratic formalised control. Indeed, 
both personal centralised control (t-value: -4.259, P = .433, 2-tailed) and bureaucratic 
formalised control (t-value: -2.326, p = .264, 2- tailed) are used significantly less in multi-
domestic companies than on average in our sample. Global companies exhibit the same. The 
personal centralised control (t-value: -.914, P = 362, 2-tailed) and formalised control are not 
significant (t-value: -2.69, P= .058, 2-tailed). Subsidiaries from all different types of 
strategies are found to experience greater levels of control via socialisation and networks. The 
values of (p = 0.362, p = 0.058, p = 0.146 & p = 0.000) are the indicators PCC, BFC, OUT, 
and INFO respectively. In general, however, we can deduce existence of a tendency for 
global, transnational and multi-domestic MNEs to use the indirect control mechanisms, 
informal control, suited to their integrated organisational model, to a larger extent than direct 
controls.  





The above elucidates that an MNE deals with its external environment and its preferred 
control mechanisms with respect to its subsidiaries based on the MNE’s preferred strategic 
implementation. In testing the strategy of the MNE, two propositions were developed: one 
concerned a relationship between a generic strategy and HQ-Subsidiary control mechanisms 
and the other a relationship between an international strategy and performance. A generic 
strategy concerns the extent to which a company is willing and able to explore new 
opportunities in the market and develop new products, and this strategy should balance 
opportunism against more central control (see Miles and Snow, 1978). We therefore posed 
that for a strategy, flexibility and agility are necessary; these features are related more to 
resource dependency than to agency mechanisms when applying the INFO control 
mechanism.  
7.4 Knowledge flows  
Upon analysis, we found that knowledge flows were not associated with personalised (PCC) 
or bureaucratic controls (BFC), but rather moderately positively associated with (INFO) 
controls. Also, it was found, as expected, that PCC and BFC mechanisms were negatively 
associated with performance, while output control and informal coordination were positively 
associated. The direction of these relationships did not change through each model; rather, 
they amplified except for informal/socialisation controls, which weakened while remaining 
significant. This proved particularly evident in the case of output controls, where, in the final 
model, this became the strongest predictor of performance in the entire model. 
Knowledge flows can enhance performance, especially in the early stage of a subsidiary’s 
establishment, because the knowledge from other subsidiaries or the parent company will aid 
the newly established subsidiary to reduce cost and time. If subsidiaries in only rely on the 
importation of knowledge while failing to invest in their human capital long term, the 
importation of knowledge cannot significantly benefit the performance, and  the reason is that 
subsidiaries still cannot absorb or create knowledge to complete tasks; they will become less 
and less competitive over time. This can be a case of poor management, but it is more likely 
to derive from a lack of competition (Birkinshaw and Hood, 1998). Consequently, if the 
subsidiary continues to import knowledge on the basis of capabilities that lack a leading edge, 
the subsidiary gradually atrophies over time due to lack of attention. As also indicated by 
Oxley (1997), it is unlikely that continuing to increase resource commitment will bolster a 
subsidiary’s performance in a linear fashion. In other words, the net contribution of 





knowledge flow to performance might diminish after a certain point due to over-commitment 
as we found.  
7.5 Interdependence and local responsiveness  
Increasing interdependence-measured as intra-company sales and purchases between a 
particular subsidiary and either headquarters or other subsidiaries increases both the 
importance of this subsidiary for headquarters and the risk involved. Therefore, our 
hypothesis predicted a positive relationship between the extent of interdependence of a 
subsidiary with the MNE as a whole, and OUT control exercised by headquarters towards 
this subsidiary. As the table 6.14 indicates, this hypothesis is indeed confirmed by our data; 
this higher level of control suspected to be attributable to a higher level of personal 
centralised control but with more output control. The level of interdependence between a 
particular subsidiary and the rest of the MNE has a considerable influence on the level and 
type of control exerted by headquarters within this subsidiary. Highly interdependent 
subsidiaries and certain dependent subsidiaries experience a higher level of control than 
others. The control mechanisms most affected is output control, where the HQ is highly 
concerned about the outside relationships in which the subsidiary is involved.  
Taken together, the results of this thesis led us to draw four conclusions related to the 
hypotheses about interdependence and local responsiveness. First, the more embedded the 
subsidiary in the local environment, the more likely that the MNE will use informal controls. 
However, local embeddedness does not necessarily lead to fewer formal controls, as different 
types of local embeddedness appear to have differential effects. For instance, whereas 
dependence on local networks of suppliers, experts, and the like discourage the use of formal 
controls, local responsiveness appears to have the opposite effect, leading an MNE to utilize 
informal controls. This finding lends further support to Martinez and Jarillo’s (1991) 
discovery that subsidiaries pursuing strategies that required a high level of integration with 
the parent company made more extensive use of informal mechanisms of control than 
subsidiaries following other strategies. In addition, our research supports Ferner’s (2000) 
finding that formal and informal control mechanisms appear to coexist. Moreover, according 
to Hamilton and Kashlak (1999) more informal controls, such as input controls, would be 
employed when the task programmability and output measurability are low, a possibility 
when the culture in which the subsidiary operates differs or host country restrictions exist. 
Our measures of interdependence and local responsiveness attempted to measure the 





embeddedness of the influence of the local responsiveness on the subsidiary. We found that 
the local responsiveness does not significantly and accurately predicted the use of personal 
control (hypothesis 8c). It might be that when local responsiveness dominates a subsidiary’s 
operating environment, the MNE needs to provide additional control to counterbalance these 
local demands with integration. Such control might come in the form of both the more subtle 
type of informal controls and additional formal controls that guide employee behaviour, as 
argued by Gomez and Sanchez (2007). As stated in Hypothesis 8b, the degree of 
interdependence is positively related to the use of output control. This finding seems to 
support Hamilton and Kashlak’s framework (1999). That is, as the subsidiary relies more on 
local technology, supplies, managers and output measurability are likely reduced. Under such 
circumstances, informal controls can provide the flexibility needed to ensure relatively 
seamless function. 
In sum, the level of interdependence between a particular subsidiary and the rest of the MNE 
has a considerable influence on the level and type of control exerted by headquarters towards 
a particular subsidiary. Highly interdependent subsidiaries experience a higher level of 
control than other subsidiaries. The control mechanisms most affected in this respect are the 
output control mechanisms.  
For the local responsiveness as the eight hypothesis indicated would not be positively related 
to total control levels. In order to be locally responsive, a subsidiary should not be strictly 
controlled by headquarters. As Table 6.13 shows, this hypothesis can indeed be rejected. The 
only explanation for this is that many MNEs have only recently started to localise their 
production and marketing which might lead them to keep matters under rather strict control in 
this start-up period. However , this result have to be put into perspective by consideration of 
the far reaching organisational changes in MNEs over the past few years as well, whereby 
often key suppliers with regional or global reach dominate linkages and foreign subsidiaries 
tend to be tightly controlled and specialised. On the other hand, MNE entry into a different 
economy is fairly recent and economic development on-going. This is also dependent upon 
the development of local firms as the strength of external network in the host country can 
lead to an enhanced position of the subsidiary in the MNE’s network.  





7.6 Size  
The influence of size on the level of personal centralised control has received quite a lot of 
attention in previous literature. Results were in the expected direction that in hypothesis 6 we 
predicted no significant relationship between size and this type of personal control 
mechanism. As can be seen in table 6 of chapter six, there is no positive relationship between 
size and the level of personal centralised control that is applied towards subsidiaries. 
As predicted in hypothesis 6b and 6c that size with both output control and control by 
socialisation and networks are positively related. For control by socialisation and networks 
this relationship acquires a high level of significance, (t-value: .272, P= .001, 2-tailed) and (t-
value: .171, P= .039, 2-tailed). These results also confirm that the positive relationship 
between size and output control would be stronger than the relationship between size and the 
other control mechanisms. It seems that ‘size does matter’. The larger parents and 
correspondingly larger size of subsidiaries dictates and attracts larger degrees of control. 
With regard to subsidiary size in particular, output controls become progressively important 
as they increase in size. The results also indicate that, with the increase in subsidiary size, the 
level of autonomy and informal communication between the HQ and fellow subsidiaries 
decreases. These results make sense in that with growth in the size of the firm comes a 
greater need to keep a tab on its functioning. An increase in size also means difficulty on the 
part of the parent compnay to keep the informal channels of communications going, which 
may gradually come to lose their intensity as time goes by and as the subsidiary size 
increases. The second major result concerns the debate on the level of autonomy exercised in 
Oriental vs. US subsidiaries. Our results show that, when compared to the US, the level of 
control in Oriental subsidiaries is less; or, put differently, the latter enjoy a greater degree of 
autonomy than US subsidiaries. It seems that, once a unit is up and running, Oriental parents 
grant many more degrees of freedom than US parents. This result is understandable in the 
light of culture of trust and bonding that is much stronger within Oriental societies than 
amongst US or Anglo-Saxon societies, leading to greater autonomy, particularly in regard to 
short- and medium-term decision-making. The results, however, are not align with the 
findings of Jain & Tucker (1995), who reported in their work  that power is more centralised 
in Japanese companies, as well as the works of Kustin & Jones (1996) and Zaheer (1995).  
These results, thus, confirm previous studies in the field of organisation theory, in the sense 
that size is an important explanatory factor for differences in control mechanisms. In contrast 





to these studies, however, a dominant effect was found only for the indirect control 
mechanisms. As was indicated in Chapter Two, few detailed studies that have investigated 
the effect of size on the two indirect control mechanisms; in actuality, most previous studies 
focused on the direct control mechanisms (personal centralised control and bureaucratic 
formalised control) only. As such, our study reconfirms the importance of the variable size, 
but concludes that it is mainly associated with higher levels of indirect control.  
7.7 Age  
The year of establishment of the subsidiaries of MNEs drawn from the seventeen different 
countries were analysed, with the results showing that all the subsidiaries were established 
over a period of ten years. Importantly, over 82% of the subsidiaries of the MNEs 
headquartered in the North America region had been established for between 16 and 20 years. 
Moreover, it was found that most subsidiaries of the MNEs headquartered in the European 
region were established between 6 and 20 years. Furthermore, the majority of the subsidiaries 
of MNEs headquartered in the Middle East region had been established during the last 15 
years. Subsidiaries of MNEs headquartered in the Asia Pacific region had been established 
between 6 and 20 years. This analysis indicates that the majority of MNE subsidiaries—
irrespective of their industry of operations or their headquarters—were established no less 
than five years before, which thus suggests that the analysis will take subsidiary companies 
with an age of anything between 4 and more than 30 years. Turning to the hypothesis, in 
hypothesis 7, subsidiary age is negatively related to the amount of personal centralised 
control exercised by headquarters towards this subsidiary. As we predicted that the 
headquarters will supervise young subsidiaries more closely and centralise decision-making 
because the new investment brings specific uncertainties that have already been eliminated 
with older subsidiaries. The analysis in chapter 6 shows this hypothesis is not confirmed by 
our data. Controlling for the other variables included in this section, does not change this lack 
of significant relationship. Our sample shows no significant relationships between subsidiary 
age and bureaucratic formalised control, output control as predicted in hypothesis seven. 
However, a significant negative relationship is found between subsidiary age and the two 
types of control. In sum, the age of the subsidiary does not seem to have a significant 
influence on the type of control mechanism that is exercised by headquarters towards this 
particular subsidiary.  





Till now, we combined the first two building blocks of this thesis: control mechanisms and 
characteristics of MNEs. We investigated the influence of both headquarters and subsidiary 
characteristics on the level and type of control that is exercised by headquarters towards its 
subsidiaries. In the next section, Section 7.8, we will add our third component and look at 
international transfers and its power in then MNEs.  
7.8 International transfer and expatriate presence  
This section discusses the third component of our thesis: international transfers. After a 
review of the relevant literature, we formulated two hypotheses concerning the use of 
expatriates in the subsidiary in various conditions. Expatriate presence was measured using a 
question that asked for the number of expatriates in the workforce of the subsidiary. Since all 
hypotheses regard the presence of expatriates in top positions only, we will explain the choice 
of the parent country, host country or third country nationals for the subsidiary manager as 
they were considerably influenced by differences in response rates between expatriates and 
locals for certain country. We first investigated whether international transfers can indeed 
function as a way to achieve control by socialisation and networks and more in particular 
shared values and informal communication networks. Then we explored the situations in 
which the role of international transfers in achieving this informal type of control is strongest. 
Expatriates play a variety of roles when working for subsidiary firms. The majority of 
expatriates fill positions for which there are no local personnel available (n=50, 34.0%), 
indicating that trained and educated staff are not available in KSA. Expatriates also serve to 
ensure a homogeneous corporate culture throughout the company and subsidiary (n=35, 
23.8%), and work to transfer specific technical or managerial knowledge from the 
headquarters office. Fewer expatriates work to improve information and communication 
channels with headquarters (n=18, 12.2%).  
For the nationality of the managing director, we compared PCNs and HCNs, since the 
number of TCNs is too small to base any firm conclusions. HCN are found in Asian pacific 
subsidiaries, few cases in the EU and Swiss. Previously, we distinguished the four different 
control mechanisms. And then, we explained how international transfers facilitate control by 
socialisation and informal networks. Most of the authors refer to Edstrom & Galbraith 
(1977b) to substantiate their argument as we did. However, we showed the Ferner et al 
(2004) argument empirically that these transfers were seen as a way for individuals to build 





up networks of contacts and to absorb the international ethos and practices of the firm. In the 
hypothesis as we have seen in table 6.16 in the previous chapter, predicted that expatriate 
presence is strongly and significantly related to INFO control (b = .219, p < 008). Such a 
result indicates that MNEs prefer that INFO control with the subsidiaries that have more 
expatriates than subsidiaries with less number of expatriates.  
7.9 Performance  
There multiple regression models were run, hierarchical forced entry mode. The dependent 
variable was the performance measure. Model 1 used the various control mechanisms (PCC, 
BFC, OUT, INF) as predictors. Model 2 included the headquarter characteristics that were 
configured as continuous variables (INSS, KN). Model 3 then added subsidiary 
characteristics, i.e., local responsiveness and intra-company purchasing (INTR, LOCL). The 
full regression coefficients and model fit diagnostics can be seen in table 20 in the previous 
chapter. The final model significantly predicted performance, as the adjusted R
2
 was .44. In 
exploring the composition as well as the influence of the external and internal factors, based 
on the contingency theory we predict that there is an optimal fit between these factors and 
companies showing this fit will show enhanced performance as debated by (Burton et al., 
2000). In fact the informal control mechanisms indicate a positive effect on performance, 
proposing that if subsidiaries recognise the influences included in the propositions, they will 
show enhanced performance.  
In our study, performance is related to the company’s objectives, main competitors and 
headquarters’ expectations. In general, subsidiary managers are satisfied with their short- and 
long-term goal achievements. The multivariate model shows a positive relationship between 
coordination mechanisms and performance. As mentioned in the previous paragraph, agency 
mechanisms, such as strategic control, showed an indirect path to performance through a 
prospector strategy, and also through coordination. Operational control is indirectly related to 
performance through coordination mechanisms. In that sense coordination appears to be the 
central mediating variable in the association of control and performance. 
 





7.10 Chapter Summary  
This chapter described the results concerning the three main building blocks of the thesis: 
control mechanisms, MNEs and international transfers. The results of the study are reviewed 
and linked to the current stream of international business literature. The theoretical and 
practical contributions of the study are described, and the characteristics of the headquarters–
subsidiary mechanisms are emphasised. The study then shifted focus to the influence of the 
environments and home countries of the headquarters by testing different sets of hypotheses. 
Moreover, the influence of different variables is discussed and the effects on performance are 
summarised. Likewise, we discussed the different types of strategies and structures applied 
by MNEs. Finally, we discussed the effects that international transfers of managers can have 
on the subsidiary.  
Regarding control mechanisms, we identified four control mechanisms: personal centralised 
control, bureaucratic formalised control, output control, and control by socialisation and 
networks. We tested the hypotheses that had been posited concerning the country of origin’s 
effect in the application of control mechanisms in Chapter 4 (H1, H2 and H3). By virtue of 
the analysis of the first set of hypotheses in the previous chapter, we found that subsidiaries 
of German MNEs experienced a very high level of control; indeed, the only control 
mechanism that German MNEs did not implement among subsidiaries was control by 
socialisation and networks. German firms exhibited much more horizontal differentiation of 
tasks and functions, and in particular have much greater overlap of operations of functions 
and of technical and supervisory work. These results coincide with other studies (e.g., Lane, 
1989; Sparrow & Hiltrop, 1994). German and Japanese MNEs are perhaps more rooted in 
business systems concerned with the management of issues internationally than American or 
British companies. 
The second group reflects that Anglo-Saxon countries heavily used impersonal types of 
control mechanisms, specifically bureaucratic formalised control and output control. These 
results relate to the debate on the level of autonomy exercised in Oriental vs. US subsidiaries. 
Our results showed that, when compared to the US, the level of control in Oriental 
subsidiaries is less; or, put differently, the latter enjoyed a greater degree of autonomy than 
US subsidiaries. It seems that, once a unit is operational, Oriental parent companies grant 
many more degrees of freedom than US parent companies. The relatively significant amount 
of freedom in Oriental societies becomes understandable, as trust and bonding are much 





stronger within Oriental societies than among US or Anglo-Saxon societies, leading to 
greater autonomy, particularly in short- to medium-term decision-making. The results, 
however, do not align with the findings of Jain & Tucker (1995), who reported that power is 
more centralised in Japanese companies, as well as the work of Kustin & Jones (1996) and 
Zaheer (1995). 
When we deconstruct the results for Europe, comparing German and British as a group to 
Oriental MNEs reveals the latter as possessing greater overall control. With regard to output 
and bureaucratic control, we found that both US MNEs and those from the Middle East 
exercised greater control than Oriental MNEs. These results prove explicable when 
considered through the lens of the generally understood obsessions of US firms, entities that 
use short-term (often quarterly) results as a gauge of the success of their long-term 
operations. Headquarters can strategize to implement control by the informal and social 
means method by positioning a sizeable number of managers from the home country within 
the subsidiary. Indeed, our results revealed this as true. It seems that their presence has 
positive and significant effects on most levels of control: personal, output, bureaucratic and 
informal. Contrary to this, however, we found that the presence of a sizeable number of 
expatriates (as opposed to headquarters managers) leads to greater autonomy in subsidiaries. 
These results provide us with insights that suggest two opposing forces are at play in 
subsidiaries: one exerted by managers from the home country, loyal to implementing the 
ways of the headquarters; the other force is exerted by expatriates who, possibly as a result of 
being on fixed-term assignments, speak their minds and bond better with local employees, 
providing them with either a sense of well-being and freedom.  
In terms of strategy and structure, we indicated that the three distinct organisational models 
identified for MNEs could be recognised in our study. Turning towards individual control 
mechanisms, we predicted that multi-domestic companies would employ socialisation and 
network control as their dominant control mechanism. 
Control.INFO was significantly, positively related to global strategy, multi-domestic and 
transnational strategy compared with PCC, BFC, and OUT control mechanism. Conversely, 
BFC had a significant, negative and weak relationship with global strategy and transnational 
strategy, and no relationship with multi-domestic strategy. In general, however, we can 
deduce the existence of a tendency for global, transnational and multi-domestic MNEs to use 





indirect control mechanisms and informal control suited to their integrated organisational 
models to a larger extent. 
This chapter described the results concerning control mechanisms, MNEs and international 
transfers. It explained the testing of all the specific hypotheses, which had been developed 
based on an extensive review of previous research. In addition to consolidating previous 
research, the acceptance of the majority of our hypotheses enhances our confidence in the 
validity of the research instruments used to measure the various concepts. 





CHAPTER EIGHT CONCLUSIONS 
8.1 Overview 
This study has attempted to create a sound theoretical foundation for explaining the 
characteristics of control mechanisms in the relationship between MNE HQs and their 
subsidiaries, with many different variables.  
In the first research question, it was proposed that the characteristics of HQ–subsidiary 
mechanisms could be linked to agency theory (with the ‘classical’ principal–agent 
relationship as its core) and to resource dependency theory (RDT; implying relations between 
the subsidiary and other partners based on interdependence). This is in line with the 
organisation design literature, which proposes that organisations face extreme pressures that 
will initially tighten control.  
The results of the present study indeed show that the agency and RDT mechanisms are used 
alongside and complementary to one another. The model for HQ–subsidiary mechanisms 
explains the relationships between the four kinds of mechanisms that were identified in the 
study. Control (as an agency mechanism) provides a solid platform on which other 
mechanisms can be built. The complementarities of these control mechanisms may be linked 
to earlier studies that show that successful organisations combine tight control with more 
open, informal and flexible information and communication systems (Chenhall & Morris, 
1995). A focus that bends too much towards control or too much towards informal control 
may threaten a company’s existence, as was also shown by Sundaramurthy and Lewis (2003). 
The present thesis provides a theoretical explanation for this, as it argues that agency theory 
and RDT are not opposing standpoints but complementary dimensions of the HQ–subsidiary 
relationship.  
The second research question considered the aspect of international transfers and investigated 
the role of expatriates in controlling subsidiaries. It has been recognised that expatriates can 
form both direct and indirect means of control. In executing the direct type of control, 
expatriates directly supervise decisions taken at subsidiaries. This role is particularly strong 
in Asia-Pacific countries and German MNEs and is much less important in subsidiaries of 
Anglo-Saxon MNEs.  





Previous research on expatriate management often claims that expatriates play a role in 
realising an informal type of control. Thus far, however, no studies have conducted adequate 
empirical tests into this relationship. This study conducted such a test, finding that there is 
indeed a positive relationship between the level of expatriate presence and the level of both 
shared values between HQ and subsidiary managers and the informal communication 
between them. Including expatriate presence, improved models were constructed in order to 
explain the variance in the level of shared values and informal communication across 
subsidiaries. In addition, the level of informal control exercised towards a particular 
subsidiary could also be explained partly by the level of expatriate presence: the higher the 
percentage of expatriates in the workforce of a subsidiary, the lower the levels of output 
control used towards this subsidiary. INFO controls appear to be seen as alternative ways of 
controlling subsidiaries.  
The last research question investigated the importance of various MNE characteristics in an 
attempt to explain performance differences between MNEs. The advantage of this study is 
that many of the characteristics that have been identified in previous literature as being 
important factors influencing performance were included in the research design, in order to 
answer the other research questions. This therefore allowed the study to assess the relative 
importance levels of different variables in explaining performance differences between 
companies, such as: country of origin, industry, size, interdependence, local responsiveness, 
knowledge flows, and the strategy and structure of the MNE. 
The discussion section of the thesis can be summarised as follows. 
8.2 MNEs characteristics: the effect of country of origin  
Country of origin was shown to be very important. Even when considering other variables—
as was done with the help of linear and logistic regression analysis—country of origin was 
found to have high explanatory power. If we look at the main subject of this thesis—the 
headquarter-subsidiary relationship and control portfolios—we find strong differences 
between MNEs headquartered in different countries in terms of the application of the various 
control mechanisms. In addition, some of the relationships between other headquarter and/or 
subsidiary characteristics and control mechanisms differ between countries. The direction of 
the relationship between MNE size and both personal centralised control and bureaucratic 
formalised control, for instance, differs between countries. The effect of culture/society will 





be particularly strong in micro-level organisation processes relating to authority, style, 
conduct, participation and attitudes. Control mechanisms would be a good example of a 
micro-level organisation process.  
The overall conclusion that can be drawn from these observations is that, in studies relating to 
control mechanisms—as well as many other micro-level subjects—in the context of MNEs, 
the country of origin of the MNE should be given due emphasis in the research design. It 
would not seem very useful to select a large enough number of countries to randomise the 
variance on non-matched cultural/societal variables; rather, researchers are recommended to 
focus on conducting a comparison across a well-motivated selection of a limited number of 
countries to ensure that sample sizes per country are large enough to separate the effect of 
country of origin from other effects under investigation. Since there is some indication that 
contingency relationships are socially/culturally determined as well, it would also not seem 
very useful to investigate contingency relationships across a large number of different 
countries without anticipating the possibility of a country-by-country analysis in advance. We 
explain the recommendations for future research later.  
Furthermore, it has also been reported in the literature that firms commonly exercise control 
by means of non-measurable cultural bindings, commonly referred to as control by informal 
and social means (Ferner, 1997). In this regard, HQs can strategise to do so, such as by 
positioning a sizeable number of managers from home within the subsidiary. Our results 
show this to be true; it seems that their presence has positive and significant effects on most 
levels of control—personal, output, bureaucratic and informal. Contrary to this, however, we 
found that the presence of a sizeable number of expatriates (as opposed to HQ managers) 
leads to greater autonomy in subsidiaries. These results provide us with insights into the fact 
that two opposing forces are at play in subsidiaries: one exerted by managers from the home 
country who are loyal to implementing the ways of the HQ, and the other exerted by 
expatriates who, possibly as a result of being on fixed-term assignments, speak their minds 
and bond better with local employees, providing them with either an actual or perhaps 
imaginary sense of well-being and freedom. 
8.3 Contributions to Theory  
 
This research provides important contributions and novel insights into the growing body of 
research that has sought to examine and understand control mechanisms in MNEs’ 





relationships. The major theoretical contribution of this study is the development of a novel, 
holistic conceptual framework for control mechanisms in the HQ–subsidiary relationship, as 
proposed in Figure 4.1. As noted in Section 2.1, there is a lack of research offering a holistic 
and thorough examination and analysis of the key factors that facilitate or inhibit a 
company’s success through control. Thus, this integrative and coherent framework is 
particularly important as it focuses on more than one or two control mechanisms. 
Furthermore, non-US MNEs were included in the empirical part of the study.  
 
Several theoretical contributions emerge from this research. First, to the knowledge of the 
researcher, this research is the first empirical work to synthesise concepts from two main 
theories: agency theory and resource dependence theory (RDT). The results show that the 
characteristics of HQ–subsidiary mechanisms could be linked to agency theory (with the 
‘classical’ principal–agent relationship as its core) and to RDT (implying relations between 
the subsidiary and other partners based on interdependence). The results of the present study 
indeed show that the agency and RDT mechanisms are used alongside and complementary to 
one another. The study’s model for HQ–subsidiary mechanisms explains the relationships 
between the four kinds of mechanisms that were identified in the study. Control (as an agency 
mechanism) provides a solid platform on which other mechanisms can be built. The 
complementarities of these control mechanisms may reinforce earlier studies that show that 
successful organisations combine tight control with more open, informal and flexible 
information and communication systems (e.g. Chenhall & Morris, 1995). 
 
Second, the study provides a valuable contribution to our understanding of the complex 
mechanisms of HQ–subsidiary relationships, with particular reference to the culturally rich 
Middle Eastern region. To the best knowledge of the researcher, this is the first time such a 
theoretical framework has been tested empirically and theoretically in the context of KSA.  
 
Third, many previous studies have focused on MNEs from one country of origin (usually the 
US) and have investigated subsidiary operations in only one or two countries. This study 
explicitly addressed these boundaries by identifying and including a full range of control 
mechanisms and predictor variables. In addition, MNE headquarters in a range of different 
countries and subsidiaries located in one country were included in the study. 
 





Finally, a key combination relates to the fact that the findings provide empirical evidence 
from a relatively new cultural context, taking into account the fact that most prior studies 
have taken place in the US and other Western countries. This is the first study to report on 
control mechanisms and HQ–subsidiary relationships in MNEs in the Middle East, which 
adds value to the existing literature.  
 
8.4 Methodological Contribution  
The contribution of this study in terms of methodology is that this research is one of a few 
studies to test control mechanism variables outside the Western cultural setup, specifically in 
the Middle East. The research has filled gaps in global investigations by testing predictor 
variables in cross-cultural work settings, which may be useful for generalising these 
predictors. The study’s examination of predictor variables in KSA could provide additional 
insights into the extant literature, as KSA people and their cultural backgrounds are 
substantially different from those of Western countries (Niemeier et al., 1998).  
Moreover, numerous authors (e.g. Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1987; Jaeger & Baliga, 2006; 
Merchant, 1996; Nohria & Ghoshal, 1997; Birkinshaw & Hood, 1998) have pointed to the 
fact that international transfers can foster socialisation in a company’s culture, either for the 
internationally transferred manager or for the company as a whole. Despite the popularity of 
this concept, there is little empirical evidence about how international transfers can form an 
important indirect control mechanism, including the often referred to but never systematically 
investigated role of expatriate managers. This finding of this study provides a key 
contribution.  
 
The study’s methodological contribution can be summarised as follows:  
 Provides a solid theoretical foundation by reviewing contributions in the field of 
organisation studies and expatriate management, in addition to international 
management literature. 
 Included different nationalities of MNEs in the sample. 
 Investigated subsidiaries in a new context (the Middle East) and in more than one or 
two countries. 





 Questioned subsidiary managers instead of headquarter managers, in order to increase 
the accuracy of the answers and to diminish social desirability bias. 
 Resulted in a response rate that was higher than that of many other studies, so the 
sample size was relatively large.  
  
8.5 Practical Contribution 
 
Knowledge building in any field is gradual and cumulative, so the results of one single study 
can hardly be used to offer firm recommendations. This is even more the case in organisation 
research because the functioning of organisations is influenced by a multitude of factors, so 
any isolated advice may be of limited use. In spite of these reservations, some of the possible 
practical contributions of this study are provided below.  
The data clearly shows that MNEs from different countries often have different dominant 
control mechanisms and organisational models. This could partly be due to different industry 
distributions, but it is also at least partly related to cultural/societal differences between 
countries. It would be wise to consider these differences when searching for a partner in 
cross-national mergers and acquisitions. Failure to do so could hinder the successful 
operation of a merger that seems to be perfect from a financial and competitive point of view. 
In addition, the relationships between some of the explanatory variables and specific control 
mechanisms proved to be different for MNEs from different countries. This might lead MNEs 
in certain countries to prefer close personal control in situations of high risk or uncertainty. 
The common prescription in organisational theory for situations of high uncertainty is to 
decentralise operations, release strict personal control and rely on more informal control 
mechanisms. The results show, however, that this might be an example of the many US (or 
Anglo-Saxon) management prescriptions that cannot simply be transferred to other 
countries/cultures. MNEs that originate from countries with cultural/societal profiles that are 
markedly different from the profile of the US (in the sample: Japan, Germany and Middle 
Eastern countries) would, therefore, be wise not to accept the prescriptions of US 
management theorists and experts without questioning them. There is simply no ‘best way of 
management’ that is universally applicable across countries.  
Moreover, most MNEs differ in their application of control mechanisms for different types of 
subsidiaries. In the study, larger subsidiaries were more strongly controlled than smaller 
subsidiaries, especially through control by socialisation and networks. Subsidiaries that were 





highly integrated within the company network were also more strongly controlled, especially 
through the two direct control mechanisms (personal centralised control and bureaucratic 
formalised control), than their less-integrated counterparts. The reverse was true for 
subsidiaries that scored highly on local responsiveness. In addition, MNEs preferred direct 
control (output and informal) over direct (personal centralised and bureaucratic formalised) 
mechanisms for their subsidiaries located in KSA. These findings are consistent with the 
theoretical expectations. It would, therefore, not seem wise to take an undifferentiated 
approach to control; rather, it would be better to consider differences in subsidiary 
characteristics when deciding on the level and type of control exercised. A high level of 
control, especially of the direct type, might be very dysfunctional for relatively autonomous 
subsidiaries, whose main function is to be responsive to the local market. However, for 
highly integrated subsidiaries that play a crucial role in their MNEs’ integrated international 
production systems, a higher level of control might be needed and appropriate. Because of 
their importance, large subsidiaries might also need to be more strongly controlled. However, 
because of their generally higher levels of local resources and competences, a direct type of 
control is likely to be resisted. The less-obtrusive control by socialisation and networks might 
indeed be a better solution in this case.  
  
Next, we discuss the limitations of the study and directions for future research  
8.6 Limitations of the study and recommendations for future researchers 
Whichever form of organisational structure an MNE parent chooses to adopt, it ultimately 
boils down to a command structure in which power is exercised in order to achieve an end 
goal of reduced agency costs and maintained competitive position in the face of rivals, which 
is sine qua non for its long-term survival in the market. Our empirical work has proven some 
of the propositions found in the literature and has also put to test various additional ones for 
future research. 
The methodology adopted can be extended to other host countries. A useful extension would 
be to link different control mechanisms with the perceived and actual financial performance 
of subsidiaries. They can also be linked with the objectives and strategies of subsidiaries vis-
à-vis HQs. In a study of this nature, it could be researched whether inter-country differences 
exist between the control mechanisms of subsidiaries of the same parent operating in 





different host countries. Such a study would also account for the limitation that the present 
study was a one-country study. 
This summary expresses our overall view as to the direction of future research in this area. In 
addition to a discussion of the limitations of our study, the study offers various specific 
recommendations and issues that could be taken into account by other researchers in this 
field. 
Overall, the headquarters–subsidiary relationship is a fascinating area of research, and this is 
one of few studies of this nature conducted for the region of the Middle East—and the only 
one for the country of KSA.  
Now we will discuss the limitations of our study and offer some recommendations for further 
research. We would first like to indicate, however, which of the limitations apparent in many 
other studies have been remedied in our own study. As already referred to in some of the 
previous chapters, our study does not suffer from many of the ‘conventional’ limitations in 
this field of research. It avoids these by doing the following:  
  
(a) focusing on more than one or two control mechanisms; 
(b) including a whole range of predictor variables, instead of only one or two;  
(c) including different nationalities of MNEs in the sample; 
(d) explicitly dealing with the strategic aspects of MNE management; providing an 
integrated perspective on control mechanisms, including the often referred to but 
never systematically investigated role of expatriate managers; 
(e) providing a solid theoretical foundation by reviewing contributions in the field of 
organisation studies and expatriate management, in addition to international 
management literature; and 
(f) questioning subsidiary managers instead of headquarter managers, in order to increase 
the accuracy of information about the subsidiary. 
 





In spite of the fact that many limitations of previous studies have been remedied, our study 
does have its own limitations. These will be discussed in more detail below. Where 
applicable, we will include recommendations for further research. 
First, since we used a key-informant approach, our results are based on the opinions of a 
single respondent in each organisation: a limitation this study shares with virtually all large-
scale international studies. A solution to this problem might be to try and cooperate with key 
people within the various organisations, asking them to distribute questionnaires and 
convince their colleagues to co-operate. This approach, however, is very time intensive and 
does not remove the risk of low response rates. 
Second, since our study is cross-sectional rather than longitudinal, statistical correlations 
cannot unambiguously be interpreted as causal relationships. We tried to alleviate this 
problem by including an extensive literature review to motivate the hypothesised causal 
relationships tested in our study. However, a true test of the causality of the relationships 
tested in this thesis can only be offered by qualitative or longitudinal research. 
Third, because of our emphasis on generalisability and the method of data collection—
questionnaires with closed-ended questions—our results mainly focus on outcomes. The 
actual process underlying many of the relationships has remained a black box. For instance, 
now that the role of international transfers in achieving an informal type of control has been 
empirically confirmed on a large scale, more detailed analysis by means of case studies, for 
instance, should give better insight into the way in which this process actually works. An 
important but potentially very difficult issue would be to distinguish between direct and 
indirect expatriate control. 
Fourth, in spite of the fact that our study has a much larger geographical spread than previous 
studies, some areas have been neglected. Although MNEs from Japan, China and South 
Korea were included in the survey, our study did not include any other Asian MNEs (e.g., 
from Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand and Malaysia). Malhotra et al. (2005) report 
that MNEs from developing countries in Asia show patterns that resemble Japanese firms 
concerning expatriation, control and structure. Since developments in this region have 
become increasingly important, including for the Western world, it would be worthwhile to 
include MNEs from other countries in this region in future studies. 





Fifth, this study, as with most of the other studies in this field, only included the application 
of control mechanisms by headquarters towards their subsidiaries. As Forsgren & Holm 
(2010: 421) rightly indicate: “if we adopt the view of the international firm as a multi-centre 
structure, it is relevant to broaden the question of control beyond the issue of conflict between 
the subsidiary’s local adaptation and the top management’s overall integration.” The 
behaviour of a subsidiary can have an effect not only at the local level but also for the whole 
or part of the MNE to which it belongs. Therefore, control issues within an MNE should not 
only consider the design of various control systems by headquarters but should also pay 
attention to the control exercised by powerful subsidiaries. This question also relates to the 
importance of distinguishing various subsidiary roles and the effect these roles may have on 
the level and type of control exercised towards and by these subsidiaries. The fact that the 
multi-centre or transnational firm is a rather new concept has led most researchers to focus on 
‘top-down’ control. Future research could try to remedy this limitation and include ‘bottom-
up’ or ‘lateral’ types of control. This is particularly important in further investigating the role 
of expatriates, since transfers from subsidiaries to headquarters, and from subsidiaries to 
other subsidiaries, are becoming more important.  
8.7 Implications for management 
Knowledge building in any field is gradual and cumulative, so the results of one single study 
can hardly be used to offer firm recommendations. This is even more the case since the 
functioning of organisations is influenced by a multitude of factors, so any isolated advice 
may be of limited use. In spite of these reservations, we will try to give some idea of the 
possible managerial implications of our research.    
First, our data clearly show that MNEs from different countries often have different dominant 
control mechanisms and organisational models. This could partly be due to different industry 
distributions, but it is also at least partly related to cultural/societal differences between 
countries. It would be wise to consider these differences when searching for a partner in 
cross-national mergers and acquisitions. Failure to do so could hinder the successful 
operation of a merger that seems to be perfect from a financial and competitive point of view. 
Although the difficulties in merging with Japanese companies might be apparent for most 
Westerns MNEs, there are also other ‘country combinations’ that might be less successful. In 
addition, the relationship between some of the explanatory variables and specific control 
mechanisms proved to be different for MNEs from different countries. This might lead MNEs 





in these countries to prefer close personal control in situations of high risk/uncertainty. The 
common prescription in organisational theory for situations of high uncertainty is to 
decentralise operations, release strict personal control and rely on more informal control 
mechanisms. The results show, however, that this might be an example of the many 
American (or Anglo-Saxon) management prescriptions that cannot simply be transferred to 
other countries/cultures. MNEs that originate from countries with a cultural/societal profile 
that is markedly different from that of the US (in our sample: Japan, Germany and Middle 
Eastern countries) would, therefore, be wise not to accept the prescriptions of American 
management theorists and experts without questioning. There is simply no ‘best way of 
management’ that is universally applicable across countries.  
Most MNEs also differ in their application of control mechanisms for different types of 
subsidiaries. In this study, larger subsidiaries were more strongly controlled than smaller 
subsidiaries, especially through control by socialisation and networks. Subsidiaries that were 
highly integrated within the company network were also more strongly controlled, especially 
through the two direct control mechanisms (personal centralised control and bureaucratic 
formalised control), than their less integrated counterparts. The reverse was true for 
subsidiaries that scored highly on local responsiveness. In addition, MNEs preferred direct 
control (output and informal) over direct (personal centralised and bureaucratic formalised) 
mechanisms for their subsidiaries located in KSA. These findings were consistent with our 
theoretical expectations. It would, therefore, not seem wise to take an undifferentiated 
approach to control; rather, it would be better to consider differences in subsidiary 
characteristics when deciding on the level and type of control exercised. A high level of 
control, especially of the direct type, might be very dysfunctional for relatively autonomous 
subsidiaries, whose main function is to be responsive to the local market. For highly 
integrated subsidiaries, however, that play a crucial role in their MNEs’ integrated 
international production system, a higher level of control might be needed and appropriate. 
Because of their importance, large subsidiaries might also need to be more strongly 
controlled. However, because of their generally higher level of local resources and 
competences, a direct type of control is likely to be resisted. The less obtrusive control by 
socialisation and networks might indeed be a better solution in this case.  
This thesis is an empirical investigation in to the control mechanisms of 
headquarters (HQ) exercised over their subsidiaries conducted with the help of 
primary data collected from 147 Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) operating in the 





kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA). This study attempted to create a foundation for 
explaining the characteristics of control mechanisms in the relations between MNE 
headquarters and their subsidiaries with many different variables 
In the first research question, we proposed that the characteristics of headquarters–
subsidiary mechanisms could be linked to agency theory (with the ‘classical’ 
principal–agent relationship as its core) and to resource dependency theory 
(implying relations between the subsidiary and other partners based on 
interdependence). Our results show that the agency and resource dependency 
mechanisms are indeed used side by side and complementary to each other to 
exercise control.  
The Headquarters–subsidiary model used in this study has four components of 
control in it: personal centralised control (PCC), bureaucratic formalised control 
(BFC), output control (OUT) and informal control (INFO). These controls (as an 
agency mechanism) provide a solid platform on which other mechanisms can be 
built. The complementarities of these control mechanisms may be linked to earlier 
studies that show that successful organisations combine tight control with more 
open, informal and flexible information and communication systems. A focus that 
bends too much towards formal control or too much towards informal control may 
threaten a company’s existence. Our research provides an empirical explanation for 
such.   
The second research question drew the aspect of international transfers into the 
picture and investigated the role of expatriates in controlling subsidiaries. It has 
been recognised that expatriates can form both direct and indirect means of control. 
In executing direct types of control, expatriates directly supervised decisions taken 
at subsidiaries. This role is particularly strong in Asia-Pacific countries and German 
MNEs, and is much less important in subsidiaries of Anglo-Saxon MNEs.  
Previous research on expatriate management often claims that expatriates play a role 
in realising an informal type of control. Thus far, however, no studies have provided 
adequate empirical tests into this relationship. This study provided such a test and 
showed that there is a positive relationship between the level of expatriate presence 
and the level of both shared values between headquarters and subsidiary managers 
and the informal communication between them. Including expatriate presence, 





improved models were constructed in order to explain the variance in the level of 
shared values and informal communication across subsidiaries. 
In addition, the level of informal control exercised towards a particular subsidiary 
could also be explained partly by the level of expatriate presence: the higher the 
percentage of expatriates in the workforce of a subsidiary, the lower the levels of 
output control used towards this subsidiary. Socialisation and network control 
appeared to be seen as an alternative way to control subsidiaries.  
The last research question investigated the importance of various MNE 
characteristics in an attempt to explain performance differences between MNEs. 
The advantage of this study is that many of the characteristics that have been 
identified in previous literature as being important factors influencing performance 
were included in our research design, in order for us to be able to answer the other 
research questions. This therefore allowed us to assess the relative importance levels 
of different variables in explaining performance differences between MNEs.  
Some limitations apparent in many other studies have been remedied in our own 
study. As already referred to in some of the previous chapters, our study does not 
suffer from many of the ‘conventional’ limitations in this field of research. 
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Appendix 1  
Survey Questionnaire 
 
SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE ON HEADQUARTER-SUBSIDIARY RELATIONS IN 
MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS (MNCS) BASED IN SAUDI ARABIA 
 
 
Dear Subsidiary Manager, 
 
I am writing this letter to ask for your support with my PhD studies in Business Management which I 
am at present conducting at Brunel University in the UK. I am studying the Headquarter-Subsidiary 
relationships of Multinational companies located in Saudi Arabia. 
 
The success of my thesis depends on your cooperation in this questionnaire. I will treat all information 
confidentially. When the study is completed, I will send you a copy of the findings. 
Thank you. 
 
I can be contacted on the following address:  
 
34 Alkhaleej area P.O. Box 63 e-mail: Jaithen.Alharbi@brunel.ac.uk 
Riyadh,  Saudi Arabia Tel:0569395443 
Jaithen Alharbi  
 
SECTION 1: BASIC INFORMATION 
 
 
1. Please indicate the home country of this subsidiary: 
 
USA___ (i) Britain ___ (ii) France___ (iii) Sweden__ (iv) Japan___ (v) China___ 
(vi) Swiss__ (vii) Australia__ (viii) Netherland (ix) Italy___ (x) Denmark_ (xi) Canada_ 
(xii) India___ (xiii) Singapor (xiv) South Korea_ (xv) UAE___ (xvi) Lebanon_ (xvii) Kuwait__ 
(xviii) Egypt___ (xix) Jordan___ (xx) Germany___ (xxi) Sweden___ (xxii) Others___  
 
2. Please indicate the industry in which this subsidiary is operating: 
 
















ix. Others ___     
 
3. Please indicate the function in which this subsidiary is operating: 
 
i. Marketing& Sales activities___  ii. Manufacturing operations___ iii. Services___ 
iv. Assembly___ v. Product design___ vi. Production___ 
vii. Research and Development___ viii. Country headquarters___ ix. Others , please indicate___ 
 
 
4. Please fill in the following: 
 
i. The year this subsidiary was established_________ 
ii. Total of employees in this subsidiary_________ 






iv. Total turnover of this subsidiary (latest year) _______  
 
5. Please tick the nationality of the Subsidiary Manager? 
 
i. Subsidiary manager: Saudi National ____ from HQ’s country ____ from third country____ 
 
 
ii. Please tick as appropriate regarding this subsidiary: 
 
i. This is a majority owned subsidiary(51% and above)____ 
ii. This is a minority owned subsidiary(less than 50%) ____ 
iii. This is a joint-venture _____ 
 
 SECTION 2: ROLE OF EXPATRIATES 
 
1. Please tick the role expatriates perform in this subsidiary: 
 
i. Improvising information and communication channels with headquarters or other subsidiaries of the 
group______ 
ii. Transferring specific technical or management knowledge from headquarters or other subsidiaries to 
this subsidiary______ 
iii. Ensuring a homogeneous corporate culture throughout the company as a whole _____ 
iv. Filling positions for which no local personnel is available in this country ______ 
v. Training the expatriate for future positions at headquarters or other subsidiaries ______ 
 
 
SECTION 3: HEADQUARTERS-SUBSIDIARY RELATIONS 
 
     1. Please rate the following with respect to your subsidiary company. Please tick the appropriate number 
on the scale (1 = low/little, 5 = high) 
   Low                    
High 
i.  The level of autonomy in this subsidiary to decide its own 
strategies....................... 
1 2 3 4 5 
























iv.  The degree of standardisation that HQ requires from this subsidiary....................... 1 2 3 4 5 
 
v.  The kind of rules and procedures that HQ exerts towards this 
subsidiary............... 
1 2 3 4 5 
vi.  The degree of output control that HQ exerts towards this 
subsidiary........................ 
1 2 3 4 
 
5 












viii. .To what extents have this subsidiary's executives participated in 












ix.  What has been the participation of this subsidiary's executives in training 























xi.  The level of informal communication between this subsidiary and 

















xii.  Please indicate to which extent the entrepreneurial Activity in this subsidiary is 













SECTION 4: PERFORMANCE 
 
 
1. Please rate the following with respect to this subsidiary. Please tick 
the appropriate number on the scale (1 = low/little, 5 = high) 
 
     
                      
High        Low 
i.  How do you rate this subsidiary’s performance over the past three years 



























iii.  This subsidiary’s performance over the past three years relative to other 


























2. Please evaluate this subsidiary performance in terms of following items. Please tick as appropriate on 
the scale (1=lower than expected, 5 = better than expected) 
















































iv.  Innovation................................................................................................................. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 








































SECTION 5: INTRA-COMPANY PURCHASE AND SALES & LOCAL PRESENCE AND 
RESPONSIVENESS 
1. Please give your best estimate of the percentage of purchases (incl. parts/semi-manufactured 
articles) 
 
                      









i. From headquarters in relation to the total amount of purchases of 
this subsidiary. 
     
ii. From other subsidiaries of the group in relation to the total amount 
of purchases of this subsidiary 
     
iii. Of this subsidiary that is sold or delivered to headquarters 
 
     
iv.  Of this subsidiary that is sold or delivered to other subsidiaries of 
the group. 
     
2. Please give your best estimate of the % of the following: 
 
                      









i. R&D incorporated into products sold by this subsidiary that is 
actually performed by this subsidiary 
     
ii. Company products sold by this subsidiary that have been 
manufactured (to any degree) by this subsidiary 
     
iii. Company products sold by this country that have been created 
or substantially modified for this market 
     
iv. Marketing for company products sold in this country that is 
consciously adapted to local circumstances 




SECTION 7:  INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY AND STRUCTURE 
 
 
1. Please indicate to what extent you agree with these statements.  Please tick the appropriate number 
on the scale (1 = Disagree, 5 = Agree) 
 
   Disagree  Agree 
i.  Our company's strategy is focused on achieving economies of scale by 












ii.  Our company can be adequately described as a loosely coupled and 












iii.  In our company, a typical subsidiary's main function is to deliver company 












iv.  Our company can be adequately described as an integrated and interdependent 
network of different but equivalent subunits, in which headquarters does not a 


















v.  Our company not only recognises national differences in taste and values, but 
actually tries to respond to these national differences by consciously adapting 


















vi.  In our company subsidiaries regularly act as a strategic centre for a particular 













vii.   In our company, there are not only large flows of components and products, but 


















viii.  Our company's competitive position is defined in world-wide terms. Different 
national product markets are closely linked and interconnected. Competition 


















ix.  Headquarters’ competitive strategy is to let each subsidiary compete on a 
domestic level as national product markets are judged to be too different to 



















SECTION 8:  KNOWLEDGE FLOWS 
 
1.  Please indicate to what extent you agree with these statements.  Please tick the appropriate number on 
the scale (1 = Disagree, 5 = Agree) 
   Disagree      
Agree 
i.  This subsidiary possess some key strategic decision making authority concerning a 



























































vi.  The employees and managers in the Headquarters believe they have unique knowledge to 











vii.  The employees and managers in the HQ are able to explain the knowledge clearly when 






















Appendix 2  








Subject:  Participation in a survey questionnaire about studying 
Headquarter-subsidiary relations in multinational corporations (MNEs) based in Saudi 




I am writing to introduce my PhD study on “Headquarter-subsidiary relations in 
multinational corporations (MNEs) based in Saudi Arabia”. This research study is 
sponsored by the Higher Education Commission of Saudi Arabia. It i s  being carried 
out at Brunel Business School, Brunel University, UK. It has approval from a 
Business School Research Ethics Committee, Brunel University. 
 
This research involves completion of a questionnaire that comprises questions about 
home country of the company, age, size, control mechanism in the company, and its 
performance. The participants of this study include different subsidiary managers 
located in the KSA.   
 
In the hope that you are able to take part in this study and I am enclosing the consent 
form and the questionnaire. 
 
If you would like to discuss this with me in more detail please email/telephone me on 
the address/ telephone number given below. When the study is completed, I will send 
you a copy of the findings.  




PhD researcher, Brunel Business School,  
Brunel University  
116 Chadwick Building (1st Floor) Brunel University, Uxbridge Campus Uxbridge, Middlesex 
UB8 3PH 
Tel. Internal: 66902 External 0044 01895266902 






Appendix 3  
Research Consent Form 
 
 
Required for research involving human participants 
 
 
Title of Research: Headquarter-Subsidiary Relationship: An Empirical Study in the 
Country of KSA 
 




Contact Information: Jaithen.Alharbi@brunel.ac.uk   
 
Purpose of the Research: The purpose of this study is to carry out an empirically 
based examination of the types and degrees of control 
exerted by MNEs on their foreign subsidiaries located in 
KSA. 
 
What is involved in 
participating? 
 
I w i l l    ask   you   to   complete   the   following   
survey questionnaire signed below serves to signify 
that you agree to participate in this study. 
 
Your participation is voluntary and you can choose to decline to answer any question 
or even to withdraw at any point form the project. Anything you say will only be 
attributed to you with your permission: if not, the information will be reported in such 
a way as to make direct association with yourself impossible. 
 
Confidentiality also means that the questionnaire will be coded and stored in such a 
way as to make it impossible to identify them directly with any individual (e.g. they 




I wish to be identified in the report YES  NO 










APPENDIX 4  
Extra analysis for some variables 
  
Continent type and Control Mechanisms  
A one-way between subjects ANOVA was conducted to compare the effect of the continent 
type (America, Europe, Oriental, Middle East and Australia) on participants’ Control PCC 
score. There was a significant effect of Continent type on Participants’ Control PCC score at 
the p<.001 level for the five conditions [F(4,142)=5.42, p=0.000], the highest score was 
found for America (Oriental= 3.23, Europe=3.40, America=3.64, Australia=2.83; Middle 
east=2.58). Post hoc comparisons using the Bonferroni test indicated that the mean score for 
the America (M = 3.64) was significantly different (p<0.01) than the Middle East (M = 2.58). 
This result suggests that the type of continent does really have an effect on participants’ score 
on Control PCC. Specifically the results indicate that participants in American countries had 
the highest scores of control PCC followed by Europe. However both were only significantly 
different from the Middle East, but not significantly different from others. These results lend 
support to our first set of hypotheses.  
For the control BFC, there was a significant effect of Continent type on Participants’ Control 
BFC score at the p<.001 level for the five conditions [F(4,142)= 4.95, p=0.001], the highest 
score was found for Europe (Oriental= 4.37, Europe=4.02, America=3.76, Australia=4.64; 
Middle east=4.04).  
Post hoc comparisons using the Bonferroni test indicated that the mean score for the America 
(M = 3.76) was significantly different (p<0.01) than the Oriental (M = 4.37). These results 
suggest that the type of continent does really have an effect on participants’ score on the 
Control BFC. Specifically the results indicate that participants in Oriental countries had the 
highest scores of control BFC followed by Australia. 
As for the output control, there was no significant effect of continent type on Participants’ 
Control OUT score at the p<.001 level for the five conditions [F(4,142)=2.174, p=0.075], the 
mean score was (Oriental= 4.45, Europe=4.27, America=4.07, Australia=3.96; Middle 
east=4.02).  
 
For INFO control, there was a significant effect of Continent type on Participants’ Control 




score was found for Europe (Oriental= 4.49, Europe=4.04, America=3.90, Australia=3.95; 
Middle east=3.99).  
Post hoc comparisons using the Bonferroni test indicated that the mean score for the US (M 
=3.90) was significantly different (p<0.01) than the Oriental (M = 4.49). The results indicate 
that participants in Oriental countries had the highest scores of control INFO. And this is 
understandable as the relatively significant amount of social relationships and trust in 
Oriental societies becomes understandable, as trust and bonding are much stronger within 
Oriental societies than among US or Anglo-Saxon societies, leading to greater autonomy.  
Table of means and SD for the continent type with the control variables PCC, BFC, OUT and INFO   
Variables Continent type 
 America Europe  Asia  Middle East  Australia  
 M= SD M SD M SD M SD M SD 
PCC 3.64 .90 3.40 .98 3.24 .43 2.59 .94 2.83 1.42 
BFC 3.77 .65 4.03 .62 4.38 .55 4.04 1.1 4.64 .50 
OUT 4.07 .70 4.27 4.45 .64 .53 4.02 .82 3.96 .75 
INFO 3.90 .72 4.04 .69 4.48 .43 3.98 .78 3.95 .75 
Source: developed by researcher for the purpose of this study  
Continent impact on Interdependence and Local Responsiveness  
A one-way between subjects ANOVA was conducted to compare the effect of continent type 
(America, Europe, Middle East, Oriental and Australia) on interdependence score. There was 
no significant effect of Continent type on Interdependence score at the p<.001 level for the 
five conditions [F(4,142)=2.846, p=0.026], the mean score was (Oriental= 2.77, 
Europe=3.39, America=2.70, Australia=3.07; Middle east=2.6).  
There was a significant effect of Continent type on local responsiveness score at the p<.001 
level for the five conditions [F(4,142)=6.479, p=0.000], the mean score was (Oriental= 2.35, 
Europe=3.05, America=2.26, Australia=1.91; Middle east=2.70). Using the Bonferroni test 
indicated that the mean score for the US (M = 2.26) was significantly different (p<0.01) than 
the Europe (M = 2.58). Also a significant difference (p<0.01) was found between Europe (M 
= 3.05) and Oriental (M=2.35). These results suggest that the type of continent have an 
impact on MNEs on local responsiveness. And this is also support our hypotheses that the 








Continent type and interdependence and local responsiveness with Means and Standard deviations   
 
Source: developed by author for the purpose of the study  
Subsidiary manager and Control variables  
A one-way between subjects ANOVA was conducted to compare the effect of nationality of 
the manager (Saudi nationals, HQ national and third country national) on participants’ 
Control PCC score. There was no significant effect of nationality of the manager on 
Participants’ Control PCC score at the p<.001 level for the three conditions [F(2,144)=2.049, 
p=0.133], the highest (KSA= 3.12, HQ national= 3.42, Third country national=3.059).  
 
A one-way between subjects ANOVA was conducted to compare the effect of nationality of 
the manger (Saudi nationals, HQ national and third country national) on participants’ Control 
OUT score. 
There was a significant effect of nationality manager on participants’ Control OUT score at 
the p<.001 level for the three conditions [F(2,594)=5.177, p=0.007], the highest score was 
found for HQ nationality and the mean score was (KSA= 3.93, HQ national= 4.23, Third 
country national=4.05). This is also support our hypotheses.  
Post hoc comparisons indicated that the mean score for the Saudi National (M = 3.93) was 
significantly different (p<0.01) than the HQ nationals (M = 4.23). Also a significant 
difference (p<0.01) was found between Saudi National (M = 3.93) and the third country 




effect on participants’ score on Control INFO. Specifically the results indicate that HQ 
managers had the highest scores of control INFO followed by Saudi National.  
 
Table of the means for the different nationality groups with control variables  
 Nationality of the manger 
Variables Saudi N=50 HQ country N=58 Third Country N=39 
 M= SD M SD M SD 
PCC 3.12 1.16 3.40 .80 3.01 .95 
BFC 3.93 .76 4.13 .75 4.28 .64 
OUT 4.44 .68 4.08 .74 4.04 .52 
INFO 3.93 .70 4.24 .72 4.05 .65 
Source: developed by researcher for the purpose of this study 
 
Subsidiary mangers based on their continent type  
Source: developed by author for the purpose of the study  
Performance and nationality of manager   
A one-way between subjects Anova was conducted to compare the effect of nationality of the 
manger (Saudi nationals, HQ national and third country national) on participants’ perceived 
performance score. There was a significant effect of nationality manager on Participants’ 
perceived performance score at the p<.001 level for the three conditions [F(2,594)=9.48, 
p=0.000], the highest score was found for Saudi managers nationality and the mean score was 
(KSA= 4.21, HQ national= 3.69, Third country national=3.61).  
Obviously, as we found a statistically significant result in this example, we needed to 
compute a post hoc test. Post hoc comparisons using the Bonferroni test indicated that the 
mean score for the Saudi National (M = 4.21) was significantly different (p<0.01) than the 




National (M = 4.21) and the third country national (M=3.61). No significant difference was 
found with other comparisons (p>0.05). These results suggest that nationality of the manger 
does really have an effect on participants’ score on perceived performance. Specifically the 
results indicate that HQ managers had the highest scores of performance followed by Saudi 
National lending support to our hypothesis.  
Mean and standard deviation of the nationality of the subsidiary manger  
Nationality N Mean Std. Deviation 
Saudi National 50 4.2100 .64752 
HQ Country 58 3.6983 .81617 
Third Country 
National 
39 3.6154 .67093 
Total 147   
Source: developed by researcher for the purpose of this study 
 
Figure MNE Headquarters Country by Region of the World 
Source: developed by researcher for the purpose of this study 
Knowledge flows and Manager of the subsidiary   
A one-way between subjects ANOVA was conducted to compare the effect of nationality of 
the manger (Saudi nationals, HQ national and third country national) on knowledge flows 
score. There was a significant effect of nationality manager on the knowledge flows score at 
the p<.001 level for the three conditions [F(2,594)=5.117, p=0.007], the mean score was 
(KSA= 1.79, HQ national= 2.01, Third country national=1.677).  
Obviously, as we found a statistically significant result in this example, we should compute a 
post hoc test. We selected the Bonferroni post hoc test. Post hoc comparisons using the 




significantly different (p<0.01) than the third country national (M = 1.677). These results 
suggest that nationality of the manger does really have an effect on participants’ score on the 
knowledge flows. Specifically the results indicate that HQ managers had the highest scores of 
knowledge flows followed by Saudi National.  
 
Mean values and Standard Deviation for the Nationality of the manger with knowledge flows   
Nationality of the 
manager  
N Mean Std. Deviation  
Saudi National 50 1.79 .60 
HQ National 58 2.07 .65 
Third Country National 39 1.67 .63 
Source: developed by the researcher for the purpose of this study 
 
Performance and type of Subsidiary ownership  
A one-way between subjects ANOVA was conducted to compare the type of the subsidiary 
(Majority owned, Minority owned and Joint-Venture) on performance score. There was a 
significant effect of subsidiary type on the performance score at the p<.001 level for the three 
conditions [F(2,594)=7.76, p=0.001], the mean score was (Majority owned= 4.31, Minority 
owned = 3.67, JV=3.75).  
Obviously, as we found a statistically significant result in this example, we should compute a 
post hoc test. Post hoc comparisons using the Bonferroni test indicated that the mean score 
for the Majority owned (M= 4.31) was significantly different (p<0.01) than the Minority 
owned (M = 3.67). And the Majority owned (M= 4.31) was significantly different than the 
Joint venture (M=3.75) 
Tthese results suggest that subsidiary type does really have an effect on participants’ score on 
perceived performance. Specifically the results indicate Majority owned had the highest 
scores of perceived performance followed by Minority owned.  
Ownership  
Subsidiary type   N Mean Std. Deviation  
Majority owned 50 4.31 .59 
Minority owned 35 3.67 .82 
Joint-Venture  82 3.75 .73 
Total  147 3.85 .76 







Subsidiary ownership by the World Region 
Source: developed by author for the current study  
Role of the manager and PCC Control  
A one-way between subjects ANOVA was conducted to compare the effect of role of the 
manger (improvising information and communication, transferring specific technical 
knowledge, ensuring homogenous corporate culture, filling position with no local personnel, 
training the expatriate for future position) on participants’ Control PCC score. 
There was a significant effect of manager role on Participants’ Control PCC score at the 
p<.001 level for the five conditions [F(4,142)=4.146, p=0.003], the mean score (improvising 
information and communication=2.66, transferring specific technical knowledge=3.38, 
ensuring homogenous corporate culture=3.38, filling position with no local personnel=303, 
training the expatriate for future position=3.83).  
Because we have found a statistically significant result in this example, a post hoc test is 
needed. We selected the Bonferroni post hoc test. Post hoc comparisons using the Bonferroni 
test indicated that the mean score for the improvising information (M = 2.66) was 
significantly different (p<0.01) than training the expatriate (M = 3.83). Also a significant 
difference (p<0.01) was found between training the expatriates (M = 3.83) and Filling 
positions (M=3.03). No significant difference was found with other comparisons (p>0.05) 
these results suggest that the role of the manger does really have an effect on participants’ 





Role of the Manager and INFO Control  
A one-way between subjects ANOVA was conducted to compare the effect of role of the 
manger (improvising information and communication, transferring specific technical 
knowledge, ensuring homogenous corporate culture, filling position with no local personnel, 
training the expatriate for future position) on participants’ INFO Control score. 
There was a significant effect of manager role on Participants’ Control INFO score at the 
p<.001 level for the five conditions [F(4,142)=3.20, p=0.015], the mean score (improvising 
information and communication=3.87, transferring specific technical knowledge=3.80, 
ensuring homogenous corporate culture=4.14, filling position with no local personnel=4.14, 
training the expatriate for future position=4.50).  
We needed to compute a post hoc test. Post hoc comparisons using the Bonferroni test 
indicated that the mean score for the transferring technical knowledge (M = 4.14) was 
significantly different (p<0.01) than training the expatriate (M = 4.50). No significant 
difference was found with other comparisons (p>0.05). These results suggest that the role of 
the manger does really have an effect on participants’ score on Control INFO providing 
support to the hypothesis.  
Figure Expatriates role in the subsidiary 





Industry type and PCC 
A one-way between subjects ANOVA was conducted to compare the effect of the industry 
type (Petroleum and Chemicals, Electronics, electrical components and computers, motor 
vehicles and parts, paper, products and food, and others) on participants’ Control PCC score. 
There was a significant effect of the industry type on Participants’ Control PCC score at the 
p<.001 level for the five conditions [F(4,142)=3.572, p=0.008], the mean score was 
(Petroleum and Chemicals = 3.33, Electronics, electrical components and computers=2.69, 
motor vehicles and parts=3.96, paper , products and food=3.04, and others=3.29).  
Because we have found a statistically significant result in this example, we are required to 
compute a post hoc test. Post hoc comparisons using the Bonferroni test indicated that the 
mean score for the electronics and components (M = 2.69) was significantly different 
(p<0.01) than motor vehicles and parts (M = 3.96). Taken together, these results suggest that 
the industry type does really have an effect on participants’ score on Control PCC.  
Industry type and the different control variables  
 Industry type 








and food  
Others 
 M= SD M SD M SD M SD M SD 
PCC 3.33 .678 3.33 .678 3.33 .678 3.33 .678 3.33 .678 
BFC 4.11    .670 
 
4.34   .611 
 
3.5 .00 4.36 1.16 3.80 .25 
OUT 4.11 .70 4.43 .484 4.22 .26 4.34 .918 4.03 .65 
 
INFO 3.90 .64 4.52    .41 
 
3.78 1.0 4.27 .87 4.20 .50 
Performance  3.78 .67 4.21 .640 3.19 .52 4.04 .80 3.76 1.05 
Source: developed by author for current study  
Industry and INFO Control  
A one-way between subjects ANOVA was conducted to compare the effect of the industry 
type (Petroleum and Chemicals, Electronics, electrical components and computers, motor 
vehicles and parts, paper, products and food, and others) on participants’ Control INFO score. 
There was a significant effect of the industry type on Participants’ Control INFO score at the 
p<.001 level for the five conditions [F(4,142)=4.91, p=0.001], the mean score was 
(Petroleum and Chemicals = 3.90, Electronics, electrical components and computers=4.52, 




Bonferroni test indicated that the mean score for petroleum and chemcicals (M = 3.90) was 
significantly different (p<0.01) than electronics, electrical components and computers (M = 
4.52). Taken together, these results suggest that the industry type does really have an effect 
on participants’ score on Control INFO as electrical components and computers industry used 
IFNO control more than the petroleum and chemical industry which has been more controlled 
by the MNEs. 
MNEs by industry type and their World Region 
 
Source: Developed by researcher for current study 
 
Function of the subsidiary and PCC Control  
A one-way between subjects ANOVA was conducted to compare the effect of the function of 
the subsidiary (marketing and sales, manufacturing, country HQ, Assembly, services, product 
design and R&D) on prticipants’ Control PCC score. 
There was a significant effect of function type on Participants’ Control PCC score at the 
p<.001 level for the six conditions [F(5,141)=4.410, p=0.001], the highest score was found 
for Marketing and sales (marketing and sales = 2.94, manufacturing=3.30, country HQ=2.77, 
Assembly=3.85, services3.33, product design=3.97).  
A post hoc test is needed. This test is designed to compare each of function of the subsidiary 
other functions. Post hoc comparisons using the Bonferroni test indicated that the mean score 
for the Europe (M = 3.40) was significantly different (p<0.01) than the Middle east (M = 
2.58). Also a significant difference (p<0.01) was found between Oriental (M = 3.64) and the 




These results suggest that the type of continent does really have an effect on participants’ 
score on Control PCC. Specifically the results indicate that participants in Oriental countries 
had the highest scores of control PCC followed by Europe. However both were only 
significantly different from the Middle East, but not significantly different from others. 
Table for all the functions with different types of control  
 Subsidiary function  














N= 14  






.76 2.77 1.38 3.85 .170 3.30 .930 3.9 1.02 
BFC 3.96 .77 4.50 .00 4.33 .48 
 










4.55 .43 3.8 1.05 4.18 .61 4.5 .33 









Source: developed by author for current study 
Performance and Industry   
A one-way between subjects ANOVA was conducted to compare the effect of the industry 
type (Petroleum and Chemicals, Electronics, electrical components and computers, motor 
vehicles and parts, paper, products and food, and others) on participants’ performance score. 
There was a significant effect of the industry type on Participants’ Control INFO score at the 
p<.001 level for the five conditions [F(4,142)=4.91, p=0.001], the mean score was 
(Petroleum and Chemicals = 3.90, Electronics, electrical components and computers=4.52, 
motor vehicles and parts=3.78, paper , products and food=4.27, and others=4.20).  
Bonferroni test indicated that the mean score for petroleum and chemicals (M = 3.90) was 
significantly different (p<0.01) than electronics, electrical components and computers (M = 
4.52). Taken together, these results suggest that the industry type does really have an effect 
on participants’ score on Control INFO as electrical components and computers industry used 
IFNO control more than the petroleum and chemical industry which has been more controlled 






DETAILED RESULTS FOR THE ONE-WAY ANOVA AND TUKEY 
MULTIPLE COMPARISON TESTS 
 
Table A.1. Hypothesis 10: One-way ANOVA Results for Mean Differences in Overall Performance by Home 
Country of the Subsidiary  
(I) Home Country  
of Subsidiary  
(J) Home Country  
of Subsidiary  
Mean  
Difference (I-J) 
p-value 95% CI- 95% CI+ 
USA 
  
Britain .728* .040 .015 1.44 





Switzerland -1.75* .000 -2.86 -.639 
Australia -.982* .003 -1.78 -.183 
Netherlands -1.75* .000 -2.86 -.639 
Lebanon -1.25* .035 -2.46 -.040 
Sweden 
  
Switzerland -1.38* .013 -2.60 -.149 
Netherlands -1.38* .013 -2.60 -.149 
Japan 
  
Switzerland -1.50* .002 -2.68 -.322 




Switzerland -1.75* .000 -2.93 -.572 
Australia -.982* .016 -1.87 -.092 




USA 1.02* .073 -.039 2.08 
Kuwait 2.00* .000 .557 3.44 
Egypt 2.25* .000 .807 3.69 
Australia 
  
Kuwait 1.23* .045 .013 2.45 
Egypt 1.48* .004 .263 2.70 
Netherlands 
  
Kuwait 2.00* .000 .557 3.44 
Egypt 2.25* .000 .807 3.69 
Canada Egypt 1.50* .033 .057 2.94 




Lebanon -1.75* .009 -3.27 -.229 
Jordan -1.25 .042 -2.48 -.020 












DETAILED RESULTS FOR THE ONE-WAY ANOVA AND TUKEY 
MULTIPLE COMPARISON TESTS 
Table A.2. Hypothesis 11: One-way ANOVA Results for Mean Differences in Overall Performance by Industry 
of the Subsidiary  
(I) Industry (J) Industry Mean 
Difference (I-J) 





Chemicals -.642* .004 -1.15 -.129 
Electronics / Electrical 
Equipment 
-.656* .043 -1.30 -.011 
Computers -1.66* .000 -2.67 -.639 
Paper -1.16* .000 -1.94 -.377 
Chemicals  
  
Computers -1.01* .033 -1.98 -.045 
Motor Vehicles and Parts .791* .030 0.043 1.54 





Computers -1.33* .007 -2.43 -.232 
Chemicals 1.01* .033 0.045 1.98 
Food / Beverages 1.33* .007 0.232 2.43 
Motor Vehicles and Parts 1.81* .000 0.651 2.96 
Others 1.24* .009 0.190 2.28 
Motor Vehicles  
and Parts  
  
Computers -1.81* .000 -2.96 -.651 
Paper -1.31* .001 -2.26 -.355 
Others Computers -1.24* .009 -2.28 -.190 
*. The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level. Source: Developed by researcher for current study 
 
ANOVA 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Control.PCC Between Groups 31.525 4 7.881 10.086 .000 
Within Groups 110.955 142 .781   
Total 142.481 146    
Control.BFC Between Groups 15.364 4 3.841 8.556 .000 
Within Groups 63.751 142 .449   
Total 79.116 146    
Control.OUT Between Groups 12.423 4 3.106 7.764 .000 
Within Groups 56.802 142 .400   
Total 69.224 146    
Control.INFO Between Groups 8.156 4 2.039 4.522 .002 
Within Groups 64.031 142 .451   
Total 72.187 146    
Performance.overall Between Groups 13.215 4 3.304 6.483 .000 
Within Groups 72.367 142 .510   
Total 85.582 146    




Within Groups 204.549 142 1.440   
Total 214.439 146    
Local.overall Between Groups 18.673 4 4.668 5.328 .001 
Within Groups 124.410 142 .876   
Total 143.082 146    
Strategy Between Groups 10.022 4 2.506 7.911 .000 
Within Groups 44.974 142 .317   
Total 54.996 146    
Knowledge.overall Between Groups 10.017 4 2.504 6.905 .000 
Within Groups 51.498 142 .363   
Total 61.515 146    
 




Dependent Variable (I) Years Subsidiary 
was Established 
(J) Years Subsidiary 















6-10 years .67816 .30341 .270 -.1870 1.5434 
11-15 
years 
-.18605 .28859 1.000 -1.0090 .6369 
16-20 
years 
.30189 .28259 1.000 -.5039 1.1077 
21-30 
years 
-1.16667* .37849 .025 -2.2459 -.0874 
6-10 years 
dimension3 
1-5 years -.67816 .30341 .270 -1.5434 .1870 
11-15 
years 
-.86421* .21240 .001 -1.4699 -.2585 
16-20 
years 
-.37627 .20417 .674 -.9585 .2059 
21-30 
years 




1-5 years .18605 .28859 1.000 -.6369 1.0090 
6-10 years .86421* .21240 .001 .2585 1.4699 
16-20 
years 
.48793 .18142 .080 -.0294 1.0053 
21-30 
years 




1-5 years -.30189 .28259 1.000 -1.1077 .5039 
6-10 years .37627 .20417 .674 -.2059 .9585 
11-15 
years 
-.48793 .18142 .080 -1.0053 .0294 
21-30 
years 




1-5 years 1.16667* .37849 .025 .0874 2.2459 
6-10 years 1.84483* .32416 .000 .9205 2.7692 
11-15 
years 
.98062* .31034 .019 .0957 1.8656 
16-20 
years 





6-10 years .10345 .22999 1.000 -.5524 .7593 
11-15 
years 
-.58140 .21875 .088 -1.2052 .0424 
16-20 
years 
.16981 .21420 1.000 -.4410 .7806 
21-30 
years 






1-5 years -.10345 .22999 1.000 -.7593 .5524 
11-15 
years 
-.68484* .16100 .000 -1.1440 -.2257 
16-20 
years 
.06636 .15476 1.000 -.3750 .5077 
21-30 
years 




1-5 years .58140 .21875 .088 -.0424 1.2052 
6-10 years .68484* .16100 .000 .2257 1.1440 
16-20 
years 
.75121* .13752 .000 .3591 1.1434 
21-30 
years 




1-5 years -.16981 .21420 1.000 -.7806 .4410 
6-10 years -.06636 .15476 1.000 -.5077 .3750 
11-15 
years 
-.75121* .13752 .000 -1.1434 -.3591 
21-30 
years 




1-5 years .25000 .28689 1.000 -.5681 1.0681 
6-10 years .35345 .24572 1.000 -.3472 1.0541 
11-15 
years 
-.33140 .23524 1.000 -1.0022 .3394 
16-20 
years 





6-10 years -.05747 .21709 1.000 -.6765 .5616 
11-15 
years 
-.19380 .20649 1.000 -.7826 .3950 
16-20 
years 
.27044 .20219 1.000 -.3061 .8470 
21-30 
years 
-.83333* .27081 .025 -1.6056 -.0611 
6-10 years 
dimension3 
1-5 years .05747 .21709 1.000 -.5616 .6765 
11-15 
years 
-.13633 .15197 1.000 -.5697 .2970 
16-20 
years 
.32791 .14609 .263 -.0887 .7445 
21-30 
years 




1-5 years .19380 .20649 1.000 -.3950 .7826 
6-10 years .13633 .15197 1.000 -.2970 .5697 
16-20 
years 
.46424* .12981 .005 .0941 .8344 
21-30 
years 




1-5 years -.27044 .20219 1.000 -.8470 .3061 
6-10 years -.32791 .14609 .263 -.7445 .0887 
11-15 
years 
-.46424* .12981 .005 -.8344 -.0941 
21-30 
years 




1-5 years .83333* .27081 .025 .0611 1.6056 
6-10 years .77586* .23194 .011 .1145 1.4372 
11-15 
years 
.63953* .22204 .046 .0064 1.2727 
16-20 
years 





6-10 years .19157 .23049 1.000 -.4657 .8488 
11-15 
years 
-.18346 .21923 1.000 -.8086 .4417 
16-20 
years 






-.55556 .28752 .553 -1.3754 .2643 
6-10 years 
dimension3 
1-5 years -.19157 .23049 1.000 -.8488 .4657 
11-15 
years 
-.37503 .16136 .215 -.8351 .0851 
16-20 
years 
.03275 .15510 1.000 -.4095 .4750 
21-30 
years 




1-5 years .18346 .21923 1.000 -.4417 .8086 
6-10 years .37503 .16136 .215 -.0851 .8351 
16-20 
years 
.40778* .13782 .036 .0148 .8008 
21-30 
years 




1-5 years -.22432 .21467 1.000 -.8365 .3878 
6-10 years -.03275 .15510 1.000 -.4750 .4095 
11-15 
years 
-.40778* .13782 .036 -.8008 -.0148 
21-30 
years 




1-5 years .55556 .28752 .553 -.2643 1.3754 
6-10 years .74713* .24626 .029 .0449 1.4493 
11-15 
years 
.37209 .23575 1.000 -.3002 1.0444 
16-20 
years 





6-10 years .13793 .24504 1.000 -.5608 .8367 
11-15 
years 
.17442 .23307 1.000 -.4902 .8390 
16-20 
years 
.36321 .22822 1.000 -.2876 1.0140 
21-30 
years 
-.87500* .30567 .048 -1.7466 -.0034 
6-10 years 
dimension3 
1-5 years -.13793 .24504 1.000 -.8367 .5608 
11-15 
years 
.03649 .17154 1.000 -.4527 .5256 
16-20 
years 
.22528 .16489 1.000 -.2449 .6955 
21-30 
years 




1-5 years -.17442 .23307 1.000 -.8390 .4902 
6-10 years -.03649 .17154 1.000 -.5256 .4527 
16-20 
years 
.18879 .14652 1.000 -.2290 .6066 
21-30 
years 




1-5 years -.36321 .22822 1.000 -1.0140 .2876 
6-10 years -.22528 .16489 1.000 -.6955 .2449 
11-15 
years 
-.18879 .14652 1.000 -.6066 .2290 
21-30 
years 




1-5 years .87500* .30567 .048 .0034 1.7466 
6-10 years 1.01293* .26179 .002 .2664 1.7595 
11-15 
years 
1.04942* .25063 .000 .3347 1.7641 
16-20 
years 





6-10 years .53448 .41196 1.000 -.6403 1.7092 
11-15 
years 






-.10377 .38369 1.000 -1.1979 .9903 
21-30 
years 
-.25000 .51390 1.000 -1.7154 1.2154 
6-10 years 
dimension3 
1-5 years -.53448 .41196 1.000 -1.7092 .6403 
11-15 
years 
-.63913 .28839 .283 -1.4615 .1832 
16-20 
years 
-.63826 .27722 .228 -1.4288 .1523 
21-30 
years 




1-5 years .10465 .39184 1.000 -1.0127 1.2220 
6-10 years .63913 .28839 .283 -.1832 1.4615 
16-20 
years 
.00088 .24633 1.000 -.7015 .7033 
21-30 
years 




1-5 years .10377 .38369 1.000 -.9903 1.1979 
6-10 years .63826 .27722 .228 -.1523 1.4288 
11-15 
years 
-.00088 .24633 1.000 -.7033 .7015 
21-30 
years 




1-5 years .25000 .51390 1.000 -1.2154 1.7154 
6-10 years .78448 .44014 .768 -.4706 2.0396 
11-15 
years 
.14535 .42136 1.000 -1.0562 1.3469 
16-20 
years 





6-10 years 1.07759* .32128 .010 .1614 1.9937 
11-15 
years 
.38953 .30559 1.000 -.4819 1.2609 
16-20 
years 
.87264* .29923 .041 .0194 1.7259 
21-30 
years 
.12500 .40078 1.000 -1.0178 1.2678 
6-10 years 
dimension3 
1-5 years -1.07759* .32128 .010 -1.9937 -.1614 
11-15 
years 
-.68805* .22491 .027 -1.3294 -.0467 
16-20 
years 
-.20494 .21620 1.000 -.8214 .4116 
21-30 
years 




1-5 years -.38953 .30559 1.000 -1.2609 .4819 
6-10 years .68805* .22491 .027 .0467 1.3294 
16-20 
years 
.48311 .19211 .130 -.0647 1.0309 
21-30 
years 




1-5 years -.87264* .29923 .041 -1.7259 -.0194 
6-10 years .20494 .21620 1.000 -.4116 .8214 
11-15 
years 
-.48311 .19211 .130 -1.0309 .0647 
21-30 
years 




1-5 years -.12500 .40078 1.000 -1.2678 1.0178 
6-10 years .95259 .34325 .063 -.0262 1.9314 
11-15 
years 
.26453 .32861 1.000 -.6725 1.2016 
16-20 
years 
.74764 .32271 .219 -.1726 1.6679 






.47115 .18374 .114 -.0528 .9951 
16-20 
years 
.87561* .17991 .000 .3626 1.3886 
21-30 
years 
.53704 .24097 .274 -.1501 1.2242 
6-10 years 
dimension3 
1-5 years -.81098* .19317 .000 -1.3618 -.2601 
11-15 
years 
-.33984 .13523 .131 -.7255 .0458 
16-20 
years 
.06463 .12999 1.000 -.3060 .4353 
21-30 
years 




1-5 years -.47115 .18374 .114 -.9951 .0528 
6-10 years .33984 .13523 .131 -.0458 .7255 
16-20 
years 
.40447* .11550 .006 .0751 .7338 
21-30 
years 




1-5 years -.87561* .17991 .000 -1.3886 -.3626 
6-10 years -.06463 .12999 1.000 -.4353 .3060 
11-15 
years 
-.40447* .11550 .006 -.7338 -.0751 
21-30 
years 




1-5 years -.53704 .24097 .274 -1.2242 .1501 
6-10 years .27395 .20638 1.000 -.3146 .8625 
11-15 
years 
-.06589 .19758 1.000 -.6293 .4975 
16-20 
years 





6-10 years -.59770* .20671 .044 -1.1871 -.0083 
11-15 
years 
-.44740 .19661 .244 -1.0080 .1133 
16-20 
years 
-.48607 .19252 .127 -1.0351 .0629 
21-30 
years 
.40476 .25785 1.000 -.3305 1.1400 
6-10 years 
dimension3 
1-5 years .59770* .20671 .044 .0083 1.1871 
11-15 
years 
.15030 .14471 1.000 -.2623 .5629 
16-20 
years 
.11163 .13910 1.000 -.2850 .5083 
21-30 
years 




1-5 years .44740 .19661 .244 -.1133 1.0080 
6-10 years -.15030 .14471 1.000 -.5629 .2623 
16-20 
years 
-.03868 .12360 1.000 -.3911 .3138 
21-30 
years 




1-5 years .48607 .19252 .127 -.0629 1.0351 
6-10 years -.11163 .13910 1.000 -.5083 .2850 
11-15 
years 
.03868 .12360 1.000 -.3138 .3911 
21-30 
years 




1-5 years -.40476 .25785 1.000 -1.1400 .3305 
6-10 years -1.00246* .22084 .000 -1.6322 -.3727 
11-15 
years 






-.89084* .20763 .000 -1.4829 -.2988 


















Control.PCC 101-500 36 2.7870 .88785 .14797 2.4866 3.0874 1.33 4.33 
501-1000 62 3.5054 .73859 .09380 3.3178 3.6929 2.33 5.00 
1001-5000 32 3.1042 1.35318 .23921 2.6163 3.5920 1.00 4.67 
5001-10000 12 3.6389 .90407 .26098 3.0645 4.2133 2.33 4.67 
10001-
15000 
5 2.6667 .00000 .00000 2.6667 2.6667 2.67 2.67 
Total 147 3.2245 .98787 .08148 3.0635 3.3855 1.00 5.00 
Control.BFC 101-500 36 3.9861 .83226 .13871 3.7045 4.2677 2.00 5.00 
501-1000 62 4.1774 .75257 .09558 3.9863 4.3685 3.00 5.00 
1001-5000 32 4.3906 .51953 .09184 4.2033 4.5779 3.50 5.00 
5001-10000 12 3.5833 .55732 .16088 3.2292 3.9374 3.00 4.50 
10001-
15000 
5 3.5000 .00000 .00000 3.5000 3.5000 3.50 3.50 
Total 147 4.1054 .73613 .06072 3.9854 4.2254 2.00 5.00 
Control.OUT 101-500 36 3.9583 .84832 .14139 3.6713 4.2454 2.50 5.00 
501-1000 62 4.1613 .64512 .08193 3.9975 4.3251 3.00 5.00 
1001-5000 32 4.5938 .48256 .08531 4.4198 4.7677 3.50 5.00 
5001-10000 12 4.2917 .39648 .11445 4.0398 4.5436 3.50 5.00 
10001-
15000 
5 3.5000 .00000 .00000 3.5000 3.5000 3.50 3.50 
Total 147 4.1939 .68858 .05679 4.0816 4.3061 2.50 5.00 
Control.INFO 101-500 36 3.9722 .63434 .10572 3.7576 4.1869 3.00 5.00 
501-1000 62 3.8763 .79441 .10089 3.6746 4.0781 2.67 5.00 
1001-5000 32 4.5104 .44789 .07918 4.3489 4.6719 3.67 5.00 
5001-10000 12 4.2500 .58818 .16979 3.8763 4.6237 2.67 4.67 
10001-
15000 
5 4.3333 .00000 .00000 4.3333 4.3333 4.33 4.33 
Total 147 4.0839 .70316 .05800 3.9693 4.1985 2.67 5.00 
Performance.overall 101-500 36 3.8889 .82255 .13709 3.6106 4.1672 2.75 5.00 
501-1000 62 3.6573 .75236 .09555 3.4662 3.8483 2.50 5.00 
1001-5000 32 4.2500 .57851 .10227 4.0414 4.4586 3.25 5.00 
5001-10000 12 4.1250 .48265 .13933 3.8183 4.4317 2.75 4.75 
10001-
15000 
5 2.7500 .00000 .00000 2.7500 2.7500 2.75 2.75 
Total 147 3.8503 .76562 .06315 3.7255 3.9751 2.50 5.00 
Interdependance.overall 101-500 36 2.5347 1.19546 .19924 2.1302 2.9392 1.00 5.00 
501-1000 62 3.0645 .99170 .12595 2.8127 3.3164 2.00 5.00 
1001-5000 32 3.3828 1.50668 .26635 2.8396 3.9260 1.00 5.00 
5001-10000 12 2.8958 1.37947 .39822 2.0194 3.7723 1.25 4.25 
10001-
15000 
5 2.7500 .00000 .00000 2.7500 2.7500 2.75 2.75 
Total 147 2.9796 1.21192 .09996 2.7820 3.1771 1.00 5.00 
Local.overall 101-500 36 2.5903 .99670 .16612 2.2530 2.9275 1.50 5.00 
501-1000 62 2.7097 1.02848 .13062 2.4485 2.9709 1.00 5.00 
1001-5000 32 2.5469 1.07095 .18932 2.1608 2.9330 1.25 4.25 
5001-10000 12 2.1458 .66108 .19084 1.7258 2.5659 1.00 3.75 
10001-
15000 
5 2.7500 .00000 .00000 2.7500 2.7500 2.75 2.75 




Strategy 101-500 36 2.8488 .79733 .13289 2.5790 3.1185 1.67 4.11 
501-1000 62 2.6846 .48503 .06160 2.5614 2.8078 1.56 3.67 
1001-5000 32 3.0069 .60985 .10781 2.7871 3.2268 2.33 3.89 
5001-10000 12 2.7222 .28623 .08263 2.5404 2.9041 2.11 3.00 
10001-
15000 
5 3.6667 .00000 .00000 3.6667 3.6667 3.67 3.67 
Total 147 2.8314 .61375 .05062 2.7314 2.9315 1.56 4.11 
Knowledge.overall 101-500 36 1.7262 .55526 .09254 1.5383 1.9141 1.00 2.57 
501-1000 62 2.1889 .55466 .07044 2.0481 2.3298 1.14 3.00 
1001-5000 32 1.2857 .42626 .07535 1.1320 1.4394 1.00 2.14 
5001-10000 12 2.4286 .57467 .16589 2.0634 2.7937 1.14 2.86 
10001-
15000 
5 1.4286 .00000 .00000 1.4286 1.4286 1.43 1.43 




 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Control.PCC Between Groups 15.861 4 3.965 4.447 .002 
Within Groups 126.620 142 .892   
Total 142.481 146    
Control.BFC Between Groups 8.540 4 2.135 4.296 .003 
Within Groups 70.575 142 .497   
Total 79.116 146    
Control.OUT Between Groups 9.702 4 2.425 5.786 .000 
Within Groups 59.523 142 .419   
Total 69.224 146    
Control.INFO Between Groups 9.583 4 2.396 5.434 .000 
Within Groups 62.604 142 .441   
Total 72.187 146    
Performance.overall Between Groups 14.435 4 3.609 7.203 .000 
Within Groups 71.147 142 .501   
Total 85.582 146    
Interdependance.overall Between Groups 13.122 4 3.281 2.314 .060 
Within Groups 201.316 142 1.418   
Total 214.439 146    
Local.overall Between Groups 3.427 4 .857 .871 .483 
Within Groups 139.655 142 .983   
Total 143.082 146    
Strategy Between Groups 5.965 4 1.491 4.319 .003 
Within Groups 49.032 142 .345   
Total 54.996 146    
Knowledge.overall Between Groups 22.693 4 5.673 20.751 .000 
Within Groups 38.822 142 .273   








Dependent Variable (I) Total Employees in 
this Subsidiary 
(J) Total 

















501-1000 -.71834* .19787 .004 -1.2826 -.1541 
1001-5000 -.31713 .22942 1.000 -.9713 .3371 






.12037 .45067 1.000 -1.1648 1.4055 
501-1000 
 
101-500 .71834* .19787 .004 .1541 1.2826 
1001-5000 .40121 .20554 .529 -.1849 .9873 
5001-10000 -.13351 .29781 1.000 -.9827 .7157 
10001-
15000 
.83871 .43900 .581 -.4131 2.0905 
1001-5000 
 
101-500 .31713 .22942 1.000 -.3371 .9713 
501-1000 -.40121 .20554 .529 -.9873 .1849 
5001-10000 -.53472 .31965 .966 -1.4462 .3768 
10001-
15000 
.43750 .45410 1.000 -.8574 1.7324 
5001-10000 
 
101-500 .85185 .31476 .076 -.0457 1.7494 
501-1000 .13351 .29781 1.000 -.7157 .9827 
1001-5000 .53472 .31965 .966 -.3768 1.4462 
10001-
15000 




101-500 -.12037 .45067 1.000 -1.4055 1.1648 
501-1000 -.83871 .43900 .581 -2.0905 .4131 
1001-5000 -.43750 .45410 1.000 -1.7324 .8574 





501-1000 -.19131 .14772 1.000 -.6125 .2299 
1001-5000 -.40451 .17128 .195 -.8929 .0839 
5001-10000 .40278 .23500 .887 -.2673 1.0729 
10001-
15000 
.48611 .33646 1.000 -.4733 1.4456 
501-1000 
 
101-500 .19131 .14772 1.000 -.2299 .6125 
1001-5000 -.21321 .15345 1.000 -.6508 .2244 
5001-10000 .59409 .22234 .084 -.0399 1.2281 
10001-
15000 
.67742 .32775 .406 -.2572 1.6120 
1001-5000 
 
101-500 .40451 .17128 .195 -.0839 .8929 
501-1000 .21321 .15345 1.000 -.2244 .6508 
5001-10000 .80729* .23864 .009 .1268 1.4878 
10001-
15000 
.89063 .33902 .096 -.0761 1.8574 
5001-10000 
 
101-500 -.40278 .23500 .887 -1.0729 .2673 
501-1000 -.59409 .22234 .084 -1.2281 .0399 
1001-5000 -.80729* .23864 .009 -1.4878 -.1268 
10001-
15000 




101-500 -.48611 .33646 1.000 -1.4456 .4733 
501-1000 -.67742 .32775 .406 -1.6120 .2572 
1001-5000 -.89063 .33902 .096 -1.8574 .0761 





501-1000 -.20296 .13566 1.000 -.5898 .1839 
1001-5000 -.63542* .15730 .001 -1.0840 -.1869 
5001-10000 -.33333 .21581 1.000 -.9487 .2821 
10001-
15000 
.45833 .30900 1.000 -.4228 1.3395 
 501-1000 
 
101-500 .20296 .13566 1.000 -.1839 .5898 
1001-5000 -.43246* .14093 .026 -.8343 -.0306 
5001-10000 -.13038 .20419 1.000 -.7126 .4519 
10001-
15000 
.66129 .30099 .296 -.1970 1.5196 
1001-5000 
 
101-500 .63542* .15730 .001 .1869 1.0840 
501-1000 .43246* .14093 .026 .0306 .8343 
5001-10000 .30208 .21916 1.000 -.3229 .9270 
10001-
15000 






101-500 .33333 .21581 1.000 -.2821 .9487 
501-1000 .13038 .20419 1.000 -.4519 .7126 
1001-5000 -.30208 .21916 1.000 -.9270 .3229 
10001-
15000 




101-500 -.45833 .30900 1.000 -1.3395 .4228 
501-1000 -.66129 .30099 .296 -1.5196 .1970 
1001-5000 -1.09375* .31134 .006 -1.9816 -.2059 





501-1000 .09588 .13913 1.000 -.3009 .4926 
1001-5000 -.53819* .16132 .011 -.9982 -.0782 
5001-10000 -.27778 .22133 1.000 -.9089 .3534 
10001-
15000 
-.36111 .31689 1.000 -1.2648 .5425 
501-1000 
 
101-500 -.09588 .13913 1.000 -.4926 .3009 
1001-5000 -.63407* .14453 .000 -1.0462 -.2219 
5001-10000 -.37366 .20940 .765 -.9708 .2235 
10001-
15000 
-.45699 .30868 1.000 -1.3372 .4232 
1001-5000 
 
101-500 .53819* .16132 .011 .0782 .9982 
501-1000 .63407* .14453 .000 .2219 1.0462 
5001-10000 .26042 .22476 1.000 -.3805 .9013 
10001-
15000 
.17708 .31930 1.000 -.7334 1.0876 
5001-10000 
 
101-500 .27778 .22133 1.000 -.3534 .9089 
501-1000 .37366 .20940 .765 -.2235 .9708 
1001-5000 -.26042 .22476 1.000 -.9013 .3805 
10001-
15000 




101-500 .36111 .31689 1.000 -.5425 1.2648 
501-1000 .45699 .30868 1.000 -.4232 1.3372 
1001-5000 -.17708 .31930 1.000 -1.0876 .7334 





501-1000 .23163 .14832 1.000 -.1913 .6546 
1001-5000 -.36111 .17197 .375 -.8515 .1293 
5001-10000 -.23611 .23595 1.000 -.9089 .4367 
10001-
15000 
1.13889* .33782 .010 .1756 2.1022 
501-1000 
 
101-500 -.23163 .14832 1.000 -.6546 .1913 
1001-5000 -.59274* .15407 .002 -1.0321 -.1534 
5001-10000 -.46774 .22324 .379 -1.1043 .1688 
10001-
15000 
.90726 .32907 .066 -.0311 1.8456 
1001-5000 
 
101-500 .36111 .17197 .375 -.1293 .8515 
501-1000 .59274* .15407 .002 .1534 1.0321 
5001-10000 .12500 .23960 1.000 -.5582 .8082 
10001-
15000 
1.50000* .34039 .000 .5294 2.4706 
5001-10000 
 
101-500 .23611 .23595 1.000 -.4367 .9089 
501-1000 .46774 .22324 .379 -.1688 1.1043 
1001-5000 -.12500 .23960 1.000 -.8082 .5582 
10001-
15000 




101-500 -1.13889* .33782 .010 -2.1022 -.1756 
501-1000 -.90726 .32907 .066 -1.8456 .0311 
1001-5000 -1.50000* .34039 .000 -2.4706 -.5294 





501-1000 -.52979 .24949 .354 -1.2412 .1817 
1001-5000 -.84809* .28928 .039 -1.6730 -.0232 
5001-10000 -.36111 .39689 1.000 -1.4929 .7707 
10001-
15000 






101-500 .52979 .24949 .354 -.1817 1.2412 
1001-5000 -.31830 .25917 1.000 -1.0573 .4207 
5001-10000 .16868 .37551 1.000 -.9021 1.2395 
10001-
15000 
.31452 .55354 1.000 -1.2639 1.8930 
1001-5000 
 
101-500 .84809* .28928 .039 .0232 1.6730 
501-1000 .31830 .25917 1.000 -.4207 1.0573 
5001-10000 .48698 .40305 1.000 -.6623 1.6363 
10001-
15000 
.63281 .57258 1.000 -.9999 2.2656 
5001-10000 
 
101-500 .36111 .39689 1.000 -.7707 1.4929 
501-1000 -.16868 .37551 1.000 -1.2395 .9021 
1001-5000 -.48698 .40305 1.000 -1.6363 .6623 
10001-
15000 




101-500 .21528 .56827 1.000 -1.4052 1.8357 
501-1000 -.31452 .55354 1.000 -1.8930 1.2639 
1001-5000 -.63281 .57258 1.000 -2.2656 .9999 





501-1000 -.11940 .20780 1.000 -.7120 .4732 
1001-5000 .04340 .24094 1.000 -.6437 .7305 
5001-10000 .44444 .33057 1.000 -.4982 1.3871 
10001-
15000 
-.15972 .47330 1.000 -1.5094 1.1899 
501-1000 
 
101-500 .11940 .20780 1.000 -.4732 .7120 
1001-5000 .16280 .21586 1.000 -.4527 .7783 
5001-10000 .56384 .31276 .735 -.3280 1.4557 
10001-
15000 
-.04032 .46104 1.000 -1.3550 1.2744 
1001-5000 
 
101-500 -.04340 .24094 1.000 -.7305 .6437 
501-1000 -.16280 .21586 1.000 -.7783 .4527 
5001-10000 .40104 .33570 1.000 -.5562 1.3583 
10001-
15000 
-.20313 .47690 1.000 -1.5630 1.1568 
5001-10000 
 
101-500 -.44444 .33057 1.000 -1.3871 .4982 
501-1000 -.56384 .31276 .735 -1.4557 .3280 
1001-5000 -.40104 .33570 1.000 -1.3583 .5562 
10001-
15000 




101-500 .15972 .47330 1.000 -1.1899 1.5094 
501-1000 .04032 .46104 1.000 -1.2744 1.3550 
1001-5000 .20313 .47690 1.000 -1.1568 1.5630 





501-1000 .16418 .12313 1.000 -.1869 .5153 
1001-5000 -.15818 .14277 1.000 -.5653 .2489 
5001-10000 .12654 .19587 1.000 -.4320 .6851 
10001-
15000 
-.81790* .28045 .041 -1.6176 -.0182 
501-1000 
 
101-500 -.16418 .12313 1.000 -.5153 .1869 
1001-5000 -.32236 .12790 .128 -.6871 .0424 
5001-10000 -.03763 .18532 1.000 -.5661 .4908 
10001-
15000 
-.98208* .27318 .004 -1.7611 -.2031 
1001-5000 
 
101-500 .15818 .14277 1.000 -.2489 .5653 
501-1000 .32236 .12790 .128 -.0424 .6871 
5001-10000 .28472 .19891 1.000 -.2825 .8519 
10001-
15000 
-.65972 .28258 .210 -1.4655 .1461 
5001-10000 
 
101-500 -.12654 .19587 1.000 -.6851 .4320 
501-1000 .03763 .18532 1.000 -.4908 .5661 










101-500 .81790* .28045 .041 .0182 1.6176 
501-1000 .98208* .27318 .004 .2031 1.7611 
1001-5000 .65972 .28258 .210 -.1461 1.4655 





501-1000 -.46275* .10956 .000 -.7752 -.1503 
1001-5000 .44048* .12704 .007 .0782 .8027 
5001-10000 -.70238* .17429 .001 -1.1994 -.2054 
10001-
15000 
.29762 .24955 1.000 -.4140 1.0092 
501-1000 
 
101-500 .46275* .10956 .000 .1503 .7752 
1001-5000 .90323* .11381 .000 .5787 1.2278 
5001-10000 -.23963 .16490 1.000 -.7099 .2306 
10001-
15000 
.76037* .24308 .021 .0672 1.4535 
1001-5000 
 
101-500 -.44048* .12704 .007 -.8027 -.0782 
501-1000 -.90323* .11381 .000 -1.2278 -.5787 
5001-10000 -1.14286* .17699 .000 -1.6476 -.6381 
10001-
15000 
-.14286 .25144 1.000 -.8599 .5741 
5001-10000 
 
101-500 .70238* .17429 .001 .2054 1.1994 
501-1000 .23963 .16490 1.000 -.2306 .7099 
1001-5000 1.14286* .17699 .000 .6381 1.6476 
10001-
15000 




101-500 -.29762 .24955 1.000 -1.0092 .4140 
501-1000 -.76037* .24308 .021 -1.4535 -.0672 
1001-5000 .14286 .25144 1.000 -.5741 .8599 
5001-10000 -1.00000* .27832 .004 -1.7936 -.2064 



















Control.PCC 1001-5000 17 2.7647 .86414 .20958 2.3204 3.2090 1.33 3.67 
5001-10000 41 2.7561 .93993 .14679 2.4594 3.0528 1.00 4.33 
10001-20000 4 2.6667 .00000 .00000 2.6667 2.6667 2.67 2.67 
200001-50000 37 3.3333 .92296 .15173 3.0256 3.6411 1.67 4.33 
More than 
50000 
48 3.7500 .88726 .12807 3.4924 4.0076 2.33 5.00 
Total 147 3.2245 .98787 .08148 3.0635 3.3855 1.00 5.00 
Control.BFC 1001-5000 17 3.8235 1.18508 .28742 3.2142 4.4328 2.00 5.00 
5001-10000 41 4.5488 .73997 .11556 4.3152 4.7823 3.00 5.00 
10001-20000 4 4.0000 .00000 .00000 4.0000 4.0000 4.00 4.00 
200001-50000 37 3.9595 .51879 .08529 3.7865 4.1324 3.00 4.50 
More than 
50000 
48 3.9479 .53831 .07770 3.7916 4.1042 3.00 5.00 
Total 147 4.1054 .73613 .06072 3.9854 4.2254 2.00 5.00 
Control.OUT 1001-5000 17 3.5294 .62426 .15141 3.2084 3.8504 2.50 4.00 
5001-10000 41 4.2561 .61362 .09583 4.0624 4.4498 3.00 5.00 
10001-20000 4 4.0000 .00000 .00000 4.0000 4.0000 4.00 4.00 






48 4.1042 .78522 .11334 3.8762 4.3322 3.00 5.00 
Total 147 4.1939 .68858 .05679 4.0816 4.3061 2.50 5.00 
Control.INFO 1001-5000 17 3.7647 .64296 .15594 3.4341 4.0953 3.00 4.67 
5001-10000 41 4.0732 .74354 .11612 3.8385 4.3079 2.67 5.00 
10001-20000 4 4.3333 .00000 .00000 4.3333 4.3333 4.33 4.33 
200001-50000 37 4.3153 .38447 .06321 4.1871 4.4435 3.67 4.67 
More than 
50000 
48 4.0069 .84911 .12256 3.7604 4.2535 2.67 5.00 
Total 147 4.0839 .70316 .05800 3.9693 4.1985 2.67 5.00 
Performance.overall 1001-5000 17 2.9706 .48317 .11719 2.7222 3.2190 2.50 3.75 
5001-10000 41 3.8110 .47362 .07397 3.6615 3.9605 3.00 4.50 
10001-20000 4 4.5000 .00000 .00000 4.5000 4.5000 4.50 4.50 
200001-50000 37 4.0203 .86478 .14217 3.7319 4.3086 2.75 5.00 
More than 
50000 
48 4.0104 .78204 .11288 3.7833 4.2375 2.75 5.00 
Total 147 3.8503 .76562 .06315 3.7255 3.9751 2.50 5.00 
Interdependance.overall 1001-5000 17 2.3824 1.08296 .26266 1.8255 2.9392 1.00 4.00 
5001-10000 41 2.8598 1.05482 .16474 2.5268 3.1927 2.00 5.00 
10001-20000 4 5.0000 .00000 .00000 5.0000 5.0000 5.00 5.00 
200001-50000 37 3.0743 1.16498 .19152 2.6859 3.4627 2.00 5.00 
More than 
50000 
48 3.0521 1.29438 .18683 2.6762 3.4279 1.00 5.00 
Total 147 2.9796 1.21192 .09996 2.7820 3.1771 1.00 5.00 
Local.overall 1001-5000 17 2.6765 .54317 .13174 2.3972 2.9557 2.00 3.50 
5001-10000 41 2.4207 .75299 .11760 2.1831 2.6584 1.50 3.75 
10001-20000 4 5.0000 .00000 .00000 5.0000 5.0000 5.00 5.00 
200001-50000 37 2.3514 .67562 .11107 2.1261 2.5766 2.00 4.00 
More than 
50000 
48 2.7188 1.23623 .17843 2.3598 3.0777 1.00 5.00 
Total 147 2.6003 .98996 .08165 2.4390 2.7617 1.00 5.00 
Strategy 1001-5000 17 2.5425 .32366 .07850 2.3761 2.7089 2.00 2.78 
5001-10000 41 2.6369 .74412 .11621 2.4020 2.8717 1.56 3.89 
10001-20000 4 4.1111 .00000 .00000 4.1111 4.1111 4.11 4.11 
200001-50000 37 3.0210 .41146 .06764 2.8838 3.1582 2.44 3.78 
More than 
50000 
48 2.8472 .54991 .07937 2.6875 3.0069 2.11 3.67 
Total 147 2.8314 .61375 .05062 2.7314 2.9315 1.56 4.11 
Knowledge.overall 1001-5000 17 2.2437 .21288 .05163 2.1342 2.3532 2.00 2.57 
5001-10000 41 1.7979 .62595 .09776 1.6003 1.9955 1.00 2.86 
10001-20000 4 1.0000 .00000 .00000 1.0000 1.0000 1.00 1.00 
200001-50000 37 1.9730 .66653 .10958 1.7507 2.1952 1.00 2.71 
More than 
50000 
48 1.8006 .69783 .10072 1.5980 2.0032 1.00 3.00 





 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Control.PCC Between Groups 27.528 4 6.882 8.501 .000 
Within Groups 114.953 142 .810   
Total 142.481 146    
Control.BFC Between Groups 11.434 4 2.858 5.997 .000 
Within Groups 67.682 142 .477   
Total 79.116 146    
Control.OUT Between Groups 13.368 4 3.342 8.496 .000 
Within Groups 55.857 142 .393   
Total 69.224 146    




Within Groups 67.936 142 .478   
Total 72.187 146    
Performance.overall Between Groups 17.208 4 4.302 8.934 .000 
Within Groups 68.375 142 .482   
Total 85.582 146    
Interdependance.overall Between Groups 23.565 4 5.891 4.383 .002 
Within Groups 190.874 142 1.344   
Total 214.439 146    
Local.overall Between Groups 27.421 4 6.855 8.417 .000 
Within Groups 115.661 142 .815   
Total 143.082 146    
Strategy Between Groups 10.864 4 2.716 8.739 .000 
Within Groups 44.133 142 .311   
Total 54.996 146    
Knowledge.overall Between Groups 6.237 4 1.559 4.006 .004 
Within Groups 55.278 142 .389   




























5001-10000 .00861 .25955 1.000 -.7315 .7487 
10001-20000 .09804 .50000 1.000 -1.3277 1.5238 
200001-50000 -.56863 .26363 .327 -1.3204 .1831 
More than 
50000 
-.98529* .25394 .002 -1.7094 -.2612 
5001-10000 
 
1001-5000 -.00861 .25955 1.000 -.7487 .7315 
10001-20000 .08943 .47130 1.000 -1.2545 1.4334 
200001-50000 -.57724 .20402 .053 -1.1590 .0045 
More than 
50000 
-.99390* .19134 .000 -1.5395 -.4483 
10001-20000 
 
1001-5000 -.09804 .50000 1.000 -1.5238 1.3277 
5001-10000 -.08943 .47130 1.000 -1.4334 1.2545 
200001-50000 -.66667 .47356 1.000 -2.0171 .6837 
More than 
50000 
-1.08333 .46824 .221 -2.4185 .2519 
200001-50000 
 
1001-5000 .56863 .26363 .327 -.1831 1.3204 
5001-10000 .57724 .20402 .053 -.0045 1.1590 
10001-20000 .66667 .47356 1.000 -.6837 2.0171 
More than 
50000 




1001-5000 .98529* .25394 .002 .2612 1.7094 
5001-10000 .99390* .19134 .000 .4483 1.5395 
10001-20000 1.08333 .46824 .221 -.2519 2.4185 





5001-10000 -.72525* .19915 .004 -1.2932 -.1574 
10001-20000 -.17647 .38366 1.000 -1.2705 .9176 
200001-50000 -.13593 .20229 1.000 -.7128 .4409 
More than 
50000 
-.12439 .19485 1.000 -.6800 .4312 
5001-10000 
 
1001-5000 .72525* .19915 .004 .1574 1.2932 




200001-50000 .58932* .15655 .002 .1429 1.0357 
More than 
50000 
.60086* .14682 .001 .1822 1.0195 
10001-20000 
 
1001-5000 .17647 .38366 1.000 -.9176 1.2705 
5001-10000 -.54878 .36164 1.000 -1.5800 .4825 
200001-50000 .04054 .36337 1.000 -.9956 1.0767 
More than 
50000 
.05208 .35929 1.000 -.9724 1.0766 
200001-50000 
 
1001-5000 .13593 .20229 1.000 -.4409 .7128 
5001-10000 -.58932* .15655 .002 -1.0357 -.1429 
10001-20000 -.04054 .36337 1.000 -1.0767 .9956 
More than 
50000 




1001-5000 .12439 .19485 1.000 -.4312 .6800 
5001-10000 -.60086* .14682 .001 -1.0195 -.1822 
10001-20000 -.05208 .35929 1.000 -1.0766 .9724 





5001-10000 -.72669* .18092 .001 -1.2426 -.2108 
10001-20000 -.47059 .34854 1.000 -1.4645 .5233 
200001-50000 -1.03816* .18377 .000 -1.5622 -.5141 
More than 
50000 
-.57475* .17701 .015 -1.0795 -.0700 
5001-10000 
 
1001-5000 .72669* .18092 .001 .2108 1.2426 
10001-20000 .25610 .32853 1.000 -.6807 1.1929 
200001-50000 -.31147 .14222 .301 -.7170 .0941 
More than 
50000 
.15193 .13338 1.000 -.2284 .5323 
10001-20000 
 
1001-5000 .47059 .34854 1.000 -.5233 1.4645 
5001-10000 -.25610 .32853 1.000 -1.1929 .6807 
200001-50000 -.56757 .33011 .877 -1.5089 .3738 
More than 
50000 
-.10417 .32640 1.000 -1.0349 .8266 
200001-50000 
 
1001-5000 1.03816* .18377 .000 .5141 1.5622 
5001-10000 .31147 .14222 .301 -.0941 .7170 
10001-20000 .56757 .33011 .877 -.3738 1.5089 
More than 
50000 




1001-5000 .57475* .17701 .015 .0700 1.0795 
5001-10000 -.15193 .13338 1.000 -.5323 .2284 
10001-20000 .10417 .32640 1.000 -.8266 1.0349 





5001-10000 -.30846 .19953 1.000 -.8774 .2605 
10001-20000 -.56863 .38438 1.000 -1.6647 .5275 
200001-50000 -.55061 .20266 .074 -1.1285 .0273 
More than 
50000 
-.24224 .19522 1.000 -.7989 .3144 
5001-10000 
 
1001-5000 .30846 .19953 1.000 -.2605 .8774 
10001-20000 -.26016 .36232 1.000 -1.2933 .7730 
200001-50000 -.24214 .15684 1.000 -.6894 .2051 
More than 
50000 
.06623 .14709 1.000 -.3532 .4857 
10001-20000 
 
1001-5000 .56863 .38438 1.000 -.5275 1.6647 
5001-10000 .26016 .36232 1.000 -.7730 1.2933 
200001-50000 .01802 .36406 1.000 -1.0201 1.0561 
More than 
50000 
.32639 .35996 1.000 -.7001 1.3528 
200001-50000 
 
1001-5000 .55061 .20266 .074 -.0273 1.1285 
5001-10000 .24214 .15684 1.000 -.2051 .6894 
10001-20000 -.01802 .36406 1.000 -1.0561 1.0201 
More than 
50000 
.30837 .15132 .434 -.1231 .7399 




50000 5001-10000 -.06623 .14709 1.000 -.4857 .3532 
10001-20000 -.32639 .35996 1.000 -1.3528 .7001 





5001-10000 -.84039* .20017 .000 -1.4112 -.2696 
10001-20000 -1.52941* .38562 .001 -2.6290 -.4298 
200001-50000 -1.04968* .20332 .000 -1.6295 -.4699 
More than 
50000 
-1.03983* .19585 .000 -1.5983 -.4814 
5001-10000 
 
1001-5000 .84039* .20017 .000 .2696 1.4112 
10001-20000 -.68902 .36349 .600 -1.7255 .3475 
200001-50000 -.20929 .15735 1.000 -.6580 .2394 
More than 
50000 
-.19944 .14757 1.000 -.6202 .2214 
10001-20000 
 
1001-5000 1.52941* .38562 .001 .4298 2.6290 
5001-10000 .68902 .36349 .600 -.3475 1.7255 
200001-50000 .47973 .36523 1.000 -.5617 1.5212 
More than 
50000 
.48958 .36112 1.000 -.5402 1.5193 
200001-50000 
 
1001-5000 1.04968* .20332 .000 .4699 1.6295 
5001-10000 .20929 .15735 1.000 -.2394 .6580 
10001-20000 -.47973 .36523 1.000 -1.5212 .5617 
More than 
50000 




1001-5000 1.03983* .19585 .000 .4814 1.5983 
5001-10000 .19944 .14757 1.000 -.2214 .6202 
10001-20000 -.48958 .36112 1.000 -1.5193 .5402 





5001-10000 -.47740 .33445 1.000 -1.4311 .4763 
10001-20000 -2.61765* .64429 .001 -4.4549 -.7804 
200001-50000 -.69197 .33970 .435 -1.6607 .2767 
More than 
50000 
-.66973 .32722 .425 -1.6028 .2634 
5001-10000 
 
1001-5000 .47740 .33445 1.000 -.4763 1.4311 
10001-20000 -2.14024* .60731 .006 -3.8720 -.4085 
200001-50000 -.21457 .26290 1.000 -.9642 .5351 
More than 
50000 
-.19233 .24655 1.000 -.8954 .5107 
10001-20000 
 
1001-5000 2.61765* .64429 .001 .7804 4.4549 
5001-10000 2.14024* .60731 .006 .4085 3.8720 
200001-50000 1.92568* .61022 .020 .1856 3.6658 
More than 
50000 
1.94792* .60336 .015 .2274 3.6684 
200001-50000 
 
1001-5000 .69197 .33970 .435 -.2767 1.6607 
5001-10000 .21457 .26290 1.000 -.5351 .9642 
10001-20000 -1.92568* .61022 .020 -3.6658 -.1856 
More than 
50000 




1001-5000 .66973 .32722 .425 -.2634 1.6028 
5001-10000 .19233 .24655 1.000 -.5107 .8954 
10001-20000 -1.94792* .60336 .015 -3.6684 -.2274 





5001-10000 .25574 .26034 1.000 -.4866 .9981 
10001-20000 -2.32353* .50154 .000 -3.7537 -.8934 
200001-50000 .32512 .26444 1.000 -.4289 1.0792 
More than 
50000 
-.04228 .25472 1.000 -.7686 .6841 
5001-10000 
 
1001-5000 -.25574 .26034 1.000 -.9981 .4866 
10001-20000 -2.57927* .47275 .000 -3.9273 -1.2312 
200001-50000 .06938 .20465 1.000 -.5142 .6529 
More than 
50000 
-.29802 .19193 1.000 -.8453 .2493 




5001-10000 2.57927* .47275 .000 1.2312 3.9273 
200001-50000 2.64865* .47502 .000 1.2941 4.0032 
More than 
50000 
2.28125* .46968 .000 .9419 3.6206 
200001-50000 
 
1001-5000 -.32512 .26444 1.000 -1.0792 .4289 
5001-10000 -.06938 .20465 1.000 -.6529 .5142 
10001-20000 -2.64865* .47502 .000 -4.0032 -1.2941 
More than 
50000 




1001-5000 .04228 .25472 1.000 -.6841 .7686 
5001-10000 .29802 .19193 1.000 -.2493 .8453 
10001-20000 -2.28125* .46968 .000 -3.6206 -.9419 





5001-10000 -.09437 .16082 1.000 -.5530 .3642 
10001-20000 -1.56863* .30981 .000 -2.4521 -.6852 
200001-50000 -.47854* .16335 .040 -.9443 -.0127 
More than 
50000 
-.30474 .15734 .548 -.7534 .1439 
5001-10000 
 
1001-5000 .09437 .16082 1.000 -.3642 .5530 
10001-20000 -1.47425* .29202 .000 -2.3070 -.6415 
200001-50000 -.38416* .12641 .028 -.7446 -.0237 
More than 
50000 
-.21037 .11855 .781 -.5484 .1277 
10001-20000 
 
1001-5000 1.56863* .30981 .000 .6852 2.4521 
5001-10000 1.47425* .29202 .000 .6415 2.3070 
200001-50000 1.09009* .29342 .003 .2534 1.9268 
More than 
50000 
1.26389* .29013 .000 .4366 2.0912 
200001-50000 
 
1001-5000 .47854* .16335 .040 .0127 .9443 
5001-10000 .38416* .12641 .028 .0237 .7446 
10001-20000 -1.09009* .29342 .003 -1.9268 -.2534 
More than 
50000 




1001-5000 .30474 .15734 .548 -.1439 .7534 
5001-10000 .21037 .11855 .781 -.1277 .5484 
10001-20000 -1.26389* .29013 .000 -2.0912 -.4366 





5001-10000 .44579 .17998 .144 -.0674 .9590 
10001-20000 1.24370* .34673 .005 .2550 2.2324 
200001-50000 .27072 .18281 1.000 -.2506 .7920 
More than 
50000 
.44310 .17609 .130 -.0590 .9452 
5001-10000 
 
1001-5000 -.44579 .17998 .144 -.9590 .0674 
10001-20000 .79791 .32683 .159 -.1341 1.7299 
200001-50000 -.17506 .14148 1.000 -.5785 .2284 
More than 
50000 
-.00269 .13268 1.000 -.3810 .3757 
10001-20000 
 
1001-5000 -1.24370* .34673 .005 -2.2324 -.2550 
5001-10000 -.79791 .32683 .159 -1.7299 .1341 
200001-50000 -.97297* .32839 .036 -1.9094 -.0365 
More than 
50000 
-.80060 .32470 .149 -1.7265 .1253 
200001-50000 
 
1001-5000 -.27072 .18281 1.000 -.7920 .2506 
5001-10000 .17506 .14148 1.000 -.2284 .5785 
10001-20000 .97297* .32839 .036 .0365 1.9094 
More than 
50000 
.17238 .13650 1.000 -.2168 .5616 
More than 
50000  
1001-5000 -.44310 .17609 .130 -.9452 .0590 
5001-10000 .00269 .13268 1.000 -.3757 .3810 




200001-50000 -.17238 .13650 1.000 -.5616 .2168 




Group Statistics for the HQ country  
 Home Country of 
Subsidiary N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Control.PCC 
dimension1 
USA 23 3.3623 .94769 .19761 
Japan 10 3.5000 .52705 .16667 
Control.BFC 
dimension1 
USA 23 3.9348 .58977 .12298 
Japan 10 4.7500 .26352 .08333 
Control.OUT 
dimension1 
USA 23 4.1957 .71889 .14990 
Japan 10 4.5000 .52705 .16667 
Control.INFO 
dimension1 
USA 23 3.9565 .79331 .16542 
Japan 10 4.3333 .35136 .11111 
Performance.overall 
dimension1 
USA 23 3.9783 .62574 .13048 
Japan 10 3.5000 1.05409 .33333 
Interdependance.overall 
dimension1 
USA 23 2.6413 1.13525 .23672 
Japan 10 2.2500 .26352 .08333 
Local.overall 
dimension1 
USA 23 1.9457 .59332 .12372 
Japan 10 2.2500 .26352 .08333 
Strategy 
dimension1 
USA 23 2.3333 .47849 .09977 
Japan 10 2.9444 .17568 .05556 
Knowledge.overall 
dimension1 
USA 23 1.6957 .71078 .14821 
Japan 10 2.4286 .30117 .09524 
 





Independent Samples Test 
 
Levene's Test for 
Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means 








Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
Control.PCC Equal variances 
assumed 




-.533 28.803 .598 -.13768 .25851 -.66655 .39118 










30.911 .000 -.81522 .14855 -1.11822 -.51221 










23.231 .188 -.30435 .22416 -.76780 .15911 










30.936 .068 -.37681 .19927 -.78326 .02963 
Performance.overall Equal variances 
assumed 







1.336 11.855 .207 .47826 .35796 -.30272 1.25924 
Interdependance.overall Equal variances 
assumed 




1.559 26.785 .131 .39130 .25096 -.12381 .90642 










30.929 .050 -.30435 .14916 -.60860 -.00010 










30.573 .000 -.61111 .11420 -.84415 -.37807 










30.999 .000 -.73292 .17617 -1.09222 -.37362 







Model Variables Entered Variables Removed Method 
dimension0 






a. All requested variables entered. 




Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
dimension0 1 .647a .418 .376 .78056 
a. Predictors: (Constant), (0,1), Control.OUT, Knowledge.overall, (0,1), Local.overall, Control.INFO, Performance.overall, 




Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 59.619 10 5.962 9.785 .000a 
Residual 82.862 136 .609   
Total 142.481 146    
a. Predictors: (Constant), (0,1), Control.OUT, Knowledge.overall, (0,1), Local.overall, Control.INFO, Performance.overall, 
Control.BFC, Interdependance.overall, Strategy 








t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) -.567 .601  -.943 .347 
Control.BFC -.164 .126 -.122 -1.298 .197 
Control.OUT .745 .161 .519 4.616 .000 
Control.INFO .188 .140 .134 1.346 .181 




Interdependance.overall -.388 .079 -.476 -4.895 .000 
Local.overall .665 .101 .667 6.562 .000 
Strategy -.135 .173 -.084 -.780 .437 
Knowledge.overall .173 .114 .113 1.511 .133 
(0,1) JAPAN .052 .285 .013 .182 .856 
(0,1) US .479 .213 .177 2.254 .026 







Model Variables Entered Variables Removed Method 
dimension0 






a. All requested variables entered. 




Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
dimension0 1 .722a .522 .487 .52736 
a. Predictors: (Constant), (0,1), Control.OUT, Knowledge.overall, (0,1), Local.overall, Control.INFO, Control.PCC, 




Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 41.293 10 4.129 14.848 .000a 
Residual 37.823 136 .278   
Total 79.116 146    
a. Predictors: (Constant), (0,1), Control.OUT, Knowledge.overall, (0,1), Local.overall, Control.INFO, Control.PCC, 
Performance.overall, Strategy, Interdependance.overall 








t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 1.845 .375  4.915 .000 
Control.PCC -.075 .058 -.100 -1.298 .197 
Control.OUT .631 .104 .590 6.064 .000 
Control.INFO .428 .088 .408 4.868 .000 
Performance.overall -.053 .079 -.055 -.669 .505 
Interdependance.overall -.081 .058 -.133 -1.397 .165 
Local.overall .082 .078 .111 1.051 .295 
Strategy -.460 .111 -.383 -4.160 .000 
Knowledge.overall -.178 .076 -.157 -2.330 .021 
(0,1) .441 .189 .151 2.338 .021 
(0,1) -.361 .143 -.179 -2.521 .013 













Model Variables Entered Variables Removed Method 
dimension0 







a. All requested variables entered. 




Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
dimension0 1 .841a .708 .686 .38564 
a. Predictors: (Constant), (0,1), Control.PCC, Interdependance.overall, Control.BFC, Knowledge.overall, (0,1), 




Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 48.999 10 4.900 32.948 .000a 
Residual 20.225 136 .149   
Total 69.224 146    
a. Predictors: (Constant), (0,1), Control.PCC, Interdependance.overall, Control.BFC, Knowledge.overall, (0,1), 
Performance.overall, Control.INFO, Local.overall, Strategy 








t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) .222 .297  .747 .457 
Control.PCC .182 .039 .261 4.616 .000 
Control.BFC .337 .056 .361 6.064 .000 
Control.INFO .076 .069 .078 1.102 .272 
Performance.overall .282 .053 .314 5.367 .000 
Interdependance.overall .259 .036 .456 7.144 .000 
Local.overall -.342 .049 -.491 -6.907 .000 
Strategy .184 .084 .164 2.186 .031 
Knowledge.overall .102 .056 .096 1.810 .072 
(0,1) .116 .140 .043 .828 .409 
(0,1) -.012 .107 -.007 -.116 .908 





















a. All requested variables entered. 




Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
dimension0 1 .758a .575 .543 .47512 





Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 41.487 10 4.149 18.379 .000a 
Residual 30.700 136 .226   
Total 72.187 146    
a. Predictors: (Constant), (0,1), Control.OUT, Knowledge.overall, (0,1), Local.overall, Control.PCC, Strategy, Control.BFC, 
Performance.overall, Interdependance.overall 








t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) .291 .366  .796 .428 
Control.PCC .070 .052 .098 1.346 .181 
Control.BFC .347 .071 .363 4.868 .000 
Control.OUT .116 .105 .114 1.102 .272 
Performance.overall -.033 .071 -.035 -.456 .649 
Interdependance.overall -.049 .052 -.084 -.938 .350 
Local.overall -.005 .071 -.008 -.076 .940 
Strategy .659 .089 .575 7.379 .000 
Knowledge.overall .022 .070 .020 .315 .753 
(0,1) -.131 .173 -.047 -.758 .450 
(0,1) .272 .130 .141 2.096 .038 
a. Dependent Variable: Control.INFO 
 
 
 
 
